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Recent accounting research suggests that auditor identification or familiarity with their 
clients may be an additional threat to auditor independence, which may be mitigated by a strong 
professional identity (King 2002; Bamber and Iyer 2007). However, social identity theory 
suggests that a strong professional identity will only be effective if it is highly salient and thus 
readily activated. Yet, professional identity salience is argued to have diminished in recent years 
(Warren and Alzola 2009). I examine if the level of professional identity salience moderates the 
positive association between auditor agreement with the client and client identity strength, or the 
negative association between auditor agreement with the client and professional identity strength. 
I address these research questions using two experiments completed by experienced 
professional auditors. In the first experiment with an ambiguous audit judgment task, I examine 
client identity strength and professional identity salience at two levels each and measure 
professional identity strength. Results show that auditors with stronger client identities agree 
more with the client, but only when professional identity salience is not heightened. I do not find 
that auditors with stronger professional identities agree less with the client, even when 
professional identity salience is heightened. In the second experiment with an unambiguous audit 
judgment task, I examine client identity strength at two levels when professional identity salience 
is not heightened. Results are inconclusive as to whether auditors with strong client identities 
differ in their agreement with the client, relative to auditors with weak client identities. 
My research contributes to literature on auditor identification and independence by 
demonstrating the importance of professional identity salience, not just professional identity 
strength, on auditor judgments. I also show that threats to auditor objectivity can arise from 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Professional regulations define good judgment for auditors as judgments “free of any 
influence, interest or relationship, in respect of the client’s affairs” (Institute of Chartered 
Accountants of Ontario 2006)
1
 and require auditors to be objective and maintain an attitude of 
professional skepticism or a questioning mind (Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) 1; 
Canadian Auditing Standards (CAS) 200). Auditors must be independent in both mind (fact) and 
appearance (Independence Standards Board (ISB) 2003; CAS 200) but whether either holds has 
been increasingly questioned since the highly publicized accounting scandals of Enron, 
WorldCom, and Waste Management.
2
 In the United States, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
(SOX) was enacted partly in response to perceived failures of the auditing profession. SOX 
regulations have been predominantly focused on restricting financial influences of the auditor-
client relationship to improve independence, which has also been the focus of accounting 
research (Frankel, Johnson, and Nelson 2002; Ashbaugh, LaFond, and Mayhew 2003; Kinney, 
Palmrose, and Scholz 2004; Li 2009). However, social identity theory (SIT) suggests that 
auditors’ identification with the client and their identification with the profession also play a role 
in influencing auditor independence (King 2002; Ashmore, Deaux, and McLaughlin-Volpe 2004; 
Bamber and Iyer 2007). Consequently, current accounting rules and standards may not 
adequately safeguard audit judgment against a lack of independence in fact.  
The purpose of this study is to investigate the effects of auditors’ identification with the 
norms, values, and attributes of the audit client (client identity) and their identification with the 
norms, values, and attributes of the accounting profession (professional identity) on audit 
                                                 
1
 This statement is similar to Rule 102 of the Code of Professional Conduct of the American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants (AICPA; 2005) 
2
 Independence and objectivity are commonly linked terms; “[I]ndependence refer[s] to an auditor’s ability to make 
audit judgments objectively (Bazerman, Morgan and Lowenstein 1997, p. 91). Independence refers to the objectivity 
of the decision being made or the relationship of the groups involved in the decision (Warren and Alzola 2009). 
 
2 
judgment. King (2002) finds that impaired objectivity arising from client familiarity is mitigated 
when auditors identify with an audit group. Bamber and Iyer (2007) find that auditors with 
stronger client identities agree with the client more but also find that agreement with the client 
decreases as professional identity strength increases.
3
 I address two broad research questions. 
First, when does a stronger client identity lead to more agreement with client? Second, when 
does a stronger professional identity lead to less agreement with client? 
Prior audit literature has not examined contextual factors that may moderate the influence 
of either client or professional identity strength on auditor judgment. SIT suggests that contextual 
factors are critical to understanding when an individual relies on a particular identity (Haslam 
and Ellemers 2005). Identity strength represents the degree of association between an identity 
and an individual’s underlying values and attributes (Forehand, Deshpande, and Reed 2002). SIT 
suggests that whether client or professional identity strength influences auditor judgment will 
depend critically on the salience of each identity (Ashforth, Harrison, and Corley 2008; LeBoeuf, 
Shafir, and Bayuk 2010). Identity salience represents the degree to which an identity is activated 
(Forehand et al. 2002) or stands out among other identities at a given moment and the most 
salient identity will guide behaviour (Ashforth and Johnson 2001; Haslam and Ellemers 2005). 
In the auditing context, Warren and Alzola (2009) argue that the likelihood that auditors’ 
professional identity will be most salient has diminished in recent years as the emphasis on client 
service, relative to serving the public, has increased. Although prior accounting research suggests 
that a strong professional identity can offset impaired objectivity from a strong client identity 
(King 2002; Bamber and Iyer 2007), the mitigating effect may be limited if professional identity 
salience is not sufficiently high. Increasing professional identity salience may be necessary to 
                                                 
3
 In the final chapter I discuss the reasons for differences in results, between my study and these prior studies, with 
respect to the effect of professional identity strength. 
 
3 
reduce the negative influence of a strong client identity and to increase the positive influence of a 
strong professional identity. 
I assume that a client’s identity will generally be highly salient as interactions with client 
personnel or working papers couched in terms of the client will call attention to the client’s 
identity. Given this assumption, I predict that professional identity salience will moderate the 
relationship between client identity strength and auditor agreement with the client, such that as 
client identity strength increases, auditor agreement with the client will increase more when 
professional identity salience is not heightened versus heightened. Professional identity salience 
will also moderate the relationship between professional identity strength and auditor agreement 
with the client, such that as professional identity strength increases, auditor agreement with the 
client will decrease more when professional identity salience is heightened versus not 
heightened.  
In addition, King (2002) and Bamber and Iyer (2007) have related client identity to 
having a long or familiar relationship with the client. Other accounting research, including 
Hackenbrack and Nelson (1996) and Blay (2005) demonstrate impaired auditor objectivity due to 
financial incentives. However, a strong client identity, and the potential increase in agreement 
with the client, can occur even when the auditor has minimal history with the client (Rousseau 
1998; Meyer, Becker and Van Dick 2006) or is independent of financial influence from the client 
(Haslam and Ellemers 2005). For example, “situated” client identity is created by situational 
cues that signal common interests or common fate/goals (Rousseau 1998) and does not require a 
long time period to develop. Independence frameworks and SOX rules attempt to restrict client-
auditor financial incentives and have begun to address concerns about familiarity; however they 
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do not acknowledge threats to independence that result from an auditor’s situated client identity. 
I examine situated client identity in this study. 
I address my research questions using two experiments where professional auditors are 
asked to evaluate a hypothetical client’s going concern assumption by reviewing company 
financial statements and two additional pieces of audit evidence that either support or refute the 
assumption. Although the case facts initially create ambiguity, the client believes it satisfies the 
going concern assumption and wishes to avoid any related note disclosure. Greater auditor 
agreement with the client, measured both before and after additional evidence is provided, is 
indicated by a more favourable going concern assessment. In the first study, the additional 
evidence continues to indicate ambiguity about the appropriate judgment and I compare the 
effect of (manipulated) low versus high client identity strength and (measured) professional 
identity strength on auditor judgments, for two different levels of professional identity salience. 
In the second study, the additional evidence unambiguously indicates that the client’s preference 
is unsupportable and I explore the effect of low versus high client identity strength on auditor 
judgments, when professional identity salience is not heightened.  
Consistent with my predictions, results from Study One show that there is a positive 
association between client identity strength and initial auditor agreement with the client, but only 
when professional identity salience is not heightened. I do not find support for my prediction that 
professional identity salience moderates the relationship between professional identity strength 
and initial agreement with the client. Results of Study One also show that professional identity 
salience moderates the relationship between client identity strength and final auditor agreement 
with the client. There is no evidence that the interactive effect between client identity strength 
and professional identity salience, on agreement with the client, differs across subsequent versus 
 
5 
initial agreement. Results of Study Two are inconclusive as to whether there is an association 
between client identity strength and subsequent revisions in auditor agreement with the client, in 
an unambiguous setting. 
My research contributes to the literature on social identity effects in auditing (Bamber 
and Iyer 2002; King 2002; Bamber and Iyer 2007; Suddaby, Gendron, and Lam 2009) as well as 
research on auditor independence in two ways. First, by separating the constructs of identity 
salience and strength, I illuminate how the auditor’s “independence in mind” is threatened by 
various dimensions of identification and their interaction. Although prior research demonstrates 
the importance of client and professional identity strength (King 2002; Bamber and Iyer 2007), 
the extent to which either of these identities influences auditors depends critically on their 
relative identity salience (Ashforth et al. 2008). Second, I demonstrate the effects of situated 
client identity (e.g. immediate but potentially temporary), which is distinct from client identity 
arising from familiarity and financial influence. While prior audit research has focused 
particularly on how familiarity and financial influence affect auditor independence, I 
demonstrate that situated identity can similarly hinder auditor independence. 
This research also has practical significance for auditors and audit firms. My results show 
that even if a professional identity is strong it may not be sufficient to mitigate impairment in 
objectivity from a strong client identity; the professional identity must also be highly salient. 
Furthermore, my first experiment demonstrates that the salience of professional identity can be 
readily heightened and focusing on ways to increase professional identity salience can improve 
auditor judgments. Finally, by differentiating client identity from familiarity and financial 
influence, I demonstrate a facet of client identity that has been the subject of little research but 
may pose a serious threat to auditor objectivity. 
 
6 
My research also contributes to identity research more generally. Few studies to date 
have examined both the salience and strength of identity (with the exceptions of Forehand et al. 
2002; Reed 2004) and even fewer have examined these constructs in the context of multiple 
identities (LeBoeuf et al. 2010). In particular, I am unaware of any empirical studies that 
explicitly test a setting in which two strong identities are simultaneously salient.  
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, I use psychology and 
accounting literature to examine how professional identity salience will moderate the 
relationships between client and professional identity strength and auditor judgments. In Chapter 
3, I develop my predictions and pose three research questions. In Chapter 4, I describe the 
research design for both studies. In Chapters 5 and 6, I discuss the results of Study one and Study 
two, respectively. In Chapter 7, I draw conclusions about the results of my thesis. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
 In this chapter, I review the existing psychology and accounting literature to examine 
how auditors’ identification with either their clients or the audit profession influences their 
willingness to support inappropriate or questionable client-preferred accounting treatments. In 
section 2.2, I introduce theories on identification that provide a basis for client and professional 
identity. In section 2.3, I contrast between deep structure and situated group identities. In section 
2.4, I examine the antecedents and outcomes of group identity strength. In section 2.5, I explore 
client and professional identity in further detail. In section 2.6, I describe how identity salience 
moderates the identity strength-behaviour relationship. In section 2.7, I examine how audit 
context ambiguity affects auditor judgments. I conclude this chapter in section 2.8. 
2.2 Social Identity Theory, Self-Categorization Theory, and Organizational Identification  
In this section I introduce theories from social psychology and organizational behaviour 
that provide the basis for prior accounting research and my research on client and professional 
identity. Social identity theory (SIT) and self-categorization theory (SCT) are closely linked, and 
both theories argue that it is natural for individuals to view the world as a collection of social 
groups to which one belongs or does not belong to, in order to cognitively process information 
and enhance esteem. Organizational identification (OI) research uses SIT to provide 
organization-specific theory on behaviour in work groups, which more directly applies to the 
audit setting. 
SIT describes a social identity as “that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives 
from their knowledge of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional 
significance of that membership” (Tajfel 1981, p. 255). SCT posits that people have a natural 
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desire or need to categorize the social environment into meaningful groups to help organize their 
thoughts and actions (Tajfel 1978). Categorization allows individuals to reduce cognitive effort 
by generalizing the characteristics of others based on group membership. SIT and SCT argue that 
by nature individuals “define and evaluate themselves in terms of the groups to which they 
belong” (Hogg and Abrams 2003, p. 412) and broaden their self concepts by associating or 
disassociating themselves with these groups (Ashforth et al. 2008).  
Prior research argues that individual behaviour is guided by this internal sense of 
belonging to in-groups and the need to maintain positive value from that social identity (Tajfel 
1978; Hogg and Abrams 2003; Ashforth et al. 2008). As will be discussed in greater detail later, 
research on identity has shown that while it is common to internalize identities, other identities 
may simply exist through affiliation and association. Identifying with groups is the result of a 
human desire to enhance self-esteem; “people identify to provide the basis for thinking of 
themselves in a positive light” (Ashforth et al. 2008, p. 335). Individuals categorize themselves 
as belonging to groups they perceive to be similar, they view out-groups as those that have 
dissimilar characteristics, and they use the magnitude of those similarities and differences to 
enhance the importance of their in-groups and deflate the importance of out-groups (Tajfel 1982) 
in order to maintain positive self-esteem (Perdue et al. 1990).  
OI research, while based on SIT, specifically examines behaviour in work groups as 
opposed to more general social groups. Seminal research in the organizational behaviour field by 
Ashforth and Mael (1989) developed the beginnings of OI as distinct from other organization-
relevant concepts such as organizational commitment. Over time, OI has shifted away from the 
SIT-specific focus on inter-group comparisons, of in versus out groups, by also examining intra-
group settings (Ashmore et al. 2004). Common organization and work-related groups studied in 
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the OI literature include the employer organization, divisions or departments of the firm, 
workgroups, and job/occupation/profession (see Ashforth 2001, p. 33).  
2.3 Deep-Structure versus Situated Identities 
In this section I describe two general forms of identity, which differ in the way that an 
individual comes to identify with the group of interest. Deep structure identity is the common 
form of identity, where an identity is formed and strengthened over time as the individual 
internalizes the norms and values of a particular group.  Situated identity develops more rapidly 
and does not require internalization; it does, however, require common interests, and often 
considerable interaction, between individual and group. As will be explained in section 2.5, the 
latter form may have important implications for auditors and the prevalence of client identities. 
Many researchers argue that self-categorization is at the heart of becoming identified (e.g. 
Turner 1987; Ashforth and Mael 1989; Ashforth 2001; Ashmore et al. 2004; Haslam and 
Ellemers 2005); that is, an identity does not exist until the individual acknowledges the group as 
self-defining (“I am X”) in some respect (Ashmore et al. 2004). The process of becoming 
identified is complete when group membership is included in one’s self-concept (Meyer et al. 
2006). Others argue that the above concept is but one form of becoming identified, which they 
refer to as self-defining identification (Pratt 1998; Meyer et al. 2006). Also, some researchers 
note that membership with an identified group does not require acceptance by, or real interaction 
with, any group members (Ashforth and Mael 1989; Ashmore et al. 2004).  
Self-defining identification is identification through emulation (Pratt 1998); an individual 
emulates prototypical group members and internalizes the group identity into her own self-
concept (“I am a part of X – I am becoming like X – I am X”). Another form of becoming 
identified is self-referential identification, which refers to identification through affinity (Pratt 
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1998); an individual identifies with a group because he perceives the affiliated group as having 
common features with his own self-concept (“I am like X”). Identification through emulation and 
affinity lead to deep structure identity and situated identity, respectively (Rousseau 1998; Meyer 
et al. 2006).  
Deep structure identities are developed over time as the individual internalizes the 
group’s norms and beliefs (Rousseau 1998; Meyer et al. 2006). Situated identities are created by 
situational or immediate environmental cues that signal common interests and can develop 
rapidly; however, they are more unstable and fleeting than deep structure identities and persist as 
long as the cues are present (Rousseau 1998; Meyer et al. 2006; Ashforth et al. 2008).  
Situated identities can be strengthened through common interests or common fate/goals 
(Rousseau 1998; Gaertner et al. 1999), interdependent tasks (Rousseau 1998), by encouraging 
cooperation and interaction (Gaertner et al. 1999), or by subtle cues/symbols that relate the role 
of the individual to the organization (Perdue et al. 1990; Rousseau 1998). These cues may 
include uniforms, a habitual location at the office, swiping a pass-card for office entry, slogans 
on clothes, and other mediums that promote the “we” of the organization (Rousseau 1998; 
Ashforth 2001; Meyer et al. 2006). In section 2.5 I return to these concepts and, in particular, I 
discuss deep-structure professional identity and situated client identity. 
2.4 Antecedents and Outcomes of Group Identity Strength 
In this section I describe how the strength with which an individual identifies with a 
particular group can have both positive and negative effects on behaviour or group outcomes. I 
also use SIT and OI theory to demonstrate that characteristics of the group, such as prestige, 
success, and image, contribute positively to identity strength. Typically, SIT and OI research 
refer to the extent to which an individual identifies with a group as the level of identification 
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(low to high); level of identification is synonymous with a more recent term, identity strength 
(weak to strong identity) (Forehand et al. 2002).
4
  
2.4.1 Identity Strength and Individual Behaviour 
Individuals view and treat in-group members more positively than out-group members 
(in-group bias) and may even discriminate against out-group members (out-group 
discrimination) (Ashforth and Mael 1989; Ashmore et al. 2004). A stronger identity leads to 
greater bias toward the in-group or against the out-group (Tajfel 1982). In-group or out-group 
bias contains both motivational and cognitive elements (Dovidio, Gaertner, and Validzic 1998). 
First, individuals are motivated to “maintain positive distinctiveness of the in-group relative to 
out-groups” (Glasford, Dovidio, and Pratto 2009, p. 417; Tajfel and Turner 1979). Second, 
cognitive processing of information changes (e.g. attention to detail, ease of information recall) 
as the referent identity changes (Brown, 2000; Maitner, Mackie, Claypool, and Crisp 2010) or as 
categorization of a group changes from in-group to out-group, or vice-versa (Dovidio et al. 1998; 
Dovidio, Pearson, and Orr 2008).  
Reducing in-group bias or out-group discrimination generally involves changing the 
categorization or identity of relevant groups. For example, individuals will display out-group 
discrimination when other group members are perceived to hail from a distinct out-group but will 
show in-group favouritism to the same group members when they perceive themselves to share a 
common identity with the other group members (Dovidio et al. 1998). Changing categorization is 
important because an individual’s identity strength is relatively enduring and stable (Forehand et 
al. 2002); thus, attempting to decrease identity strength is not likely to be successful. 
                                                 
4
 I use the term identity strength, as opposed to level of identification, to avoid confusion with the term identity 
salience, which I will describe in section 2.6. I also refer to prior research as defined in terms of antecedents and 
outcomes of identity strength, as opposed to level of identification used by prior researchers; such conceptualization 
does not change the theory or results demonstrated in prior literature. 
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Although a stronger group identity leads to greater in-group bias, OI research argues that 
this bias can be good or bad. Positive organizational outcomes include enhanced support and 
commitment, cooperation, enhanced positive evaluations of the organization, and adherence to 
group values and norms (Ashforth and Mael 1989) as well as increased effort, participation, and 
information sharing (Ashforth et al. 2008). Further, individuals interacting with other perceived 
group members are not only cooperative but expect the other person to be more cooperative, 
expect to agree with the other person, and strive to actively reach agreement (Ellemers and Rink 
2005; Haslam and Ellemers 2005). However, negative outcomes include unduly extending a 
benefit of the doubt to the group (Ellemers and Rink 2005), an inability to question the ethicality 
of organizational behaviour, and behaving unethically on behalf of the organization (Ashforth et 
al. 2008). Individuals may also perceive less need for intervening in questionable behaviour or 
suppressing dissenting remarks when group ideas/actions are questionable (Ashforth et al. 2008). 
2.4.2 Determinants of Identity Strength 
As suggested earlier, individuals identify with groups in an effort to enhance self-esteem 
(Perdue et al. 1990; Ashforth et al. 2008). Accordingly, a particular identity strengthens as the 
distinctiveness and prestige of the group (Ashforth and Mael 1989), the salience of out-group 
differences (Ashforth and Mael 1989), or the success of the group (Haslam and Ellemers 2005) 
increases. Identification can also increase as interpersonal interaction, similarity, liking, 
proximity (individuals located near each other), shared goals or threats, common history, or 
perceived shared fate with the group increases (Ashforth and Mael 1989).  
2.5 Client Identity and Professional Identity 
In this section I describe two specific organizational identities that are relevant to audit 
research; client identity and professional identity. It is common for an individual to possess 
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multiple identities in an organizational context. Prior research has demonstrated that client 
identity and professional identity are important, yet distinct, identities in an audit setting with 
opposing influences on independent and objective auditor judgments. However, prior accounting 
research has not closely considered how situated identity applies to the auditor-client 
relationship, which may expand the circumstances in which auditors develop strong client 
identities and expose auditors to greater risk of impaired independence. I conclude this section 
by contrasting the influence and importance of social identity vis-à-vis other factors, such as 
financial incentives, on auditor judgments. 
2.5.1 Multiple Identities 
Research in SIT and OI states that it is common for individuals to have multiple identities 
within a particular category, such as multiple work-related identities (Ashforth 2001; Ashforth 
and Johnson 2001; Ellemers and Rink 2005; Haslam and Ellemers 2005; Ashforth et al. 2008). 
Studies that examine multiple workplace identities include: organization versus workgroup 
(Richter, West, Van Dick and Dawson 2006; Meyer et al. 2006); organization versus profession 
(Russo 1998; Van Dick, Wagner, Stellmacher and Christ 2005; Brickson 2007); organization 
versus workgroup versus profession (Johnson, Morgeson, Ilgen, Meyer and Lloyd 2006); or 
organization versus client (Alvesson 2000). Research in accounting and law has also examined 
organizational identity versus professional identity (accounting: Iyer 1998; Bamber and Iyer 
2002; law: Gunz and Gunz 2007, 2008a) and client identity versus professional identity 
(accounting: Bamber and Iyer 2007; Suddaby et al. 2009; law: Gunz and Gunz 2008b). 
Russo (1998) indicates that having both professional and organization identities is natural 
for knowledge workers since they are regularly involved in their employer organization’s 
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activities but have gone through extensive education and training in their profession.
5
 While 
client identity has been studied less often, both Alvesson (2000) and Gunz and Gunz (2007, 
2008b) highlight that the relationship between service provider (e.g. consultant, lawyer, or 
auditor) and client can be as close as that of employee and employer and note the similarities 
between the role of auditor and consultant (Alvesson 2000) or accountant and lawyer (Gunz and 
Gunz 2007). Recent accounting research that surveyed professional accountants demonstrates 
that auditors possess both client and professional identities (Bamber and Iyer 2007) and even top 
level accountants, such as audit partners, have high commitment levels to both client and 
profession (Suddaby et al. 2009). Overall, this research shows that on average, auditors have a 
moderately strong client identity and a strong professional identity, and that these identities are 
distinct from each other. 
In this study I focus on client and professional (audit) identity. Client identity is defined 
as auditors’ identification with the norms, values, and attributes of the audit client. This varies by 
client organization but may relate to factors such as management philosophy and tone at the top, 
client performance and reputation, client personnel, extent of corporate social responsibility, 
political affiliations, or industry and product/service attributes. Professional identity is defined as 
auditors’ identification with the norms, values, and attributes of the accounting profession. 
Professional identification will align the norms, goals, and values of auditors with their 
professional obligations (Warren and Alzola 2009). The norms or values of the profession may 
include upholding or maintaining public duty, professionalism and ethics, professional 
skepticism, or objectivity. I focus on professional rather than audit firm identity because it is 
                                                 
5
 Alvesson (2000) distinguishes between knowledge-intensive firms and professional organizations: the latter 
encompasses the former but not vice versa since professional organizations contain aspects such as code of ethics 




argued that professional affiliation precedes, and is reflected in, organizational affiliation such as 
audit firm identity (Aranya, Pollock, and Amernic 1981; Bamber and Iyer 2002). Audit firms 
may endorse a mix of client and professional goals (Warren and Alzola 2009) while professional 
identity has consistent goals and norms for all auditors that focus on the profession.
6
 
2.5.2 Client versus Professional Identity Strength and Auditor Judgments 
The main obligation for auditors is to attest that the financial statements of their clients 
are not materially misleading, which requires objectivity in auditor judgment (Johnstone et al. 
2001). The discussion in the previous section suggests that it is desirable for auditors to possess a 
strong professional identity, in order to reinforce the need for objectivity. At the same time, 
auditors are best able to make objective audit judgments when they are independent from their 
clients (Kinney 1999). Although independence standards have not been formally codified, both 
the Independence Standards Board (ISB 2003) and American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (AICPA 2006) have provided conceptual frameworks for auditor independence, the 
definitions of which are often cited in academic literature.
7
 These concepts of independence 
require auditors to be independent from clients both in appearance and in mind (sometimes 
referred to as “in fact”). The former prohibits auditors from having certain financial or non-
financial relationships, or undertaking certain activities, with clients, that would lead investors to 
question auditors’ independence in mind. The latter requires auditors to maintain a mental state 
of independence, even if the factors that threaten independence are not apparent to third parties 
or auditors avoid the relationships and activities above.  
                                                 
6
 For example, an auditor with an audit firm that stresses efficiency could show bias toward the client by reducing 
the extent of testing. This would not contradict his or her firm’s goal of efficiency, but it could contravene the 
professional duty to gather sufficient, appropriate evidence. Audit firm identity can also vary by auditor if they 
derive their identity by comparing their firm to other audit firms. Nonetheless, Suddaby et al. (2009) demonstrate 
that auditors have moderate to strong organizational (audit firm) identities. Interestingly, auditors in their study with 
stronger organizational identities exhibited stronger client identities. 
7
 Two recent reviews of the literature on auditor independence can be found in Schneider, Church, and Ely (2006) 
and Gramling, Jenkins, and Taylor (2010). 
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The auditor is hired by the client but has a professional duty to serve the public interest; 
client and public interest may differ. Client firms desire financial statements that present the firm 
as an attractive investment, and information asymmetry between clients and investors can create 
a conflict of interest (fair presentation versus reporting to make the firm appear successful) for 
the client to exploit (Johnstone et al. 2001). When client and professional goals do conflict, it is 
not desirable for auditors to possess a strong client identity (Bamber and Iyer 2007). A strong 
client identity can exacerbate auditors’ conflict between serving their client’s self-interest and 
providing objective attestations about the fairness of financial statements. 
Gunz and Gunz (2007) argue that individuals bound by rules of professional conduct, 
such as lawyers (or accountants; Gunz and Gunz 2008b), are expected to provide advice that is 
uninfluenced by the nature of the professional-client relationship. Beyond independence 
frameworks, professional standards require it; International Standards on Auditing (ISA) 200 and 
240, SAS 99, CAS 200 & 240 all require auditors to maintain their attitude of professional 
skepticism regardless of their beliefs about management’s honesty and integrity that arise from 
past experiences with management.
8
 Bazerman et al. (1997) argue that, whether through 
expectations or regulation, the desired objectivity and independence in mind is difficult for an 
auditor to uphold because all individuals, including auditors, are susceptible to unintentional 
judgment bias due to self-serving biases. This bias can result from a close auditor-client 
relationship (Bazerman et al. 1997) or more particularly, a strong client identity (Bamber and 
Iyer 2007).  
However, King (2002) argues that auditors’ affiliations with accounting groups (e.g. 
engagement teams, audit firms, or profession) can protect auditors from this unconscious bias. 
                                                 
8
 SAS 99, ISA 240, and CAS 240 deal specifically with the auditor’s responsibilities related to fraud. ISA 200 and 
CAS 200 deal with the overall responsibilities of an auditor in conducting an audit. 
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King (2002) uses an experimental economics setting and finds that “auditor” bias due to 
increased client financial incentives and familiarity with a “client manager” (akin to client 
identity) is mitigated when they have a strong affiliation with other “auditors” participating in the 
experiment (akin to professional identity). Bamber and Iyer (2007) also demonstrate that 
(potentially unwarranted) auditor agreement with the client increases as client identity strength 
increases but decreases as professional identity strength increases. Thus, based on prior 
accounting research, the threat to independence and objectivity from a strong client identity 
should be mitigated for auditors with a strong professional identity. However, individuals with 
multiple identities tend to rely more heavily on the strength of one identity versus another, 
depending on contextual or environmental factors that activate one identity more than the other 
(Haslam and Ellemers 2005). Thus auditors may be at risk of impaired independence due to a 
strong client identity, and a strong professional identity may not effectively mitigate this 
impairment, in certain audit settings. This possibility is discussed further in the next section. 
2.5.3 Deep Structure Professional Identity and Situated Client Identity 
Professional identity tends to be deep structure in nature since the extensive training and 
education of the auditor reinforces and internalizes the norms and beliefs of the profession over 
time (Rousseau 1998; Warren and Alzola 2009). Prior audit research commonly describes client 
identity in terms of deep structure identity, as it refers to a setting with client familiarity and 
repeated client interaction over years of audit service (King 2002; Bamber and Iyer 2007; 
Suddaby et al. 2009).
9
 Concerns about negative outcomes arising from deep structure client 
identity have been raised by regulators and Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) rules and independence 
frameworks (ISB 2003) have attempted to address them. Researchers have heavily debated the 
                                                 
9
 Farmer, Rittenberg, and Trompeter (1987) refer to a similar process, acculturation, which includes an identification 
and internalization stage. However, they suggest that over an auditor’s career he or she may internalize client norms 
as opposed to professional norms; thus, once acculturated, the auditor would have a strong identity with any client. 
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effectiveness of one SOX rule, mandatory audit partner rotation, but empirical results to date are 
mixed. Carey and Simnett (2006) find that longer partner tenure leads to lower audit quality, 
which they attribute to closer partner-client relationships that could be avoided through auditor 
rotation. However, Chi, Huang, Liao, and Xie (2009) find no evidence that mandatory audit 
partner rotation enhances actual or perceived audit quality.  
However, theory suggests that situated client identity is no less prevalent than deep 
structure client identity but similarly can lead to impaired objectivity. The audit context may be 
particularly relevant for the existence of situated client identity given that “the financial 
statements and the auditor’s report are joint products” (Gibbins, Salterio, and Webb 2001; p. 
540); situated identities strengthen as common fate/goals or interdependency of tasks increases 
(Rousseau 1998). Situated identity is also common for individuals that concurrently work for 
multiple organizations on a regular basis (Rousseau 1998); auditors routinely work for a number 
of clients.  
Client image and importance are also important antecedents of client identity strength 
(Bamber and Iyer 2007). For situated identities, individuals perceive that the affiliated group’s 
identity has common features with their own self-concepts and may feel or want to be similarly 
associated with the group, but they do not necessarily internalize the identity (Pratt 1998). An 
auditor’s client identity can fit this form of identification well. An auditor is not likely to feel that 
he/she is a member of the client organization (internalized) and may not want to be a member of 
the client organization. However, an auditor may identify with a successful or reputable client in 
order to be similarly perceived by other individuals as successful and reputable (common interest 
or values).  
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2.5.4 Financial Incentives and Auditor Judgments 
It is important to acknowledge that in practice, in addition to non-financial factors such as 
client and professional identity, financial incentives may well influence auditor behaviour. Prior 
research demonstrates that auditors respond to financial incentives, both to favour the client (e.g. 
risk of losing client, future business potential, etc.) and to oppose the client (e.g. litigation risk) 
(Magee and Tseng 1990; Krishnan and Krishnan 1997; Blay 2005). Prior research also shows 
that auditors respond to social and ethical influences, both to favour the client (e.g. client 
identification and social pressure) and to oppose the client (e.g. professional identification and 
moral development) (Sweeney and Roberts 1997; Lord and DeZoort 2001; King 2002; Bamber 
and Iyer 2007). 
Financial incentives may exacerbate the negative implications of client identity; they may 
also mitigate these negative implications. While interesting, exploring how financial incentives 
and social identity interact is beyond the scope of this thesis. That said the extant empirical 
evidence is mixed about the influence of financial incentives on auditor independence. For 
example, archival audit research has demonstrated that non-audit fees may impair audit quality 
and independence (Frankel et al. 2002), may not impair independence (DeFond, Raghunandan, 
and Subramanyam 2002; Ashbaugh et al. 2003) or may even improve audit quality (Kinney et al. 
2004). Recent post-SOX archival evidence suggests greater independence in the face of high 
audit and total fees, which is attributed to reputation preservation and litigation risk avoidance 
(Li 2009). These mixed results suggest that non-financial factors, such as social identity, likely 
play an important role in influencing auditor judgments. A recent paper by Hope and Langli 
(2010) supports this contention; they demonstrate that even in a low litigation and reputation risk 
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setting, auditors maintain independence as audit fees rise and suggest that ethics and the 
professionalism of auditors play an important role. 
In summary, research demonstrates that the client and audit profession are two 
organizational groups that auditors are likely to identify with, to varying levels of strength. A 
strong client identity can impair independence and thereby auditor objectivity but possessing a 
strong professional identity may be effective in mitigating this impairment. Auditors’ 
professional identities are generally internalized over time through education and training. Client 
identities can develop over time but may also develop in short time periods, which may increase 
the exposure of auditors to the threat of client identity. Client and professional identity are 
important to the study of auditor judgment but their potential interaction with financial 
incentives, while deserving of research attention, are beyond the scope of this study. 
2.6 Identity Salience as a Moderator of the Identity Strength-Behaviour Relationship 
In this section, I examine the moderating role of identity salience in the relationship 
between identity strength and individual behaviour. I distinguish identity salience from the 
commonly discussed concept of identity strength and demonstrate how low versus high identity 
salience can moderate the influence of identity strength on behaviour. Since individuals often 
have multiple identities with conflicting norms or goals, I examine how relative identity salience 
and identity conflict influence how individuals respond to their multiple identities. 
2.6.1 Distinguishing Identity Salience from Identity Strength 
Salience represents the degree to which an object stands out relative to other objects in a 
particular situation. Identity salience represents the degree to which an identity is activated 
(Forehand et al. 2002) or stands out among other identities at a given moment. Identity salience 
has been described as situation-dependent; identities that are more exclusive (limited 
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membership), concrete (identity attributes are easily apparent), or proximal (direct impact of 
identity on individual) are more salient (Ashforth and Johnson 2001).
10
 Further, more frequent 
cues or habitual and routine encounters with an identity relative to other identities will render it 
more salient (Hogg and Terry 2000). Identity salience also increases with the presentation of 
identity cues (Forehand et al. 2002); for example, simply mentioning a group can increase its 
salience (Van Dick et al. 2005).  
Identity strength may also determine identity salience (Forehand et al. 2002). Identity 
strength represents the degree of association between an identity and an individual’s underlying 
values and attributes (Forehand et al. 2002). An individual with a strong identity “is more likely 
to be in a state of identity salience” than an individual with a weaker identity and “it may be 
easier to elicit identity salience in a strong identifier” (Forehand et al. 2002, p. 1088). This is 
consistent with Ashforth (2001), who defines identity salience in terms of both subjective 
importance (identity is internally valued) and situational relevance (others would accept identity 
as relevant in a given situation). Individuals with strong identities perceive these identities to be 
relevant in a wider set of circumstances or situations, and thus strong identities may be 
moderately or highly salient more often than weak identities. 
However, “possessing a strong association with an identity does not necessitate identity 
salience” (Forehand et al. 2002, p. 1088). While identity salience and strength have been 
intertwined in prior research, Forehand et al. (2002) make clear that they are distinct constructs. 
Identity salience is the “momentary activation” of an identity and is highly variable; identity 
strength is the “enduring association between an individual’s sense of self and his or her 
identity” (Forehand et al. 2002, p. 1087). A strong (or weak) identity can range from low to high 
                                                 
10
 These terms are often used to distinguish between lower order identities (more salient) and higher order identities. 
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salience and a highly salient (or low salience) identity can be strong or weak (Forehand et al. 
2002; LeBoeuf et al. 2010). 
2.6.2 Influence of Identity Strength in Low versus High Identity Salience Settings 
Prior research indicates that if a particular group identity is highly salient, bias in favour 
of that group increases as the strength of the identity increases (Forehand et al. 2002). If the 
salience of a group identity is low, identity strength has minimal effect (LeBoeuf et al. 2010). 
Forehand et al. (2002) suggest that the strength of an identity is only important in predicting 
behaviour when the identity is salient (see also Haslam and Ellemers 2005). Identity salience 
moderates the relationship between identity strength and behaviour; the higher the salience of an 
identity, the more likely an individual will be guided by the strength of that identity. 
LeBoeuf et al. (2010) examine how identity salience influences consumer behaviour. In 
one experiment, they measure students’ scholar versus socialite identities and alter which 
identity is made salient. Preferences for the scholarly, relative to social, items increased as the 
scholar identity increased in strength when the scholar identity was made salient, but not when 
the social identity was made salient. Similarly, preferences for social, relative to scholarly, items 
increased as the strength of the social identity increased, but only when the social identity was 
made salient. Thus, in LeBoeuf et al. (2010), identity salience moderates the influence of identity 
strength.  
2.6.3 Multiple Identities, the Most Salient Identity, and Identity Conflict 
The implications studied above generally predict the influence of identity strength on 
behaviour, as the salience of that identity increases from low to high. However, the research 
design of LeBoeuf et al. (2010) caused the salience of one identity (e.g. scholar) to be low when 
the salience of another identity (e.g. social) was high. Nonetheless, their results demonstrate the 
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importance of relative identity salience; the strength of the more salient identity influenced 
choice behaviour whereas the strength of the less salient identity did not appear to have any 
influence on choice behaviour.  
SIT and OI research generally conclude that in situations of multiple relevant identities, 
only the most salient of the multiple identities tends to guide behaviour (Ashforth 2001; Ashforth 
and Johnson 2001; Ellemers and Rink 2005; Haslam and Ellemers 2005; Ashforth et al. 2008). 
This is consistent with the experimental findings of LeBoeuf et al. (2010). Individuals who 
possessed both a strong scholar and strong social identity made choices that were consistent with 
whichever identity was highly salient. It is also important to note that the choices made when the 




Generally, prior research is silent as to whether the strength of a less salient identity has 
any influence on behaviour. Although not hypothesized, the results of LeBoeuf et al. (2010) 
imply that the less salient identity has no effect on behaviour but identity theory is unclear about 
this issue. As an illustration of the possibilities, consider two individuals. The first has two strong 
identities that have conflicting preferences.
12
 The second individual, for the same two identities, 
weakly identifies with one and strongly identifies with the other. If the most salient identity is the 
one that both individuals strongly identify with, but the first individual exhibits less biased 
behaviour towards this group, then it suggests that, ceteris paribus, the less salient identity also 
influenced the first individual’s behaviour. Whether the less salient identity has an influence may 
                                                 
11
 In another experiment using individuals with two strong cultural (deep structure) identities, LeBoeuf et al. (2010) 
show similar conflicting preferences. The choices made when one cultural identity is highly salient conflict with the 
choices made when the other cultural identity is highly salient. 
12
 For example, a unionized employee that also works closely with non-unionized management on special projects 
may have two strong identities that create conflicting preferences during contract negotiation. 
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be an important distinction in an accounting setting, which I discuss in greater detail in Chapter 
3.  
In certain cases, multiple strong identities may be simultaneously high in salience; in 
such situations individuals suffer identity conflict, which is generally conscious and unpleasant 
(Ashforth et al. 2008).
13
 Individuals often resolve this conflict by serving one of the identities 
(commensurate with the strength of the identity) and largely or completely ignoring the others 
(Ellemers and Rink 2005; Ashforth et al. 2008). For example, individuals may defer to the 
strongest or most important identity, conform to the identity (or in-group) exerting the most 
pressure, or choose to order the identities sequentially and respond to the needs of one before 
responding to the needs of the other (Ashforth et al. 2008). Individuals may also resolve identity 
conflict by partially serving each identity; for example, by compromising between the two 
identities (Ashforth et al. 2008). However, it is not clear when individuals will choose to invoke 
a particular strategy for dealing with identity conflict. 
In summary, although they are related, identity strength is a concept distinct from identity 
salience. Identity strength refers to how greatly an individual identifies with a particular group; 
once developed, identity strength is very stable over time. Identity salience refers to the extent to 
which an identity (no matter how strong) is evoked or made active; identity salience is highly 
variable. The higher the salience of an identity, the more likely an individual will be guided by 
the strength of that identity. However, when individuals have multiple relevant identities – i.e. 
multiple identities in the workplace – relative salience matters; individuals will respond to the 
strength of the most salient identity and may not respond, even partially, to less salient identities. 
                                                 
13
 Individuals still suffer identity conflict when two strong identities differ in salience, though it is latent or minor; 
identity conflict poses a problem when both identities are readily activated/highly salient (Ashforth et al. 2008).  
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When multiple identities are simultaneously high in salience, individuals suffer identity conflict 
and often choose to act upon the strength of only one identity. 
2.7 Decision Context Ambiguity 
 In this section, I examine how auditors make audit judgments as the ambiguity about a 
normatively acceptable or reasonable conclusion increases, regarding an audit issue with a client. 
Prior auditing literature argues that auditors make “appropriate” decisions when the audit task or 
client fact situation is unambiguous but when ambiguous, auditors are more likely to agree with 
the client’s preference for resolving the audit issue (Kadous et al. 2003). Prior SIT and OI 
literature suggests that the influence of identity strength on individuals’ judgments is reduced as 
informational uncertainty regarding a decision increases (Blader 2006). However, SIT and OI 
research has also found that in-group bias still exists in certain settings despite the existence of 
unambiguously incorrect (group) behaviour (for a review, see Ashforth et al. 2008). 
 Prior research in accounting finds that auditors exhibit “bias” toward the client-preferred 
accounting treatment when the client fact situation and/or accounting standards are ambiguous as 
to the proper accounting treatment (Hackenbrack and Nelson 1996; Salterio and Koonce 1997; 
Kadous et al. 2003). However, auditors typically make appropriate, objective decisions in an 
unambiguous setting (Salterio and Koonce 1997) or remain conservative as engagement risk 
increases (Hackenbrack and Nelson 1996). Farmer et al. (1987) and Hoffman and Patton (2002) 
suggest that incentive threats pose less risk when accounting standards specifically define rules 
for an accounting issue, or are more precise, respectively. As described in Kadous et al. (2003), 
auditors are bound by reasonableness constraints and despite incentives to side with the client, 
will not support client preferences that cannot be justified where for example, an audit standard 
unambiguously prescribes a treatment that opposes the client preference.  
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Research in SIT and OI also indicates that individuals tend to display in-group bias only 
when making judgments under informational uncertainty (Ellemers and Rink 2005; Blader 
2006). Blader (2006) shows that while judgments are influenced by the evaluator’s identity 
strength when diagnostic cues are unavailable, when explicit cues are available, judgments are 
consistent with the additional information and not biased by identity. Results reported by Bamber 
and Iyer (2007) – auditor acquiescence to the (potentially unwarranted) client preferred treatment 
increases with client identity strength and decreases with professional identity strength – are in 
the context of an ambiguous task setting.  
However, SIT and OI research has found that in-group bias may still exist in certain 
settings despite the existence of unambiguously incorrect (group) behaviour, although group 
members tend to exhibit two extremes; strong bias for their in-group or strong bias against their 
in-group.
14
 A strong identity may lead to overidentification (Dukerich, Kramer, and McLean 
Parks 1998) and failure to question the ethicality of the group or its members’ behaviour 
(Ashforth et al. 2008). It may also lead to expectancy violation and in-group punishment 
(Ellemers and Rink 2005); expectancy violation occurs when behaviour of an in-group clearly 
deviates from prior expectations. In such cases, individuals will punish an in-group member 
more severely than an out-group member (Ellemers and Rink 2005). The violation may also 
tarnish the value of the identity and individuals may choose to disassociate or disidentify with 
the group in question (Haslam and Ellemers 2005; Glasford et al. 2009). Salterio and Koonce 
(1997) demonstrate that auditors make appropriate reporting decisions in an unambiguous setting 
despite client preferences for a particular accounting treatment. However, their experimental 
setting did not contain explicit factors that further motivated the participants to favour the client 
                                                 
14
 For example, individuals may cover up group mistakes when identities are attached to highly visible or high status 
roles (Ashforth et al. 2008). Ellemers and Rink (2005) suggest that individuals are more likely to punish in-group 
members the more strongly they hold prior expectations about group norms or when group disloyalty is shown. 
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preference. Thus, auditors motivated by a strong client identity may bias their judgments for 
(overidentification) or against the client (expectancy violation) even in an unambiguous setting. 
2.8 Conclusion 
This chapter reviewed relevant psychology and accounting research that examines the 
influence of social identity theory and organizational identification. Furthermore, this chapter 
examines how client identity strength and professional identity strength specifically apply in an 
audit context. Overall, the existing literature suggests that client identity strength will impair 
auditor independence while professional identity strength will help maintain it. Research 
suggests that these identity effects will persist in an ambiguous setting. When the audit decision 
context is unambiguous, auditors with strong client identities may not be influenced by the client 
preference or they may react strongly – negatively or positively – toward the client preference. In 
addition, the extant SIT and OI literature suggests that situated client identity readily applies to 
the audit context and identity salience may be an important moderator of both the client and 
professional identity strength-auditor judgment relationship. 
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CHAPTER 3: DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I use literature from SIT and OI to develop hypotheses about auditors’ 
judgments; in particular, auditors’ agreement with the client-preferred outcome for an accounting 
issue. First, I distinguish between initial and subsequent audit judgments, as prior research 
provides mixed evidence whether factors that influence initial audit judgments will similarly 
influence evaluation of additional information and subsequent judgments in a sequential audit 
judgment process. Second, I examine client and professional identity strength and professional 
identity salience in an ambiguous audit context, as prior research indicates that auditors are most 
susceptible to client influences in such a context. My objective is to determine whether the level 
of professional identity salience, and increasing that level, are important factors in  mitigating 
impaired independence and objectivity from a strong client identity. Third, I examine whether 
client identity strength can influence auditor judgments in an unambiguous audit context. My 
objective is to provide more evidence about the behaviour of auditors in an unambiguous 
context. While it is a widely-held assumption that auditors remain objective in an unambiguous 




Several aspects of my research focus are important to note. First, as explained in the 
preceding chapter, I focus on situated client identity. Regardless of whether the client identity is 
situated or deep structure, judgment is more likely to be biased in favour of the client as identity 
strength increases (Rousseau 1998). Second, as explained in the preceding chapter, I focus on 
deep structure professional identity because auditors’ sense of self will already contain this 
                                                 
15
 Salterio and Koonce (1997) provide evidence that this assumption is valid whereas Hoffman and Patton (2002) 
demonstrate that bias, while reduced, still persists even when audit standards are more precise (i.e. lower ambiguity). 
 
29 
identity (Warren and Alzola 2009). Third, I examine auditor judgments when client identity 
salience is high; SIT suggests that auditor objectivity is unlikely to be impaired by client identity 
strength when client identity salience is low. Fourth, I vary professional identity salience; 
whether the level of professional identity salience that naturally occurs in an audit setting is low, 
medium, or high is an open empirical question. But SIT and OI research suggest that 
professional identity strength should be most influential when professional identity salience is 
heightened.  
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 differentiates initial from subsequent 
audit judgments. Section 3.3 examines the ambiguous audit context. First, I develop two 
predictions regarding the moderating role of professional identity salience on the relationship 
between both client and professional identity strength and initial audit judgments. Second, I 
explore two research questions regarding whether client and professional identity strength, as 
moderated by identity salience, influences subsequent audit judgments in a similar manner to 
initial judgments. Section 3.4 explores a research question regarding the influence of identity 
strength in an unambiguous audit context, when professional salience is not heightened. I 
conclude this chapter in section 3.5. 
3.2 Initial versus Subsequent Audit Judgments 
In this section, I compare the decision context of initial and subsequent audit judgments. 
Auditing is a sequential process of iteratively assessing client financial statement assertions and 
obtaining new evidence to update those judgments, to attest whether or not the client assertions 
are reasonably supported (Gibbins 1984; Knechel and Messier 1990; Kennedy 1993). For 
example, Asare (1992) characterizes the going concern decision as a two-stage process (p. 382): 
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A judgment stage that entails an evaluation task in which the auditor forms an initial 
belief (anchor) about the client's financial distress or stability and updates this anchor 
sequentially with the acquisition and evaluation of a short series of complex evidence, 
and a decision stage in which the auditor decides on the type of report to issue. 
As implied by Asare (1992), subsequent going concern judgments are made on the basis 
of specific, detailed evidence; initial judgments, rather, are typically made with less information 
or evidence provided to the auditor. For example, initial going concern judgments may be 
generated by examining preliminary financial statements and viewing changes in balances or key 
events disclosed. Subsequent judgments would be made after examining specific evidence 
regarding various accounts or key events that are reflected in the financial statements. As another 
example, auditors may perform analytical procedures on a specific account (or set of related 
accounts) to form an initial opinion about whether changes in the account balance(s) are 
reasonable. Following these procedures, more substantive evidence is collected regarding certain 
fluctuations and is examined to update initial beliefs about the reasonableness of the changes. 
Accounting research tends to focus on subsequent or final judgments; i.e. the judgments 
made after specific, additional evidence is evaluated. However, even these judgments could be 
considered initial or interim to the extent that further evidence is collected and requires auditors 
to update beliefs/judgments made on the basis of the first set of specific, additional evidence.
16
 
As suggested by Asare (1992), initial judgments are often based on limited evidence. For 
purposes of this thesis I classify initial judgments as those made by auditors after evaluating 
background client information or general changes in account balances. I classify subsequent 
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statements. These assessments may be subsequently updated when the auditor evaluates client documentation and 
other evidence about specific financial events. At a later date this subsequent assessment may require updating due 




judgments as those made by auditors after searching for, or being provided with, additional 
evidence that contains specific details about a certain account or set of related transactions. 
Although in practice auditors likely go through more than one cycle of initial judgments, 
additional evidence gathering, and subsequent judgments, time constraints in an experiment limit 
my ability to engage auditors in multiple cycles. I examine one initial judgment and one 
subsequent judgment, which is also a final judgment. 
Prior accounting research has shown that various factors influence initial judgments, and 
these factors continue to bias subsequent evidence search, evidence evaluation, and in turn, 
subsequent judgments (confirmation bias) (Kaplan and Reckers 1989; Cloyd and Spilker 1999; 
Blay 2005). However, prior accounting research has also shown that, in a sequential audit 
judgment process, initial hypotheses or judgments will not necessarily influence subsequent 
evaluation and judgments (Trotman and Sng 1989). Rather, a recency bias may influence auditor 
judgments, causing auditors to rely heavily on the most recent evidence items (Asare 1992). 
3.3 Ambiguous Decision Context 
 In this section I make predictions about auditors’ judgments, as influenced by identity 
strength and identity salience, when faced with an ambiguous audit decision context. As 
summarized in Chapter 2, individuals tend to display in-group bias, commensurate with identity 
strength, under informational uncertainty (Ellemers and Rink 2005; Blader 2006). Further, 
auditors show favour toward the client preference when an accounting issue is ambiguous 
(Johnson 1993; Salterio and Koonce 1997; Kadous et al. 2003). As discussed in the previous 
section, it is unclear whether the effects of identity that seem likely to apply to initial audit 
judgments will be amplified in subsequent audit judgments. 
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3.3.1 Initial Audit Judgments: Professional Identity Salience as a Moderator of Client Identity 
Strength and Professional Identity Strength 
As discussed in Chapter 2, auditors possess both client and professional identities, each 
of which can range from weak to strong (Bamber and Iyer 2007; Suddaby et al. 2009). SIT and 
OI research indicates that a strong client identity can lead to undesirable biases toward the client 
as a result of the auditor actively striving to reach agreement (Haslam and Ellemers 2005), or 
unduly extending a benefit of the doubt to the client (Ellemers and Rink 2005). A strong 
professional identity can lead to enhanced auditor commitment to the profession and adherence 
to professional values and norms (Ashforth and Mael 1989), which should engender notions of 
independence and objectivity and reduce bias toward the client. 
Consistent with psychology research, Bamber and Iyer (2007) show that, when an audit 
issue is ambiguous, auditor agreement with the client increases as client identity strength 
increases and decreases as professional identity strength increases. King (2002) constructs an 
audit trust game and assigns student participants to roles that mimic auditor and client manager. 
He finds that auditor bias toward the client increases as client identity increases when auditors 
have a weak professional identity; this bias is mitigated when auditors are induced to have a 
strong professional identity. If auditors always act on their professional identity, which is 
generally strong (Bamber and Iyer 2007; Suddaby et al. 2009), then the strength of their client 
identity may be of little concern, as suggested by the results from King (2002). However, results 
from Alvesson (2000) indicate that this is unlikely; computer consultants deployed at client 
locations had both organization and client identities but conflicting goals caused the consultants 
to become conflicted and unsure where to attach their loyalties. But auditors, unlike consultants, 
are governed by rules of professional conduct and may not have similar identity conflict. 
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Alternatively, the literature reviewed in Chapter 2 suggests that the degree to which 
individuals with multiple identities suffer identity conflict depends on identity salience (Ashforth 
et al. 2008). In most cases, one identity is more salient than the others and identity conflict is 
latent or minor such that the individual unconsciously relies on the most salient identity 
(Ashforth et al. 2008). However, in a few cases, multiple strong identities are simultaneously 
high in salience, which can lead to major identity conflict requiring the individual to consciously 
choose among these identities (Ashforth et al. 2008). Although this major identity conflict is 
problematic, the fact that it is conscious bodes well for auditors and the maintenance of 
objectivity in judgment. Auditors are not likely to consciously bias their judgments in the client’s 
favour (Bazerman et al. 1997; Kadous et al. 2003).  
The greater concern for the audit community is when client identity is more salient than 
professional identity, as theory predicts auditors’ client identity will guide their judgments in this 
case (Ashforth et al. 2008; LeBoeuf et al. 2010). Warren and Alzola (2009) argue that, in 
practice, professional identity salience and strength is diminishing relative to client identity 
salience and strength and suggest that this has led to decreased auditor independence. They 
partially attribute this to a greater focus by audit firms on client service as opposed to serving the 
public; identity salience is reduced as attributes become abstract or less apparent (Ashforth and 
Johnson 2001).  
Since audit tasks are often couched in terms of the client and not the profession (e.g. 
client working papers), and client preferences are expressed whereas professional goals are less 
explicit, the client identity may be more apparent or concrete (i.e. less abstract) and thus highly 
salient relative to the professional identity. The impact of auditor judgments and decisions on the 
public, or unknown shareholders, is also more abstract or remote relative to their impact on the 
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client (Bazerman et al. 1997), which can reduce the salience of professional relative to client 
identity. Moreover, the client identity will likely become highly salient when the auditor is 
stationed at the client premises or is surrounded by client cues; offices, personnel, logos, culture, 
etc. (Rousseau 1998). Therefore, while client identity salience is likely to be high in a routine 
audit context, as discussed in Chapter 2 and above, relative salience will likely guide behaviour. 
Thus, heightening the salience of the professional identity (e.g. by focusing on service to the 
public or employing decision aids that remind auditors of their professional role) increases the 
likelihood that professional identity is at least as salient as client identity. This gives auditors 
their best chance at invoking the strength of their professional identity and maintaining 
objectivity in judgment. 
King’s (2002) results show that auditors’ self-serving client bias can be mitigated but it is 
unclear whether professional identity salience or strength drives this result. King (2002) 
strengthens professional identity by promoting a team affiliation but in the weak affiliation 
condition it appears that participants do not perceive themselves as a group. Thus, his strong 
affiliation condition both evokes (makes salient) and strengthens the team affiliation. It is unclear 
whether a similar group of participants that already possess a strong affiliation, but did not 
require it to be evoked or primed, would similarly show mitigated client bias relative to a weak 
affiliation group; i.e. identity salience may also play an important role. 
Research by Bamber and Iyer (2007) provides a good understanding of client and 
professional identity strength effects in an audit context. However, their model of client and 
professional identity suggests that both identities operate simultaneously and independently of 
each other to influence auditor agreement with the client, and they do not distinguish between 
identity strength versus salience effects. Research reviewed in Chapter 2 suggests interactive 
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effects of identity strength and salience, such that a highly salient identity may suppress the 
influence of other identities (Ashforth et al. 2008). Although Bamber and Iyer (2007) measure 
identity strength, their method of having auditors think of their largest client may have also made 
the client identity particularly salient. This may have contributed to client identity having a 
stronger effect than professional identity strength in their results. However, Bamber and Iyer 
(2007) do not examine identity salience. Based on the literature reviewed in Chapter 2, 
heightening professional identity salience may result in a stronger effect for professional identity 
strength and a weaker effect for client identity strength, thus mitigating potential “bias” from a 
highly salient client identity. 
Research in accounting suggests that client influences are particularly relevant in the 
context of initial audit judgments. Blay (2005) shows that auditors’ directional goals, to agree 
with or disagree with the client, influence initial going concern assessments. These initial 
judgments are formed based on ambiguous financial statement information. Other audit research 
has demonstrated that auditors’ willingness to support a client-preferred, aggressive accounting 
treatment is influenced by financial incentives or motivated reasoning in favour of client 
preferences (Farmer et al. 1987; Lord 2002; and Kadous et al. 2003). Farmer et al. (1987) and 
Lord (2002) provide few details about the accounting issue to experiment participants, such that 
the audit judgment is made with minimal audit evidence, akin to an initial audit judgment.
17
  
Research in accounting and psychology suggests that identity effects will also be 
particularly relevant in the context of initial audit judgments. Bamber and Iyer (2007) ask 
auditors to assess their willingness to acquiesce to the client’s preferred accounting treatment, 
although the accounting issue is described only as having equal and opposing support for and 
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 However, the study by Kadous et al. (2003) has auditors assess an ambiguous accounting issue, with no further 
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against the client preference. Bamber and Iyer (2007) demonstrate that these “initial” judgments 
are influenced by client identity and professional identity strength. Blader (2006) demonstrates 
that individuals asked to judge the fairness of a selection process are influenced by their weak or 
strong identity with the selecting group. However, when additional, specific, diagnostic 
information is provided to the judges, the effects of identity strength are mitigated. Thus, identity 
effects appear to be strongest when minimal information is provided, as is typically the case for 
initial audit judgments. 
Therefore, I examine the effect of client identity strength and professional identity 
strength on initial agreement with the client, when client identity salience is high and 
professional identity salience is either heightened or not. In this setting, when professional 
identity salience is not heightened, the extent of auditors’ initial agreement with a client is likely 
to be influenced by the strength of their client identity rather than the strength of their 
professional identity. However, when professional identity salience is heightened, professional 
identity salience should be at least as high as client identity salience. This will lead to a 
conscious identity conflict, leading auditors to choose to conform to their professional identity 
and obligations. Thus, the extent of auditors’ initial agreement with the client should be less 
influenced by the strength of their client identity and more influenced by the strength of their 
professional identity. My predictions, when client identity salience is high, stated in the 
alternative form are as follows: 
H1:  Professional identity salience and client identity strength will interact such that as 
client identity strength increases, initial auditor agreement with the client will 




H2:  Professional identity salience and professional identity strength will interact such 
that as professional identity strength increases, initial auditor agreement with the 
client will decrease more when professional identity salience is heightened versus 
not heightened. 
The nature of the interaction effects in H1 and H2 may be sufficiently strong such that 
there is no association between client (professional) identity strength and agreement with the 
client when professional identity salience is heightened (not heightened). SIT does not provide 
strong enough theory to predict if or when the interaction will lead to no association. Figure 1, 
Panels A and B, provide a graphical representation of hypotheses 1 and 2, respectively.  
3.3.2 Additional Audit Evidence and Subsequent Audit Judgments 
Research by Bamber and Iyer (2007) demonstrates the influence of both client and 
professional identity strength on initial audit judgments. However, the factors that influence 
initial audit judgments may or may not similarly influence subsequent audit judgments. SIT and 
OI research also provides mixed theory and evidence about whether the effects of identity will 
persist in subsequent audit judgments. 
Some researchers indicate that information processing depends on the referent identity. 
For example, as long as client identity is the most salient identity, research suggests that a 
stronger client identity will result in more biased evaluation of information or evidence, 
regardless of whether the judgment is initial or final (Ostrom, Carpenter, Sedikides, and Li 1993; 
Brown 2000; Gramzow, Gaertner, and Sedikides 2001; Maitner et al. 2010). Thus, there is 
evidence to suggest that the effects of client and professional identity strength on initial audit 
judgments, as moderated by professional identity salience, will persist for additional audit 
evidence evaluation and may lead to greater effects for subsequent audit judgments. 
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Psychology research also indicates that the provision of additional information can 
diminish the influence of identity strength. Blader (2006) demonstrates that individuals make 
judgments consistent with their identity strength only when diagnostic information about the 
situation is unavailable. Regardless of whether the diagnostic information is positive or negative, 
individuals receiving the information make judgments consistent with the direction of the 
evidence and their judgments are not influenced by identity strength. Weber et al. (2004) also 
suggest that the increasing provision of information can change the decision context; the 
provision of information may cause individuals to better recognize the decision context as 
typical, even if the decision is unique. They argue that individuals will thus act in a more 
normative manner – i.e. evaluate the content of the negative and positive evidence equally – and 
in a manner less consistent with their identities. In a review of audit research, Smith and Kida 
(1991) find that certain judgment biases are mitigated when experienced or knowledgeable 
auditors perform the task, since increased knowledge makes the task more familiar and less 
complex (Kennedy 1995). Thus, a portion of the effect for experienced auditors may be 
attributed to better knowledge structures but it also can be attributed to recognizing the task as 
familiar or routine. 
However, the research above suggests that the combined effects of additional positive 
and negative audit evidence will offset each other and do little to resolve ambiguity. Therefore 
the effects of client and professional identity strength on subsequent audit judgments, as 
moderated by professional identity salience, will not differ from their impact on initial audit 
judgments. 
As suggested by Gibbins (1984) and Asare (1992) the sequential audit judgment process 
results in auditors forming implicit or explicit initial judgments. These judgments will be updated 
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as additional pieces of evidence are provided. Kaplan and Reckers (1989) and Blay (2005) show 
that auditors’ information search is also biased in a manner that confirms initial hypotheses or 
judgments, respectively. Prior accounting research has also found that, in the absence of 
explicitly provided or formulated hypotheses about the likely outcome, information search is still 
biased in favour of the client preference (Cloyd and Spilker 1999; Kadous et al. 2008). These 
studies demonstrate that tax professionals, in low practice risk situations, undertake biased 
information search in favour of the client preference, which ultimately results in final judgments 
biased in favour of the client preference. Blay (2005) similarly finds that auditors’ biased 
information search results in biased final judgments. Overall, the results of these studies suggest 
that factors that influence initial judgments influence evidence gathering and final judgments.  
However, consistent evaluation throughout the audit judgment process is not a universal 
finding. Salterio and Koonce (1997) find that, regardless of whether they were aware of the 
client’s preferred revenue recognition outcome, auditors presented with explicit conflicting 
evidence provided equivalent overall assessments of the evidence. But they do find that auditors 
who were aware of the client’s preference reached final decisions that were more supportive of 
that preference. Thus, auditors who knew the client’s preference were able to appropriately 
assess the positive and negative evidence as balanced on the whole but still biased their final 
judgment towards the client. However, it is not clear from the results of Salterio and Koonce 
(1997) whether these final judgments differed from initial judgments, which were not measured. 
Kida (1984) and Trotman and Sng (1989) find only weak support that auditors seek to 
confirm initial hypotheses when evaluating additional evidence. In a going concern task they find 
that all auditors choose more client-failure cues than client-viable cues from the available set of 
evidence. Even auditors, whose initial hypothesis and evidence framed the client as likely to be 
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viable, searched for additional evidence that indicated failure and refuted the initial hypothesis. 
However, this latter group of auditors did select proportionally fewer failure cues relative to the 
other experimental conditions that initially suggested client failure.  
Asare (1992) presents results that indicate that the initial hypothesis frame (fail versus 
continue) resulted in consistent initial viability assessments (lower assessment in fail and higher 
assessment in continue condition). However, this initial hypothesis frame had no influence on 
auditor participants’ revisions in assessments (final assessment minus initial assessment). Rather, 
the order of evidence (negative items followed by positive items, or vice versa) predicted the 
final assessment outcomes; auditors receiving negative items last had greater downward belief 
revision and also issued more modified opinions.
18
 Since Asare (1992) did not specifically test 
the influence of initial hypothesis frame, except for its effect on assessment revision, it is unclear 
from his results whether the final assessment itself, or the audit report choice, was associated 
with the initial hypothesis frame. That is, it is unclear whether the initial hypothesis frame (i.e. a 
factor that can affect initial judgments) influenced the subsequent judgments, independent of the 
recency effect that is due to evidence order. At the very least, the initial frame did not lead to a 
greater influence on final assessments than its influence on initial assessments. 
The manner by which additional evidence is gathered or provided may have important 
implications. Kadous et al. (2008) suggest that indirect influences of client preference are more 
likely to persist than direct influences. That is, the auditor unknowingly and indirectly biases 
conclusions by searching for additional evidence consistent with the client preference; although 
the content of the evidence may suggest supporting the client preference, this conclusion is 
reached because client-unsupportive evidence is underrepresented. However, when a mix of 
                                                 
18
 Asare (1992) and similar accounting research on recency effects make predictions based on Hogarth and 




additional positive and negative evidence is provided to the auditor a greater balance may be 
maintained, which would likely result in subsequent assessments that are consistent with initial 
assessments, since subsequent evidence provides no further clarity than initial evidence. 
Alternatively, the most recent evidence may be overweighted and result in biased subsequent 
judgments consistent with the recency effect.
19
  
Therefore, it is unclear how professional identity salience will moderate the relationships 
between client and professional identity strength and subsequent auditor judgments, relative to 
its moderating effect on initial auditor judgments. As discussed in section 3.2, initial evidence 
may be ambiguous because it is limited while additional evidence tends to be explicit and 
specific (Asare 1992). Each additional evidence item is also more likely to be explicitly positive 
or negative, since it provides finer details about specific accounts or events; all additional 
evidence together may still convey an ambiguous conclusion. If, as suggested by Blader (2006), 
auditors appropriately recognize positive evidence as positive and negative evidence as negative, 
then they are likely to net the evidence in a normative manner. If so, identity effects will not 
differ between initial and subsequent auditor judgments.  
Alternatively, if, as suggested by Maitner et al. (2010), identity effects lead to subsequent 
biased evaluation of additional evidence, then auditors with strong client identities are likely to 
overweight (underweight) positive (negative) evidence and increase the level of agreement with 
the client in subsequent judgments, when professional identity salience is not heightened. 
Auditors with strong professional identities are likely to overweight (underweight) negative 
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(positive) evidence and decrease the level of agreement with the client in subsequent judgments, 
when professional identity salience is heightened. Asare (1992) argues that auditors will suffer 
recency bias when evaluating subsequent evidence and will not continue to use their initial 
hypothesis frame for subsequent judgments. Rather, auditors will still recognize positive 
evidence as positive and negative evidence as negative but judge the evidence, as a whole, more 
in the direction of the most recent set of evidence. Although Asare’s (1992) results demonstrate 
recency effects, identity may provide a much stronger initial “frame” than his going concern 
assessment, which was framed simply as “likely to fail” or “continue”. Regardless, it is unclear 
whether both recency and identity effects will influence revisions in auditor assessments, 
whether neither will, or whether one effect will dominate the other. Overall, prior research 
provides mixed evidence as to whether my first two hypotheses will apply to subsequent audit 
judgments. As such, I pose the following two research questions, when client identity salience is 
high: 
RQ1: Will professional identity salience and client identity strength interact to influence 
subsequent revisions in auditor agreement with the client?  
RQ2: Will professional identity salience and professional identity strength interact to 
influence subsequent revisions in auditor agreement with the client?  
3.4 Unambiguous Decision Context when Professional Identity Salience is not Heightened 
As discussed in Chapter 2, SIT and OI research demonstrates that in-group bias may still 
exist in certain settings even when the in-group or its members display unambiguously incorrect 
group behaviour. This may have implications for auditor behaviour when the client desires an 
accounting treatment that is unambiguously unsupported by accounting standards or the audit 
evidence available. I examine these predictions when professional identity salience is not 
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heightened, as auditors are most likely to rely on the strength of their client identity in such a 
setting. 
Auditors with strong client identities may overidentify (Dukerich et al. 1998) and fail to 
sufficiently scrutinize the accounting issue or underestimate the severity of negative evidence. 
However, when the accounting issue has an unambiguous correct treatment and the client 
requests an incompatible treatment, auditors with strong client identities may perceive this as an 
expectancy violation (Ellemers and Rink 2005) not just a GAAP violation. Thus, auditors with 
strong client identities may be even more critical of the client than auditors with weak client 
identities (who perceive it as a GAAP violation only) and therefore be less likely to agree with 
the client. SIT and OI theory is inconclusive as to which of these two outcomes will occur.  
Moreover, the widely-held assumption in auditing research is that auditors will correctly 
interpret audit evidence that is unambiguously unsupportive of the client-preferred accounting 
position and not be persuaded by the client (Kadous et al. 2003). Evidence from Salterio and 
Koonce (1997) supports this assumption. Thus, all auditors, regardless of their client identity 
strength, should provide similar audit judgments when the audit issue is unambiguous. Given this 
strong assumption, I pose the following research question, when client identity salience is high: 
RQ3: When additional evidence is unambiguously against the client’s position, is there a 
relationship between client identity strength and subsequent revisions in auditor 
agreement with the client, when professional identity salience is not heightened? 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter develops two hypotheses based on theory drawn from psychology and 
accounting research. My objective for the hypotheses is to determine whether increasing the 
level of professional identity salience is essential to mitigate impaired independence and 
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objectivity from a strong client identity. This chapter also poses three research questions drawn 
from psychology and accounting research that provides competing but unresolved theoretical 
predictions. My objective for the research questions is to document the behaviour of auditors in 
making subsequent judgments and, in unambiguous task settings, to provide evidence whether 
these judgments are also influenced by the effects of identity. 
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH METHOD 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes the case materials, 
participants, and experimental design for the first of two studies. Section 4.3 describes the 
participants and modifications made to the materials and experimental design for the second 
study. Section 4.4 describes the dependent variables. Section 4.5 describes manipulation checks, 
control and other measured variables. I conclude this chapter in section 4.6. 
4.2 Study One 
 To test my hypotheses and explore my first two research questions, I employ a 2 x 2 
factorial design with professional identity (PI) salience (not heightened versus heightened) and 
client identity (CI) strength (low versus high) as between-subjects measures and an additional 
measured covariate, PI strength. I control CI salience as high across the four conditions. 
Participants, assigned the role of in-charge auditor, are presented with a hypothetical audit case 
and are required to provide initial and subsequent opinions to the partner about the client’s going 
concern assumption. Both the initial and subsequent evidence provided to participants to develop 
their judgments are ambiguous, on the whole, as to the proper accounting treatment. A fifth 
(control) group receives the same audit and client information, except for information pertaining 
to the two manipulations, to provide baseline audit judgments for comparison to the treatment 
groups. 
This section is organized as follows. Subsection 4.2.1 describes the case materials used in 
the experiment. Subsection 4.2.2 explains the pilot testing performed prior to completion of the 
final experimental case. Subsection 4.2.3 describes the participants that completed study one. 
Subsection 4.2.4 explains the experimental design. 
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4.2.1 Case Materials 
Task 
The auditing case used in the experiment describes a hypothetical audit client, Highpoint 
Computer Corporation (Highpoint), that manufactures and sells real-time computer systems and 
services; the case is adapted from Blay (2005). Each participant is assigned the role of in-charge 
auditor of Highpoint, a new audit client that was put up for bid as a result of mandatory audit 
partner rotation.
20
 Participants are initially provided background information about the client and 
the engagement, in addition to excerpts from the current year audit planning memo. This 
information varies depending on the manipulation of client identity strength; current and past 
financial success is equivalent across conditions.  Participants then complete a recall task about 
the client information and complete a task unrelated to the audit task but containing the 
manipulation of professional identity salience.  
Following this, participants read about the specific audit issue regarding the company’s 
going concern assumption and are provided with preliminary financial statements in order to 
make an initial audit judgment. After providing their initial assessment of the going concern 
assumption, participants are then provided with additional evidence that both supports and 
refutes the going concern assumption. Participants are requested to evaluate the additional 
evidence before making final audit judgments. After providing their final assessments, 
participants are asked to complete a post-experiment questionnaire. The Appendix presents a 
copy of the case materials used in the experiment (pp. 157-179). Figure 2 provides a diagram that 
summarizes the timeline of study one. 
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 Highpoint is presented as a new client to show that the effects of identity prevail even when a client is unfamiliar. 
Fiolleau, Hoang, Jamal, and Sunder (2011) document a real company that put its audit up for tender when its audit 
partner required rotation, even though audit firm rotation was not necessary. I use a similar situation to avoid 
Highpoint being a new company but also reduce concerns that the auditor change was due to differences of opinion 
between prior auditor and client, which could reduce the effectiveness of my client identity strength manipulation.  
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Going Concern Audit Issue 
I request participants to assess the client’s going concern assumption because, by nature, 
this assumption is open to interpretation; issues that allow for alternative interpretations are 
difficult accounting issues (Johnstone et al. 2001, p. 6). Johnstone et al. (2001) suggest that 
judgment-based decisions, which include difficult accounting issues, are necessary to study the 
relationship between independence and auditor judgment quality.
21
  
In the case materials, participants are informed that management asserts that Highpoint 
meets the going concern assumption and asserts that no material uncertainty exists about this 
assumption. Participants are reminded that GAAP requires note disclosure where material 
uncertainty exists about the ability to continue as a going concern even if the going concern 
assumption is generally met. Instructions to participants also indicate that the partner would like 
their opinion on the appropriateness of management’s conclusion. Management indicates that 
note disclosure would violate its debt covenants, highlighting a client preference for meeting and 
having no material uncertainty about the going concern assumption. 
Initial Audit Judgment 
To initially assess the client’s going concern assumption, participants are provided with 
client financial statements that are designed to be ambiguous with respect to the client’s ability to 
meet the going concern assumption. The financial statements are part of the materials provided 
by Blay (2005), as used in his experiment; he provides a description of his design on p. 770. The 
financial statements, with slight modifications to the presentation format used by Blay (2005), 
are included in the case materials in the Appendix (pp. 166-167). 
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Subsequent Audit Judgments 
Following initial audit judgments, participants are given two pieces of evidence and 
asked whether the evidence, individually and combined, supports or refutes the going concern 
assumption. The evidence is designed to maintain ambiguity as one evidence item supports the 
client’s assertion and the other refutes it; evidence order is counter-balanced within each of the 5 
conditions. The additional evidence items, as adapted slightly from Blay (2005), are included in 
the case materials in the Appendix (pp. 170-172).
22
 After rating the extent to which each piece of 
evidence supports or refutes the going concern assumption, participants: (1) provide a second 
going concern assessment; (2) assess the appropriateness of the client’s conclusion that no 
material uncertainty about the going concern assumption exists; and (3) rate the importance of 
working with the client to avoid note disclosure.  
4.2.2 Pilot Testing 
The final version of the experimental task benefitted from results and comments gleaned 
from multiple rounds of pilot testing. First, two PhD students (both Chartered Accountants with 
an average of 4.5 years of public accounting experience) reviewed the case materials for task 
realism and accuracy. Second, six Masters of Accounting (MAcc) students reviewed the 
experiment and 78 MAcc students completed a pilot test (average public accounting experience 
for all students is less than two years) to refine the understandability of terms used for dependent 
variables, manipulation checks, and other control measures. Third, I used the verbal protocol 
method with three senior managers from two Big4 audit firms (average of 7.0 years of public 
accounting experience) to further refine the manipulations and manipulation check measures, and 
                                                 
22
 Blay (2005) provides 24 additional evidence items in an information search task. From this list, I selected each of 
the two most-viewed negative and positive items, by participants in the Blay (2005) study, that were also clearly 
rated as negative or positive, in the predicted direction. Based on pilot testing I retained the most negatively and 
positively rated evidence items. 
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to verify the appropriateness of the financial statements and audit task (accordance with 
Canadian GAAP and GAAS). Finally, I conducted a pilot test with 7 seniors, 8 managers, and 5 
senior managers from various audit firms (predominantly Big4 with an average of 6.0 years of 
public accounting experience) to verify the completeness of the case materials, the effectiveness 
of the PI salience manipulation, and to determine the two additional evidence items to retain in 
study one. 
4.2.3 Participants 
The participants included in study one are 105 auditors (60 seniors, 29 managers, and 16 
senior managers) from multiple offices of three Big 4 audit firms. I contacted the national offices 
of these audit firms and one national office leader from each firm sent an email to the requested 
staff levels, in various offices, endorsing the study and encouraging participation. The leaders 
also provided a link to the experiment website for their staff to access at their convenience.
23
 
Twelve auditors that completed the study had less than three years of experience and are 
excluded from the final sample, leaving me with 93 usable responses.
24
 The final sample of 
auditors has an average of 5.4 years of public accounting experience (range 3-13 years); mean 
experience by rank is 3.7 years for seniors, 5.6 years for managers and 10.1 years for senior 
managers. 
Most participants (81 percent) reported being involved in audit engagements where 
substantial doubt existed about the going concern assumption. The number of such engagements 
(mean = 3.1) does not differ by experimental condition (F (4,87) = 0.79, p = 0.535) but differs by 
                                                 
23
 186 auditors accessed the website link resulting in a response rate of 56 percent; the true response rate, while 
unknown, is lower than 56 percent since not all auditors that received an email from their firm accessed the website. 
24
 Pilot testing revealed that auditors with less than two years of public accounting experience had little experience 
with going concern issues and thus I did not seek auditors at more junior levels. Further, comments from two Big 4 
senior managers that provided guidance on the design of the experimental materials indicated that auditors below the 
senior level (generally, two years or less experience) would not typically be involved in any stages of a going 
concern matter. Results of the experiment are qualitatively unchanged when the sample is expanded to auditors with 
at least 2 years of experience (n = 104). 
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rank (F (2,89) = 2.72, p = 0.071).
25
  Senior managers reported significantly more experience with 
going concern doubt than seniors and managers combined (4.9 versus 2.8, t90 = 2.35, p = 0.021), 
which is consistent with senior managers having more years of public accounting experience; 
there is no difference between managers and seniors on this measure (2.8 versus 2.8, t74 = 0.01, p 
= 0.992). Two-thirds of participants reported at least one audit engagement where going concern 
note disclosure was required and on average, 50 percent of the audits involving going concern 
doubt resulted in note disclosure. Overall it appears that participants had sufficient experience 
dealing with going concern issues to meaningfully complete the experiment.  
In addition, the task informs participants that they will make recommendations to a 
hypothetical partner, who will use this information in making her conclusions regarding the 
going concern assumption. Thus, the task requirements closely match participants’ typical audit 
roles. Although auditor conclusions regarding going concern are generally made by partners, 
prior auditing research has shown that supervisors’ decisions are influenced by subordinate 
judgments (Ricchiute 1999) even when supervisors intervene prior to their subordinates’ 
judgment-making (Peecher, Piercey, Rich, and Tubbs 2010). 
4.2.4 Experimental Design 
 I employ a 2 x 2 factorial design with PI salience (two levels) and CI strength (two 
levels) as between-subject factors and an additional, measured covariate, PI strength. Figure 3 
illustrates the experimental design. Upon accessing the website containing the experimental case, 
participants are randomly assigned to one of the four treatment conditions or the control 
condition described in the following sections.  
                                                 
25
 One senior auditor reported having experience in 90 engagements with going concern issues; regardless of 
whether this is an error it will skew the mean reported experience. I exclude this observation from the statistics 
reported above; however, tests of my hypotheses were unaffected by the inclusion or exclusion of this observation. 
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Client Identity Strength 
The first independent variable is CI strength. Participants are randomly assigned to an 
audit task containing client and engagement information that weakens or strengthens CI. To 
manipulate CI strength, I vary antecedents of identity discussed in prior literature. In the high CI 
strength condition participants read that the Highpoint audit is more prestigious than most audits 
conducted by the firm and the partner communicates the general plan for coordination with the 
client to complete the audit field work, using words such as “we” to emphasize it as a joint task 
between the audit team and the client.
26
 Further, Highpoint is praised for its environmental 
responsibility, community involvement, and treatment of current and former employees.
27
  
In the low CI strength condition participants read that the Highpoint audit is less 
prestigious than most of their firm’s audits and the partner communicates coordination with the 
client to complete the audit field work, using words such as “they/them” to emphasize it as a task 
of the audit team independent from the client. Further, Highpoint is criticized for its lack of 
environmental responsibility, community involvement, and treatment of current and former 
employees. The actual wording of these manipulations can be found in the Appendix (pp. 160-
161). 
The number of cues provided across the two conditions is equal, but opposite in direction 
and thus I expect equivalent CI salience, but varying CI strength. The presence of cues primes an 
identity while the direction of cues influences identity strength. Therefore, by providing all 
participants with client identity cues as part of the CI strength manipulation, I control CI salience 
at a high level across all treatment conditions. 
                                                 
26
 Visibility of prestige within audit firm increases client importance, which strengthens identity (Bamber and Iyer 
2007). Perdue et al. (1990) show that using words like “we” rather than “they” result in feelings of a shared identity. 
27
 Client identity strength increases as client image increases (Bamber and Iyer 2007). 
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After viewing the client information, including identity cues, participants are asked to 
respond to eight multiple choice questions to ensure they properly understand the case facts. 
Four of these questions refer to client identity factors and serve to reinforce the low or high 
identity of Highpoint. The questions in this recall task are equivalent across treatment conditions 
and are presented in the Appendix (p. 162). 
Professional Identity Salience 
The second independent variable is PI salience. Participants are randomly assigned to an 
audit task containing verbal and visual cues (Forehand et al. 2002) that either heighten PI 
salience (prime PI) or do not heighten PI salience (prime an unrelated identity). After the recall 
task, described in the previous section, participants are asked to respond to a brief survey/quasi-
advertisement before proceeding to the audit task. This survey contains the verbal and visual 
cues for the two PI salience conditions. 
In the heightened PI salience condition, participants are provided with cues about the 
Chartered Accountant (CA) profession; this is designed to increase the prime without altering PI 
strength. These cues include: logos, information, and questions regarding CA magazine; 
information and a question about the CICA’s website; and a question asking participants to 
respond to the recent decision to allow the Certified General Accountant (CGA) profession to 
issue audit opinions (a role primarily served by CA’s in Canada). The information in this last 
question represents a threat to the in-group (CA) identity; threats to a group’s identity have been 
shown to be powerful mechanisms to increase identity salience (Dovidio et al. 1998; Glasford et 
al. 2009). 
In the unheightened PI salience condition, participants are provided with cues about 
Tourism Canada, which should have no effect on PI salience. These cues include: logos, 
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information, and a question regarding Tourism Canada and its website; questions about the 
participant’s use of vacation time; and a question asking participants to respond to stricter travel 
laws to the US and implications this has for travel to Canadian destinations. The “surveys” used 
for these manipulations are presented in the Appendix (pp. 163-164). 
Professional Identity Strength 
The third independent variable is PI strength; however, this variable is measured, unlike 
the first two independent variables. I use the Inclusion of Others in the Self Scale (Aron, 
McLaughlin-Volpe, Mashek, Lewandowski, Wright, and Aron 2004). I provide participants with 
7 images of two overlapping circles (self and accounting profession) ranging from no overlap 
(weakest identity) to near-eclipse (strongest identity); this provides a 7-point scale similar to a 
Likert scale. This measurement scale is presented in the Appendix (p. 175, question 5). 
Control Condition 
To determine a baseline level for auditor judgments (i.e. the level of agreement with the 
client), without the effects of client identity strength or professional identity salience, I include a 
control condition in the experimental design. The purpose of this condition is to examine 
whether the level of agreement with the client when CI strength is high is greater than what 
would be expected from an auditor uninfluenced by client identity, which provides stronger 
evidence of biased judgment. Participants in the control condition do not receive any information 
with respect to the client identity nor do they receive cues priming any identity.
28
  
My expectation is that auditors with strong client identities will demonstrate levels of 
agreement that are not only higher on average than auditors with weak client identities but higher 
than auditors in a control condition, where client identity is not manipulated. This is consistent 
                                                 
28
 Participants in the control condition proceed from background information (absent identity factors) to the details 
on the going concern audit task; no alternative filler tasks are employed. 
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with theory that suggests a strong identity induces bias in favour of the group. Differences 
between auditors with weak and strong client identities may indicate that strong identifiers show 
more bias toward the client but it may also indicate that strong identifiers show less bias against 
the client relative to weak identifiers. However, it is not clear that the difference between 
auditors with strong client identities and auditors in a control condition will result when 
professional identity salience is heightened. The greater the moderating effect of professional 
identity salience, the less change in agreement with the client as client identity strength increases 
(i.e. auditor level of agreement is more normative). Also, I do not expect that auditors with weak 
client identities will demonstrate levels of agreement that are, on average, different than auditors 
in a control condition. Individuals that possess a weak identity are not necessarily “against” the 
group but may simply not identify with the group (Ashforth 2001) and thus not show favouritism 
or discrimination. Therefore auditors with weak client identities, regardless of professional 
identity salience, may not necessarily exhibit lower levels of agreement with the client than 
auditors in a control group (where client identity strength is niether increased nor decreased).  
4.3 Study Two 
 To test my third research question, I manipulate CI strength, between-subjects, at two 
levels (low versus high) and measure PI strength as a covariate. As with Study One, I control CI 
salience as high across the two conditions. Participants examine the same case and are assigned 
the same role as in Study One, with the following two exceptions: professional identity salience 
is not manipulated; and the subsequent evidence provided to participants unambiguously 
supports an accounting treatment that conflicts with the client’s preference. I do not manipulate 
professional identity salience since auditors are most likely to agree more with the client as client 
identity strength increases when professional identity salience is not heightened. I did provide a 
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manipulation in Study One where professional identity salience was not heightened. However, I 
did this to balance the content and length of time of this condition with the condition in Study 
One where professional identity salience is heightened. It is not necessary to balance conditions 
or manipulate professional identity salience in Study Two since there is only one level of 
professional identity salience, which is “not heightened”. 
This section is organized as follows. Subsection 4.3.1 describes the modifications made 
to the case materials used in this second experiment relative to the first experiment. Subsection 
4.3.2 describes the participants that completed Study Two. Subsection 4.3.3 explains the 
modifications to the experimental design in Study Two relative to Study One. 
4.3.1 Modifications to Case Materials from Study One 
Participants in the second experiment also receive the Highpoint audit case. The case 
details are equivalent to those of the first experiment until completion of the recall task about 
client information. Following the recall task, participants read about the company’s going 
concern audit issue; they do not complete an unrelated audit task containing the manipulation of 
professional identity salience. No alternative filler task is included. Participants in Study Two 
receive the same information about the client’s going concern assumption and the same 
preliminary financial statements are used to make an initial audit judgment.  
However, after providing their initial assessment of the going concern assumption, 
participants are provided with two pieces of additional evidence, each of which refutes the going 
concern assumption. Thus, unlike Study One, the evidence is designed to unambiguously refute 
the client’s preferred accounting position.
29
 After rating the persuasiveness of evidence, Study 
Two proceeds as Study One, with participants providing final audit judgments and completing 
                                                 
29
 The first negative evidence item is the same as is used in Study One. The second negative evidence item was used 
in pilot testing when two items in each direction were provided. 
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the same post-experiment questionnaire. The case materials that have been modified in Study 
Two are presented in the Appendix (p. 180). 
4.3.2 Participants 
The participants included in Study Two are 17 auditors (13 seniors and 4 managers) from 
multiple offices of a Big 6 audit firm. Participants were solicited in the same manner as in study 
one.
30
 Two auditors that completed the study had less than three years of experience and are 
excluded from the final sample, leaving me with 15 usable responses.
31
 The final sample of 
auditors has an average of 5.2 years of public accounting experience (range 3-15 years); mean 
experience by rank is 4.0 years for seniors and 8.5 years for managers.
32
 
As in Study One, most participants (80 percent) reported being involved in audit 
engagements where substantial doubt existed about the going concern assumption. Kruskal-
Wallis analyses of variance indicate that the number of such engagements (mean = 4.3) does not 
differ by experimental condition (K = 0.00, p = 0.953) or by rank (K = 0.53, p = 0.468). 80 
percent of participants reported at least one audit engagement where going concern note 
disclosure was required and on average, 46 percent of the audits involving going concern doubt 
resulted in note disclosure. Overall it appears that participants in Study Two had sufficient 
experience dealing with going concern issues to meaningfully complete the experiment and had 
similar experience as participants in Study One.  
                                                 
30
 35 auditors accessed the website link resulting in a response rate of 49 percent; the true response rate, while 
unknown, is lower than 49 percent since not all auditors that received an email from their firm accessed the website. 
31
 Results of the experiment are qualitatively unchanged when the sample is expanded to auditors with at least 2 
years of experience (n = 17). 
32
 Experience of participants in Study Two is comparable to participants in Study One except that no senior 
managers completed Study Two and managers in Study Two are older than managers in Study One. However, mean 




4.3.3 Modifications to Experimental Design from Study One 
 I employ a two-condition design with CI strength as the only factor manipulated 
between-subjects, and an additional measured covariate, PI strength. Figure 4 illustrates the 
design of the experiment. Upon accessing the website containing the experimental case, 
participants are randomly assigned to one of the two treatment conditions.  
The first independent variable, CI strength, is manipulated in the same manner as Study 
One. Unlike Study One, PI salience is not manipulated; therefore, participants are not asked to 
respond to a survey prior to completing the audit task nor is an unrelated identity primed.
33
 The 
second independent variable, PI strength, is measured in the same manner as Study One. 
4.4 Dependent Variables 
 The dependent variables measured in Study One and Study Two are equivalent. For all 
measures outlined in this section, higher values indicate greater agreement with the client. 
Importantly, greater agreement with the client when client identity strength is high versus low 
may indicate greater bias or impairment in auditor judgment.
34
 The actual questions posed to 
participants for these variables appear in Table 1. 
4.4.1 Assessment of the Going Concern Assumption 
The main dependent variable of interest is each auditor’s assessment of the likelihood (0-
100%) that the client meets the going concern assumption, and will be able to continue to exist 
for the foreseeable future (similar to measures used in Asare 1992; and Blay 2005). I first 
measure this variable when participants have only ambiguous financial statement information 
                                                 
33
 In Study One, participants are provided with an unrelated identity prime (vacation in Canada) in the unheightened 
PI salience condition in an attempt to maintain equivalent volume of information and time across it and the 
heightened PI salience condition. This is less of a concern in Study Two; thus, no unrelated identity prime is used.  
34
 Individuals that possess a weak identity are not necessarily “against” the group but may simply not identify with 
the group (Ashforth 2001). In the latter case, audit judgments of auditors with low client identity strength do not 
represent out-group discrimination. Audit judgments of auditors with high client identity strength represent in-group 
bias and thus a difference in judgment between low and high conditions may indicate impaired judgment. However, 
a stronger test of impairment is to compare audit judgments between high client identity strength and control groups. 
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available to make their assessments (GC1). I measure this variable again (GC2) after providing 
participants with two additional pieces of audit evidence. Higher initial or final assessments 
indicate greater agreement with the client’s assertion that it meets the going concern assumption.  
4.4.2 Evaluation of Additional Evidence 
I also examine participants’ ratings of the two additional pieces of evidence (Pers1, 
Pers2). After each piece of evidence participants are asked to rate how strongly the evidence 
refutes or supports the client’s preferred position (Salterio and Koonce 1997); that is, that the 
going concern assumption is met. Participants are also asked to provide an overall rating of the 
combined evidence (PersTot). Responses for all three measures are collected using a 7-point 
Likert scale ranging from -3 (Strongly refutes) to +3 (Strongly supports). 
4.4.3 Assessment of Appropriateness of Client Conclusion 
Auditors’ going concern assessments do not require them to commit to a final decision on 
the inclusion of note disclosure in Highpoint’s financial statements regarding the going concern 
assumption. However, note disclosure results in violation of Highpoint’s debt covenants, which 
management prefers to avoid. Prior audit literature (e.g. Asare 1992; Joe 2003; Blay 2005) 
stresses the importance of examining both auditor judgments and final choices (e.g. auditor 
report opinions). Thus, I measure a final decision variable (Approp) that has more direct 
consequences for Highpoint’s financial statements. I ask auditors to evaluate the appropriateness 
of Highpoint’s conclusion that no going concern note disclosure is needed. Responses are 
collected using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from -3 (Highly inappropriate) to +3 (Highly 
appropriate). 
I do not ask participants to respond “yes” or “no” as to whether they will require note 
disclosure nor do I ask participants whether they will issue a clean, modified (note disclosure 
 
59 
required), or adverse audit opinion. Pilot testing demonstrated that binary choice variables of this 
type provide insufficient variation; the majority of participants exhibited moderately 
conservative preferences and chose to require note disclosure rather than require an adverse 
opinion (or require no further action). 
4.5 Other Measured Variables 
4.5.1 Manipulation Checks 
I use two methods to assess my manipulation of PI salience. Following Forehand et al. 
(2002), I use the spontaneous self-description method and ask participants to “Tell me about 
yourself in your own words”. Free association permits any response but participants should be 
more likely to mention their profession when PI salience is high versus low. Forehand et al. 
(2002) advocate this method for examining unconscious effects on identity salience, as is the 
case with my manipulation. I construct a variable equal to one if participants mention the 
accounting profession in their response, and zero otherwise. I construct a similar variable equal 
to one if participants refer to their actual client base, and zero otherwise in order to measure CI 
salience and verify that CI salience level is equivalent across CI strength conditions.  
I also adapt a continuous measure of PI salience from Reed (2004). Participants are asked 
to what extent the information in the experiment made them think about the accounting 
profession and the values they possess as a member of the profession.  Responses are collected 
using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (Gave it little thought) to 7 (Gave it much thought). 
Both of the dichotomous and continuous measures are presented in Table 2.  
To assess my manipulation of CI strength, I use the Inclusion of Others in the Self Scale 
(Aron et al. 2004). This is the same scale used to measure PI strength; however, the 7 images of 
overlapping circles provided to participants are of self and client (Highpoint). As a reminder, the 
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images range from no overlap (weakest identity) to near-eclipse (strongest identity). This 
measurement scale is presented in the Appendix (p. 175, question 4). 
I also determine whether my manipulation of CI strength results in greater perceptions 
that the task was a joint one between the participant and Highpoint. Recall that the case materials 
used language indicating a shared identity in the high CI strength condition but not in the low CI 
strength condition. I ask participants whether the nature and timing of audit field work (including 
reporting) was a joint task with Highpoint. Responses are collected using a 7-point Likert scale 
ranging from -3 (Strongly agree) to +3 (Strongly disagree). However, differences in wording 
may also cause participants to perceive the client as having different pressure to meet reporting 
deadlines, which may influence audit judgments. To evaluate this possibility I ask participants to 
respond as to whether the client appeared to be under pressure to meet tight reporting deadlines; 
responses are collected using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from -3 (Strongly agree) to +3 
(Strongly disagree). 
Finally, I measure the degree of ambiguity in the audit task perceived by participants and 
ask them to what extent they agree that the going concern issue had a clear right answer 
(RightAns). Responses are collected using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from -3 (Strongly agree) 
to +3 (Strongly disagree). 
4.5.2 Comprehension Checks 
As described in subsection 4.2.4, I provide participants in the treatment conditions (of 
Study One and Two) with a recall task after they read the background client information. 
Participants are asked 8 multiple-choice questions that both reinforce the client identity strength 
manipulation and measure whether participants correctly interpreted the client facts; four 
questions are identity-related and four questions relate to other facts about the client. To assist 
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them with this task, participants are able to access the prior client information when responding 
to these questions. The questions and answers are presented in the Appendix (p. 162). 
I also measure participants’ understanding of the client’s preference to avoid going 
concern note disclosure. In the post-experiment questionnaire, participants are asked to indicate 
whether disclosure of going concern uncertainty by Highpoint would result in a covenant 
violation. Participants were permitted three responses: “yes”; “no; and “I am not sure”.  
4.5.3 Identity Process Measures 
A successful manipulation of CI strength, as indicated by my manipulation check 
measure in subsection 4.5.1, will help establish that differences in audit judgments across CI 
strength conditions are indeed due to the effects of CI strength. To provide further evidence that 
identity strength is the process leading to differences in judgments, I ask auditors to assess the 
client on a number of factors that SIT and OI research has shown to be positively associated with 
identity strength. First, individuals perceive in-group members to be more likely to cooperate and 
these perceptions are related to the level of trust the individual has for in-group members 
(Haslam and Ellemers 2005). Second, competence is a key determinant of organizational trust 
(Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman 1995). Finally, individuals that have a strong identity strive to 
actively reach agreement with group members (Haslam and Ellemers 2005).  
Thus, I employ four measures to capture these constructs and ask participants to rate: (1) 
how cooperative the client would be in providing documentation for an unrelated task (Coop); 
(2) the degree to which the client is trustworthy (Trust); (3) the degree to which the client is 
competent (Comp); and (4) the importance of working with the client to avoid note disclosure 
(Avoid). Responses to all four measures are collected using a 7-point Likert scale with higher 
values indicating higher ratings of the client (or importance). The measurement scale for the first 
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question ranges from 1 (Very uncooperative) to 7 (Very cooperative). The measurement scale for 
the second and third questions range from -3 (Strongly agree) to +3 (Strongly disagree). The 
measurement scale for the fourth questions ranges from -3 (Not very important) to +3 (Very 
important). These questions are presented in Table 3. 
4.5.4 Control Variables 
 To control for any differences in accounting experience or knowledge that may influence 
results, I ask participants to disclose: the number of years they have worked in public accounting; 
the number of audits they participate in per year, whether they have participated in the audit of a 
public company; the accounting firm they work for; and their current rank in the accounting firm. 
I also ask participants to disclose whether they have an industry specialization and whether they 
were familiar with the industry/business facts described in the case materials.
35
 
To control for any differences in task-specific (i.e. going-concern) experience or 
knowledge that may influence results, I ask participants to disclose: the number of prior audits 
they participated in where the client’s going concern was in doubt; the percentage of those prior 
audits that resulted in note disclosure; the percentage of those prior audits that resulted in a 
qualified opinion; and whether they felt they had sufficient experience dealing with going 
concern issues.
36
 To control for differences in perceptions about the company’s risk, I ask 
participants to assess the company’s risk of material misstatement. Responses are collected using 
a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (Low risk) to 7 (High risk).
37
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 I measure responses to this last question (familiarity with case facts) using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from -3 
(Strongly disagree) to +3 (Strongly agree). 
36
 I measure responses to this last question (going concern experience) using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from -3 
(Strongly disagree) to +3 (Strongly agree). 
37
 Perceptions of risk may be influenced by CI strength as individuals with stronger client identities may provide 
lower risk assessments. But risk perceptions may also influence audit judgments as auditors that assess risk higher 
may lower their assessment that the client meets the going concern assumption. In sections 5.9 and 6.5, I examine 
participants’ perceptions of the company’s risk of material misstatement and attempt to rule them out as competing 
explanations for the results I find in Study One and Two. 
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To evaluate whether various perceptions about the case materials or dispositional 
characteristics of participants influenced results, I ask participants whether the task was realistic, 
challenging, and whether they felt motivated to complete it. Responses are collected using a 7-
point Likert scale ranging from -3 (Strongly agree) to +3 (Strongly disagree). I also ask 
participants to assess their confidence in their ability to complete the audit task; further, I ask 
participants to assess their confidence in each audit judgment/evaluation made (including risk of 
material misstatement). Responses to these confidence questions are collected using a 7-point 
Likert scale ranging from -3 (Not very confident) to +3 (Very confident).
38
 
4.6 Summary  
 I employ two studies to test whether client and professional identity strength influence 
audit judgments (i.e. level of agreement with the client) and whether these relationships are 
moderated by professional identity salience. I control client identity salience as high in both 
studies. In the first experiment, when the audit decision task is ambiguous, I employ a 2x2 
between-subjects design where client identity strength and professional identity salience vary, 
and professional identity strength is measured. In the second experiment, when the audit decision 
task is unambiguous, I vary client identity strength but do not alter professional identity salience; 
professional identity strength is measured. A summary of the design and expectations for auditor 
agreement with the client is presented in Table 4. 
                                                 
38
 There is a possibility that individuals will rate confidence higher as information within a condition is perceived to 
be more consistent (Joe 2003). It may be the case that the information for either the low or high client identity 
conditions is perceived as more consistent with the remaining audit evidence, and thus has a greater influence on 
audit judgments. Although prior auditing studies have measured participants’ confidence in their judgments, studies 
such as Joe (2003) and Blay (2005) do not find that confidence ratings differed across experimental conditions.  
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CHAPTER 5: RESULTS OF STUDY ONE 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides results of Study One. Section 5.2 reports demographic information 
about the participants. Section 5.3 examines the manipulation checks and section 5.4 examines 
the comprehension checks. Section 5.5 reports the analysis of the control variables. Section 5.6 
examines a number of identity process measures to validate the manipulation of client identity 
strength. Section 5.7 tests the moderating effect of professional identity salience on the 
relationship between both client and professional identity strength and initial audit judgments, in 
an ambiguous decision context. Section 5.8 explores whether these moderating relationships are 
maintained for subsequent audit judgments, in an ambiguous decision context. Section 5.9 
provides additional analysis to help validate the main results. I conclude this chapter in Section 
5.10. 
5.2 Demographic Information about Experimental Participants 
As indicated in subsection 4.2.3, the final sample of participants in this study consists of 
93 auditors that have at least three years of audit experience. Seventy-three of these auditors are 
assigned to one of the four treatment conditions; unless otherwise noted, the analysis reported in 
this chapter uses the sample of 73 auditors.
39
 On average, participants spent 30 minutes on the 
task.
40
 Table 5 provides background information about the participants.  
On average, participants had 5.5 years of public accounting experience and participate in 
approximately 8 audits per year; years of experience and number of audits do not vary 
significantly between treatment conditions (experience: F(3,69) = 0.11, p = 0.953; audits: F(3,69) 
                                                 
39
 Further, unless otherwise noted, there are no qualitative differences in the results of analysis performed in this 
section if the sample is expanded to include the 20 auditors in the control condition. 
40
 Participants in the control condition spent 18 minutes on the task, on average; they received less information and 
did not complete a recall task. 
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= 0.66, p = 0.580). Eighty-two percent of participants have participated in the audit of a public 
company on multiple occasions; this frequency does not vary significantly between treatment 
conditions (chi-square = 1.18, p = 0.757). In total, 36 seniors, 23 managers, and 14 senior 
managers completed the study; distribution of auditor rank does not vary significantly by 
treatment condition (chi-square = 1.86, p = 0.932). The auditors’ employer firm also does not 
vary significantly between conditions (chi-square = 11.62, p = 0.236).
41
 Only 4 percent of 
participants reported specializing in the technology industry, the same industry as the 
hypothetical client; the most common single industry specializations reported were financial 
services (14 percent) and manufacturing (21 percent). Auditor industry specialization does not 
vary significantly between treatment conditions (chi-square = 13.94, p = 0.530).  
On average, participants indicated that they are slightly unfamiliar with the 
industry/business facts described in the case materials (mean = -0.34, on a -3 to +3 scale). 
Further analysis reveals that these perceptions differed between treatment conditions (F(3,69) = 
3.12, p = 0.032) with only participants in the high CI strength, heightened PI salience condition 
indicating that they were familiar with the case facts (mean = 0.55). However, I do not find that 
this variable is significantly associated with the main dependent variables and my main results 
are qualitatively similar whether it is included or excluded as a covariate; thus, I exclude it from 
reported results. 
As indicated in subsection 4.2.3, where I report task-specific experience for all 
participants, participating auditors in the treatment conditions appear to have sufficient 
experience dealing with going concern audit issues. Seventy-eight percent of participants 
reported being involved in audit engagements where substantial doubt existed about the going 
concern assumption and the number of such engagements (mean = 2.9) does not differ by 
                                                 
41
 30, 18, and 23 auditors from three of the Big 4 audit firms participated; 2 auditors did not disclose their audit firm. 
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condition (F (3,68) = 0.63, p = 0.595).
42
 On average, 55 percent of the audits involving going 
concern doubt resulted in note disclosure; on average, only 8 percent of the audits involving 
going concern doubt resulted in a qualified opinion. Neither frequency differed across treatment 
conditions (note disclosure: F(3,52) = 0.48, p = 0.695; qualified opinion: F(3,52) = 1.30, p = 
0.285). On average, participants felt that they have sufficient experience with going concern 
issues (mean = 0.74, on a -3 to +3 scale) and average sentiments do not differ by treatment 
condition (F(3,68) = 1.01, p = 0.394).  
In general, characteristics of the participants appear to be randomly distributed across 
treatment conditions, reducing the likelihood that differences between conditions are attributable 
to these characteristics. However, to the extent that these characteristics have equivalent but 
significant effects on auditor judgments across all conditions, they will need to be controlled for 
to isolate the treatment effects. I perform an analysis of pair-wise correlations between 
participant characteristics and my dependent variables (untabulated) and find little evidence that 
these variables are related to the dependent variables of interest. Only one variable is 
significantly correlated with more than one dependent variable (p < 0.10, two-tailed). The 
number of audits conducted per year (Audits) is positively correlated with both GC1 and GC2.
43
 
The positive association suggests that as auditors take on more client engagements, their going 
concern assessments tend to increase. To address this potential relationship, I include Audits as 
an additional covariate in all analyses.  
                                                 
42
 Again, I exclude the auditor who reported having experience in 90 engagements with going concern issues. 
43
 Audits is significant at p < 0.05, with the dependent variables GC1, GC2, and Approp, when the control condition 
is included in the analysis. A few variables are correlated, at p < 0.05 or 0.10, only with Approp. I defer discussion 
of these variables until my analysis of Approp; they are otherwise not included as a covariate in any tests. 
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5.3 Manipulation Checks 
As discussed in Section 4.5, I employ two measures to test whether my manipulation of 
PI salience is effective. Table 6, Panels A and B, show the results for my main method, using a 
dichotomous variable based on the method by Forehand et al. (2002). Panel A confirms that 
participants are more likely to mention their accounting profession when PI salience is 
heightened (35 percent) versus not (19 percent), although Panel B indicates weak statistical 
significance (Fisher exact test: p = 0.107, one-tailed; chi square = 2.26, p = 0.133, two-tailed). 
However, Panels C and D corroborate these findings using a continuous measure of PI salience 
adapted from Reed (2004); the mean rating of PI salience is significantly higher when PI salience 
is heightened (4.76) versus not (4.19) (t62 = 1.72, p = 0.045, one-tailed). An untabulated analysis 
of variance demonstrates that the continuous measure of PI salience is not influenced by the 
manipulation of CI strength (F = 0.18, p = 0.672). 
Theory suggests that salience may be associated with strength; in an untabulated analysis 
I find that the mean of PI strength is higher when PI salience is heightened (5.46) versus 
unheightened (4.58) (t66 = 2.72, p = 0.008). Although this suggests that my manipulation of PI 
salience is affected by PI strength, by including both variables in subsequent tests, I control for 
the effect of one variable when evaluating the effect of the other on going concern assessments. 
Overall, the manipulation of PI salience appears to have worked as intended with respect to 
increasing the salience of professional identity. However, increasing PI salience also appears to 
increase the strength of professional identity. 
I also verify that the level of CI salience is equivalent across CI strength conditions; a 
chi-square test (untabulated) confirms that the likelihood of auditors referring to their actual 
client base does not differ when CI strength is manipulated as high (22 percent) versus low (22 
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percent) (chi-square = 0.00, p = 0.951). Further, mean ratings of CI strength (untabulated) do not 
differ for auditors that mentioned their client base (3.38) versus those that did not (2.86) (t71 = 
1.42, p = 0.160); in addition, mean ratings of CI strength do not differ between auditors that did 
or did not mention their client base, within either the low CI strength condition or the high CI 
strength condition. 
As discussed in Section 4.5 and shown in the Appendix (p. 175, question 4), I use a 
measure with overlapping circles representing self and client (adapted from Aron et al. 2004) to 
test that the manipulation of CI strength is effective. In Panel A of Table 7, I compare the means 
from the circle-overlap scale when CI strength is manipulated as high (3.54) versus low (2.39) 
and a t-test in Panel B confirms that the mean is higher in the high CI strength condition (t67 = 
4.25, p < 0.001, one-tailed). An untabulated analysis of variance demonstrates that the measure 
of CI strength is not influenced by the manipulation of PI salience (F = 0.01, p = 0.908). 
Contrary to my expectation, I do not find that perceptions that the task was joint between 
participant/auditor and client are higher in the high versus low CI strength condition. Panel D of 
Table 7 shows that the means reported for question 1 in Panel C are statistically indistinguishable 
(t71 = -0.21, p = 0.837). However, Panels C and D also show that perceptions of client pressure to 
meet reporting deadlines are statistically indistinguishable (t69 = 0.55, p = 0.587), which 
alleviates concerns that the language in the CI strength conditions caused different perceptions of 
pressure that could influence auditor judgments. 
Finally, I verify that the task was consistently perceived as ambiguous across treatment 
conditions. Untabulated analyses demonstrate that on average, participants found the task 
ambiguous as they disagreed that the going concern issue had a clear right answer (mean = -1.34, 
on a -3 to +3 scale); their responses are significantly less than the scale midpoint of 0 (t72 = 7.73, 
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p < 0.001) and do not differ by condition (F(3,69) = 1.02, p = 0.390).
44
 In addition, I find that 
RightAns is negatively correlated with my dependent variables and thus I include it as a covariate 
in my main analyses. This association is consistent with prior literature (e.g. Peecher et al. 2003), 
which argues that auditors are more likely to be influenced by client preference (i.e. no going 
concern problem) as ambiguity about the audit issue increases. 
5.4 Comprehension Checks 
As described in subsections 4.2.4 and 4.5.2, I employ a recall task consisting of 8 
multiple-choice questions to reinforce the client identity strength manipulation and measure 
whether participants correctly interpreted the client facts. Sixty-eight of the 73 auditors in the 
treatment conditions (93 percent) correctly answered the four identity-related questions; 64 (88 
percent) answered all eight questions correctly. Excluding those participants who did not 
correctly answer the questions from the sample does not qualitatively change the results for the 
CI strength manipulation or the tests of hypotheses; thus, I retain them in my analyses. 
As described in subsection 4.5.2, I measure whether participants understood that going 
concern note disclosure would cause Highpoint to violate its debt covenant. Four of the 73 
auditors (5 percent) answered incorrectly. A further 18 (25 percent) were unsure of the correct 
answer.
45
 Although a little more than two-thirds of participants answered this question correctly, 
its purpose is to measure whether participants understood the client preference to assert that it 
meets the going concern assumption. Prior audit research shows that auditor judgments are 
influenced in the direction of client preference; including auditors who were uncertain about 
                                                 
44
 Mean responses in the control condition (-0.55) were also less than 0 (t19 = 1.27, p = 0.109, one-tailed) but 
significantly higher than mean responses across the four treatment conditions (t91 = 1.98, p = 0.051). Recall that 
participants in the control condition do not receive client information influencing client identity strength. Perhaps 
because they had less information to evaluate overall, regardless of what the information pertained to, participants in 
the control condition perceived the going concern issue to be less ambiguous.  
45
 The proportion of auditors that were unsure of the answer did not differ across the four treatment conditions. 
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client preferences would bias against finding results and thus I include these observations in my 
sample. 
5.5 Control Variables 
I defer discussion of participants’ perceptions about the risk that the financial statements 
are materially misstated until section 5.9, where I perform supplementary analysis. Participants’ 
perceptions about the case materials, and their self-efficacy at completing the experimental task, 
are summarized in Table 8.  Descriptive statistics in Panel A of Table 8 demonstrate that, on 
average, participants found the case materials to be realistic (mean = 0.96, on a -3 to +3 scale) 
and somewhat challenging (mean = 0.64, on a -3 to +3 scale); participants also felt motivated to 
complete the task (mean = 0.81, on a -3 to +3 scale) and were confident in their ability to do so 
(mean = 1.30, on a -3 to +3 scale).
46
 Panel B of Table 8 shows that the first three measures are 
significantly correlated; thus, to examine perceptions by treatment conditions, I perform a 
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) for the first three variables and an analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) for the confidence measure. 
As shown in Panel C of Table 8, the perceptions of task characteristics do not vary 
significantly between CI strength and PI salience conditions. However, Panel D of Table 8 shows 
that participants’ confidence in their ability to complete the task varied between PI salience 
conditions (F = 5.16, p = 0.026). Untabulated analyses indicate that, on average, confidence is 
higher for participants in the heightened (mean = 1.59) versus unheightened (mean = 1.00) PI 
salience condition but both means are significantly greater than the scale midpoint of 0 (p-value 
< 0.001, either condition). Further, overall confidence is not significantly associated with the 
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 All means reported are greater than the scale midpoint of 0. 
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main dependent variables and my main results are qualitatively similar whether it is included or 
excluded as a covariate. Thus, I exclude overall confidence from reported results.
47
 
5.6 Identity Process Measures 
I ask auditors to assess the client on a number of factors that SIT research has shown to 
be positively associated with identity strength. Individuals perceive in-group members to be 
more likely to cooperate and these perceptions are related to the level of trust the individual has 
for in-group members (Haslam and Ellemers 2005); competence is a key determinant of 
organizational trust (Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman 1995). Finally, individuals that have a strong 
identity strive to actively reach agreement with group members (Haslam and Ellemers 2005). I 
employ four measures to capture these constructs, which include ratings of: (1) how cooperative 
the client would be in providing documentation for an unrelated task (Coop); (2) the degree to 
which the client is trustworthy (Trust); (3) the degree to which the client is competent (Comp); 
and (4) the importance of working with the client to avoid note disclosure (Avoid). All four 
measures use a 7-point Likert scale with higher values indicating higher ratings of the client (or 
importance). 
I expect that auditors will provide higher ratings in the high versus low CI strength 
conditions.
48
 The descriptive statistics in Panel A of Table 9 show that each of the 4 measures is 
higher in the high CI strength conditions. The correlation analysis in Panel B shows that the 
ratings of Coop, Trust, and Comp are highly correlated with each other (all p < 0.011) but none 
of the measures are highly correlated with Avoid. Thus, I use a 2 x 2 MANOVA model (Table 9, 
Panel C) to jointly test the first three measures. The results indicate a significant main effect of 
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 In addition, unless otherwise reported in subsequent analyses, participants’ confidence in their specific audit 
judgments is not significantly associated with the audit judgment and is therefore excluded from reported results. 
48
 The associations may be weaker when PI salience is high versus low, similar to my main predictions. However, PI 
salience may have no influence on these perceptions because professional standards such as ISA/CAS 200 or SAS 
99 require auditors to be skeptical about client financial statements, but not necessarily about clients themselves. 
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CI strength (F = 7.12, p < 0.001) and no effect for the CI strength by PI salience interaction (p = 
0.667). However, there is also a significant main effect of PI salience (F = 2.25, p < 0.091). 
Univariate results (untabulated) show that the mean ratings of Coop and Comp are significantly 
higher in the high CI strength condition and no other effects are significant. However, while the 
mean rating of Trust is significantly higher in the high CI strength condition, there is also a 
significant main effect for PI salience (p ≤ 0.050). Examining this result further, I find that trust 
is in fact higher when PI salience is heightened (0.38) versus not heightened (-0.17). This 
unexpected result is also opposite to what might be expected, as participants’ audit judgments are 
expected to be less client-favourable when PI salience is heightened. It is not clear why this 
result occurred. However, trust is higher when CI strength is high versus low, both when PI 
salience is heightened and not heightened. 
I use a 2x2 ANOVA model (Table 9, Panel D) to test the fourth measure; results provide 
no evidence that ratings of Avoid are higher when CI strength is high versus low (p ≤ 0.285) and 
no other effects are significant. In general, these results are consistent with theory, which 
predicts that individuals that have stronger identities will exhibit more favourable perceptions of 
group members (e.g. trustworthiness, cooperativeness, competence). I do not find that 
individuals with stronger identities more actively strive to reach agreement with those members 
(i.e. feel it is important to assist the client in avoiding note disclosure).  
In untabulated analyses I also find that ratings in the high CI strength conditions are 
significantly higher than the control condition for the first three measures (F = 3.78, p < 0.016) 
but not for the fourth measure (F = 0.46, p < 0.502). This is generally consistent with my finding, 
reported later in Subsection 5.7.2, that participants had stronger client identities in the high CI 
strength conditions versus the control condition. However, I do not find that ratings in the low CI 
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strength conditions are significantly different from the control condition for the first three 
measures (F = 0.37, p ≤ 0.774) or the fourth measure (F = 0.10, p ≤ 0.757). Thus, although 
participants in the low CI strength conditions had weaker client identities than participants in the 
control condition (see Subsection 5.7.2), there is insufficient evidence to conclude that this 
difference is related to other perceptions of the client. 
5.7 Initial Audit Judgments in an Ambiguous Decision Context 
5.7.1 Professional Identity Salience as a Moderator of Client and Professional Identity Strength 
(Tests of Hypotheses 1 and 2) 
 In hypothesis 1, I predict that the influence of CI strength on auditors’ initial agreement 
with the client is more positive when PI salience is not heightened versus heightened. In 
hypothesis 2, I predict that the influence of PI strength on auditors’ initial agreement with the 
client is more negative when PI salience is heightened versus not heightened. To test these 
hypotheses, which are reported in Table 10, I examine the effect of PI salience (PISa), CI strength 
(CISt), and the measured variable of PI strength (PI_Str) on auditors’ initial assessment of the 
likelihood that Highpoint meets the going concern assumption (GC1). Higher values for GC1 
indicate greater agreement with the client. As explained previously, I also include the covariates 
RightAns (perceived task ambiguity) and Audits (number of actual audits participated in per year) 
in an Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA). 
The ANCOVA results in Panel B of Table 10 show a significant interaction effect 
between CISt and PISa (p ≤ 0.090, two-tailed); no other main or interaction effects are significant. 
Therefore, there appears to be no support for hypothesis 2. However, the covariate-adjusted 
means in Panel A indicate that the pattern of the interaction between CISt and PISa is consistent 
with hypothesis 1. There is a greater increase in GC1 as CISt increases, when PISa is not 
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heightened (low CISt Mean = 47.40; high CISt = 59.31) versus heightened (low CISt Mean = 
53.69; high CISt = 48.30). Test of simple effects in Panel C of Table 10 show that these 
differences in means are significant when PISa is not heightened (p ≤ 0.050, one-tailed) but not 
significant when PISa is heightened (p < 0.441). Therefore, initial agreement with the client 
increases as CI strength increases, but only when PI salience is not heightened.  
I examine the effect of PI strength further in Table 11. Panel A suggests a negative trend 
in GC1 as PI_Str increases but the difference between auditors with the lowest PI strength 
(rating < 4) and highest PI strength (rating = 7) is not statistically significant. Panel B further 
suggests that the negative trend exists when PI salience is heightened but not when it is 




Overall, I find results consistent with hypothesis 1 but not with hypothesis 2. The 
evidence shows that initial agreement with the client increases as CI strength increases from low 
to high, when PI salience is not heightened but not when PI salience is heightened. Conversely, 
there is no evidence to suggest that initial agreement with the client decreases as PI strength 
increases, even when PI salience is heightened. 
5.7.2 Control Condition 
The results in the previous subsection indicate that auditors’ initial judgments are more 
aligned with client preferences when CI strength is high (versus low), although only when PI 
salience is not heightened. It is unclear from these previous results, however, if the level of client 
agreement exhibited by auditors with high CI strength is unacceptably high. To examine this 
issue, I compare the level of agreement in my treatment conditions to my control condition. 
                                                 
49
 The statistical power of this test is 0.574. Further analysis indicates that approximately 7 (13) more participants 
with relatively low PI strength (rating of 4 or less) are needed in the sample to provide statistical power of 0.8 (0.9). 
 
75 
I first examine whether the mean rating of the variable CI_Str, in the control condition, 
differs from those of the low and high CI strength conditions. If CI strength in the control 
condition is not significantly different from either of the manipulated conditions then any 
differences in audit judgments cannot be attributed to CI strength. As indicated in Section 5.3, 
my manipulation of CI strength is successful as the mean rating of CI_Str is higher in the high 
versus low CI strength conditions. I also find that the mean rating of CI_Str is higher in the high 
CI strength condition versus the control condition (untabulated; t43 = 2.15, p < 0.019, one-tailed). 
Further, I find that the mean rating of CI_Str is lower in the low CI strength condition versus the 
control condition (untabulated; t35 = -1.53, p < 0.067, one-tailed).  
Panel A of Table 12 shows that, for auditors in the control condition, initial agreement 
with the client was, on average, 49 percent. Although not formally hypothesized, recall from 
subsection 4.2.4 that I expect initial agreement to exceed the control group baseline when CISt is 
high and PISa is not heightened. Panel C of Table 12 demonstrates that this pattern is weakly 
significant (difference = 10.31; p < 0.096). As indicated by the results in Panel C, I do not find 
that auditor agreement with the client differs from this baseline when CISt is high and PISa is 
heightened (p < 0.927). I also do not find that auditor agreement with the client differs from the 
control condition baseline when CISt is low (p < 0.822). Thus, results appear to be consistent with 
expectations from identity theory. 
5.8 Subsequent Audit Judgments in an Ambiguous Decision Context 
5.8.1 Professional Identity Salience as a Moderator of Client and Professional Identity Strength 
(Exploration of Research Questions 1 and 2) 
In research question 1, I explore whether the moderating influence of PI salience on the 
relationship between agreement with the client and CI strength affects revisions in subsequent 
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relative to initial auditor agreement. Further, in research question 2, I explore whether the 
moderating influence of PI salience on the relationship between agreement with the client and PI 
strength affects revisions in auditor agreement. To explore these questions, I use a repeated-
measures (RM) ANCOVA model to examine whether identity effects influenced any changes in 
subsequent versus initial going concern assessments that may have occurred. I use the same 
variables as used in the ANCOVA model in Section 5.7; however, I also examine whether the 
presentation order of additional evidence affects auditor judgments. Recall that all participants 
receive one piece of evidence that supports the going concern assumption (“positive”) and one 
piece that refutes it (“negative”). The variable Order is equal to 0 if the negative item is 




Evaluation of Additional Audit Evidence 
Before subsequently assessing the going concern assumption, auditor participants 
evaluate the evidence itself. As expected, the mean rating of the positive item (Pers1; 0.65) is 
greater than zero (t71 = 4.22, p < 0.001, one-tailed) and the mean rating of the negative item 
(Pers2; -0.89) is less than zero (t72 = -5.55, p < 0.001, one-tailed). An untabulated ANCOVA 
indicates that neither rating is influenced by presentation order of evidence. However, there is a 
significant negative relationship between PI strength and the rating of evidence; auditors with 
higher PI strength rate the positive item less positively and the negative item more negatively. 
This relationship is not moderated by PI salience. No significant relationships are present 
between evidence ratings and CI strength, regardless of PI salience.  
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 Although order of additional evidence may influence subsequent judgments and should not influence initial 
judgments, an order effect would lead to a within-subjects difference in judgments as participants that receive 
negative (positive) information last would decrease (increase) their subsequent relative to initial judgments. 
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How participants rate the evidence overall will likely be important for how they revise 
their going concern assessments. Prior research has shown that when auditors evaluate 
subsequent evidence in a manner consistent with their initial goals, subsequent audit judgments 
are increasingly biased relative to initial judgments (Kadous et al. 2003; Blay 2005). The mean 
overall rating of evidence (PersTot; -0.21) is not statistically different from zero (t72 = -1.20, p = 
0.234). I examine the influence of identity effects and evidence order on PersTot in Table 13; the 
results demonstrate a significant interaction effect between CISt and PISa (p = 0.055). An 
untabulated contrast indicates that there is a greater increase in PersTot as CI strength increases 
when PI salience is not heightened versus heightened (t = 1.96, p = 0.055). Table 13 also 
demonstrates a significant effect of PI strength (p ≤ 0.073) and an interaction effect between PI 
strength and Order; PersTot is not significantly related to Order (p = 0.196).
51
 An untabulated 
analysis of the regression coefficients indicates that there is a significant negative relationship 
between PI strength and PersTot when negative evidence is presented last (coefficient = -0.24, p 
≤ 0.08). PI strength is not associated with PersTot when positive evidence is presented last 
(coefficient = -0.18, p ≤ 0.422). Overall, these results suggest that as CI strength increases, 
participants more strongly believe that the combined audit evidence supports the client’s 
assertion that the company will continue as a going concern (PersTot), when PI salience is not 
heightened. This interactive effect of CI strength and PI salience may further influence 
subsequent going concern assessments, if the observed interactive effect for evidence evaluation 
adds to the observed interactive effect for initial assessments. Next, I examine whether the 
interactive effect of CI strength and PI salience is replicated for subsequent going concern 
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 I do not include all interactions between Order and my five identity variables in Table 13. The model presented is 
the most parsimonious; the interactions that are excluded from this model are highly insignificant and reduce the 
overall fit of the model. 
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assessments. It is not clear whether the presentation order of evidence will also have an influence 
on revisions in going concern assessments. 
Subsequent Going Concern Assessments 
After evaluating the additional audit evidence auditors are asked to make a final 
judgment about the likelihood that the client meets the going concern assumption (GC2). I 
explore my first two research questions using a RM ANCOVA that includes identity variables 
and additional covariates, which may influence both GC1 and GC2. I also examine evidence 
order and its interaction with certain identity effects, as the analysis reported in Table 13 
suggests that evidence order may also influence GC2.
52
 The repeated measure in this analysis is 
the auditors’ going concern assessment (Assess) which encompasses the initial and the final 
going concern assessment. 
Table 14 shows the covariate-adjusted means for both GC1 (Panel A) and GC2 (Panel B); 
the values reported in Panel A are duplicates of those reported in Table 10. Panel B demonstrates 
a similar pattern of means as Panel A. However, in Panel B, the positive difference between low 
and high CI strength when PI salience is not heightened is smaller, and the negative difference 
between low and high CI strength when PI salience is heightened is larger, relative to the results 
in Panel A. Examining the RM ANCOVA in Panel C of Table 14 provides further insights. The 
within subjects results show that there are no significant interaction effects between the repeated 
measure, Assess, and the main independent variables that capture the effects of identity. This 
indicates that neither CI strength nor PI strength, regardless of the level of PI salience, has a 
significant influence on subsequent agreement with the client, relative to initial agreement with 
the client. In response to my first research question, a stronger client identity did not lead to a 
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 Again, I do not include all interactions between Order and my five identity variables in an effort to retain the most 
parsimonious model. The order effects included in the repeated measures analysis are not the same as those included 
in the ANCOVA for PersTot. However, the retained interactions provide the best overall model fit. 
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greater positive change in agreement with the client when professional identity salience was not 
heightened. In response to my second research question, a stronger professional identity did not 
lead to a greater negative change in agreement with the client when professional identity salience 
was heightened.  
The pattern of means in Panel A of Table 14 were previously shown to demonstrate a 
significant moderating effect of PI salience on the relationship between CI strength and initial 
agreement with the client, as predicted in hypothesis one. However, Panel C of Table 14 does not 
show a significant between subjects effect for the two-way interaction of CI strength and PI 
salience. This suggests that this interaction effect is not as strong for subsequent agreement with 
the client. Panel C of Table 14 does demonstrate a significant within subjects Assess x Order 
effect (p = 0.002). Since the additional evidence was presented after the initial going concern 
assessment was made, it appears that the presentation order of evidence had an influence on final 
going concern assessments. Untabulated analysis indicates that GC2 is significantly lower than 
GC1 when the negative evidence item is presented last (mean = -9.40) versus when the positive 
evidence item is presented last (mean = 4.61) (t = 3.57, p < 0.001). This is consistent with the 
recency effect. The results of Table 14 may suggest that subsequent going concern assessments 
are influenced by recency effects but not by identity effects. 
To explore this possibility further, I examine only GC2 using an ANCOVA model similar 
to the model used in the between subjects portion of the RM ANCOVA in Table 14.
53
 
Untabulated results show an insignificant difference in GC2 as CISt increases, both when PISa is 
not heightened (low CISt Mean = 48.25; high CISt = 42.41; p < 0.524) and heightened (low CISt 
Mean = 46.46; high CISt = 44.65; p < 0.839) when negative evidence is presented after positive 
evidence. However, when positive evidence is presented after negative evidence there is a 
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 However, I include all interactions between Order and my five identity variables. 
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greater increase in GC2 as CISt increases, when PISa is not heightened (low CISt Mean = 48.18; 
high CISt = 63.61) versus heightened (low CISt Mean = 53.41; high CISt = 43.12). These 
differences in means are significant when PISa is not heightened (p < 0.038, one-tailed) but not 
significant when PISa is heightened (p < 0.231). These results suggest that recency effects did not 
completely dominate identity effects for subsequent assessments; the moderating effect of PI 
salience on the relationship between CI strength and agreement with the client persisted, but only 
when positive evidence was presented last. 
5.8.2 Assessment of the Appropriateness of Client Conclusion 
After providing a final going concern assessment auditors are asked to assess the 
appropriateness of the client’s conclusion that no going concern note disclosure is needed 
(Approp). Extant audit literature has examined final choices by requesting recommendations for 
the appropriate audit opinion (Asare 1992, Joe 2003; Blay 2005). I depart from prior literature by 
measuring final choices using a continuous measure (7-point Likert scale) in an effort to avoid 
categorical variables that may have insufficient variation.
54
 I do not include this analysis in my 
main examination of research questions one and two since I do not ask participants to revise their 
conclusions. Therefore I cannot explore how the effects of identity lead, or do not lead, to 
changes in final choices. Nonetheless, the results herein may provide insight into how the effects 
of identity strength and salience influence subsequent/final audit judgments. 
I examine whether evidence order influenced Approp using an ANCOVA model. I 
include an additional covariate Public that equals 1 if the participant has had experience, on more 
than one occasion, with a public company audit, and zero otherwise. As discussed in section 5.2, 
pairwise correlation analysis revealed significant associations between the variable Approp and a 
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 As mentioned previously, pilot testing revealed a preference by participants for one of three audit opinions: note 
disclosure required. This may represent a compromise between the other choices: no action; and adverse opinion. 
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few auditor characteristics. However, only the variable Public is significantly related to Approp 
after controlling for my independent variables; the inclusion or exclusion of the other variables 
does not qualitatively change results and thus I exclude them from the analysis. 
Table 15 demonstrates that evidence order again influenced the judgments made by 
auditors. Although there is no main effect for Order, there is a significant interaction effect 
between Order and PI_Str (p ≤ 0.075) and a significant three-way interaction effect between 
Order, CISt, and PISa (p ≤ 0.011). An untabulated analysis indicates that participants who receive 
the negative evidence item last agree less with the appropriateness of the client’s conclusion as 
PI strength increases, relative to participants that receive the positive evidence item last. I 
examine the significant three way interaction effect more closely in Panels B and C of Table 15 
(discussed below). Overall, participants appear to disagree that the client’s conclusion is 
appropriate, regardless of whether the evidence order presents the negative item last (-1.31) or 
the positive item last (-1.13).
55
 Regardless of evidence order, I find that participants agree less 
with the client when PI salience is heightened relative to not heightened (p ≤ 0.055). 
Unexpectedly, I find that the association between PI strength and agreement with the client 
becomes more negative when PI salience is not heightened, relative to heightened (p < 0.09). 
However, I do not find a significant association between PI strength and agreement with the 
client when PI salience is not heightened (p = 0.791) or when PI salience is heightened (p = 
0.196). 
The covariate-adjusted means of Approp in Panel B of Table 15, when the negative 
evidence item is presented last, show an unexpected result. Agreement with the client appears to 
decrease as CISt increases, when PISa is not heightened (low CISt = -0.46; high CISt = -1.56; p < 
                                                 
55
 An untabulated analysis indicates that participants with less public company audit experience agreed significantly 
less with the client’s conclusion than auditors with more public experience (Table 15; p < 0.024).  
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0.079) while there is an insignificant increase in agreement with the client as CISt increases, 
when PISa is heightened (low CISt = -1.95; high CISt = -1.25; p < 0.651). This is opposite to the 
predictions in hypothesis one for initial audit judgments; thus, the effects of identity are not 
consistent for this subsequent judgment. This unexpected pattern of means may be driven by the 
results of the low CISt, unheightened PISa condition. Untabulated analyses indicate that 
participants in this condition had higher average ratings of Approp than the other three conditions 
combined (t = 2.07, p < 0.049) and none of the average ratings in the other conditions were 
significantly different from each other (all p > 0.248). It is not clear why average ratings in this 
one condition were less negative than the others. However, due to the small treatment cell sizes, 
caution is warranted in interpreting the results of the analysis in this Subsection. 
The covariate-adjusted means for Approp in Panel C of Table 15, when the positive 
evidence item is presented last, indicate a similar pattern as was found for initial audit 
judgments. There is a greater increase in Approp as CISt increases, when PISa is not heightened 
(low CISt = -1.16; high CISt = -0.90) versus heightened (low CISt = -0.70; high CISt = -1.78). An 
untabulated contrast indicates that this pattern is not significant (p = 0.158). 
Overall, the pattern of results for Approp is generally inconsistent with results for going 
concern assessments, regardless of whether the order of evidence created a negative or positive 
frame. As I stated earlier, this may be due to my use of a final choice variable that is inconsistent 
with prior research. It was not clear, ex-ante, how auditors would respond to the measure and 
thus whether certain aspects of the various conditions led to unintended differences.  
5.8.3 Control Condition  
The results in this section suggest that the moderating role of professional identity 
salience, on the relationship between agreement with the client and client identity strength, did 
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not lead to revisions in audit judgments. However, recency effects due to the order of additional 
evidence resulted in revisions to initial going concern assessments. Participants in the control 
condition may also have exhibited a recency bias. I examine whether revisions in going concern 
assessments differed between treatment conditions and the control condition. In particular, I am 
interested whether auditors with high CI strength, when professional identity salience is not 
heightened, revised their judgments in a different manner than auditors in the control condition, 
since these two conditions exhibited the largest difference in initial judgments (as expected).  
Regarding the evaluation of additional evidence, participants in the control condition 
provided similar ratings as participants in the treatment conditions. In the control condition, the 
mean rating of the positive item (Pers1; 0.70) is greater than zero (t19 = 2.40, p ≤ 0.013, one-
tailed), the mean rating of the negative item (Pers2; -0.85) is less than zero (t19 = -3.10, p < 
0.003, one-tailed), and the mean overall rating (PersTot; -0.25) is indistinguishable from zero (t19 
= -0.75, p < 0.460). None of the mean ratings are significantly different from the mean ratings of 
the treatment conditions (all p > 0.886). Thus, to the extent that there are differences in the 
revision in going concern assessments between participants in the treatment versus control 
conditions, it is not likely due to differences in evidence evaluation. 
I examine revisions in going concern assessments using a RM ANCOVA, which uses 
Assess as the repeated measure (as in the analysis in Table 14). The main between subjects 
variable is Control, which is equal to 1 if a participant is in the control condition, and 0 if a 
participant is in the treatment group of interest. As in Table 12, I compare the control condition 
to three treatment conditions: high CI strength and unheightened PI salience; high CI strength 
and heightened PI salience; and low CI strength. Table 16 shows the covariate-adjusted means 
for both GC1 (Panel A) and GC2 (Panel B); the values reported in Panel A are duplicates of 
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those reported in Table 12. Panel C of Table 16 demonstrates the results of the repeated 
measures analysis when comparing the control condition to the treatment condition where CI 
strength is high and PI salience is unheightened. Results for comparisons to the other treatment 
conditions are qualitatively the same and thus, I do not report any further results.  
The results of the within subjects variables in Panel C Table 16 show a significant Assess 
x Order effect (p < 0.001) but no three-way interaction of Assess x Order x Control (p = 0.667). 
These results suggest that the effect of evidence presentation order does not differ between the 
control condition and the treatment condition. Untabulated analyses also reveal that GC2 is 
statistically indistinguishable between the control condition and the high CI strength and 
unheightened PI salience condition both when the negative evidence item is presented last 
(control: 38.90; treatment: 42.92; p < 0.707) and when the positive evidence item is presented 
last (control: 59.12; treatment: 62.64; p < 0.764). These results suggest that even when positive 
evidence is presented last and professional identity salience is not heightened, auditors with 
strong client identities (who are influenced by both identity and recency effects) demonstrate no 
greater subsequent agreement with the client than auditors in the control condition (who are 
influenced only by recency effects).  
5.9 Supplementary Analyses 
 Although the results thus far suggest that auditors agree more with the client when they 
have a stronger client identity and professional identity salience is not heightened, in this section 
I attempt to rule out potential competing explanations for the experimental findings. 
5.9.1 Identification with Audit Firm 
In Subsection 2.5.1, I differentiate between professional and audit firm identity. As 
alluded to earlier, and argued by Warren and Alzola (2009), audit firm identity could be related 
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to either professional or client identity. For example, before its collapse part of Arthur 
Andersen’s strategy was to immerse itself in its clients’ businesses. Thus, it could be argued that 
part of the Andersen audit firm identity was to internalize its various client identities. Regardless, 
different audit firms have different identities, which may be more in line with their clients or the 
audit profession. While it is unclear, ex-ante, which identity any particular firm is more aligned 
with, it may be the case that differences in audit firm identity influenced the association between 
client or professional identity strength and auditor agreement with the client. 
While I do not ask participants to rate the strength of their audit firm identity I do ask 
participants to indicate the firm they work for. As indicated in Section 5.2, audit firm does not 
differ by treatment condition; further, distribution of audit firm does not differ across conditions 
if the control condition is included (chi square = 12.04, p < 0.442). An untabulated ANOVA also 
demonstrates that audit firm is unrelated to ratings of CI strength (p ≤ 0.297) and PI strength (p < 
0.522), even after controlling for manipulated independent variables. I further examine whether 
responses to the dependent variables differ by audit firm. First, audit firm does not load 
significantly when it is included as a between subjects factor in any of the ANCOVA models. 
Second, while the significance levels of my independent variables are reduced, as the inclusion 
of audit firm reduces power by using another three degrees of freedom, results remain 
qualitatively the same. In fact, the general pattern of means across treatment conditions that is 
evident, for example in Panel A of Table 10, is consistent across each of the three audit firms. 
Thus, it does not appear that the participants’ audit firm or audit firm identities had any 
significant influence on results. 
 
86 
5.9.2 Perceived Risk of Material Misstatement 
Differences in information among the various manipulated conditions may have given 
rise to different opinions on the risk of material misstatement of the client. For example, 
participants in the low (versus high) CI strength conditions may have perceived the client to be 
of greater risk and therefore provided less favourable going concern assessments and audit 
judgments. After viewing the client’s financial statements but before providing their initial going 
concern assessments, I ask participants to provide an assessment of the company’s risk of 
material misstatement (MRisk). Overall, participants believed the client to be of somewhat high 
risk as the mean response for MRisk of 5.3 is significantly greater than the scale midpoint of 4.0 
(t = 11.85, p < 0.001) and the scale point of 5.0 (t = 2.74, p < 0.010).  
An untabulated ANOVA indicates that MRisk is not associated with CI strength, PI 
salience, or their interaction (all p > 0.155). Furthermore, additional analysis indicates that 
participants’ perceptions of risk have an insignificant influence on their audit judgments. 
Participants’ risk perceptions are not associated with initial going concern assessments (F = 0.04, 
p ≤ 0.842) or final going concern assessments or evaluations of client conclusions, regardless of 
negative evidence order (GC2: F = 0.03, p < 0.855; Approp: F = 1.62, p < 0.213) or positive 
evidence order (GC2: F = 0.11, p ≤ 0.742; Approp: F = 0.53, p < 0.471). 
5.10 Summary 
This chapter provides results obtained from my tests of hypotheses and examination of 
two research questions. Generally, when the audit decision context is ambiguous, professional 
identity salience is shown to moderate the relationship between agreement with the client and 
client identity strength. Professional identity salience does not similarly moderate the 
relationship between agreement with the client and professional identity strength (nor do I show 
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a consistent effect of professional identity strength on agreement with the client). As client 
identity strength increases, auditors’ initial agreement with the client increases more when 
professional identity salience is not heightened versus heightened (Hypothesis 1 is supported). 
As professional identity strength increases, auditors’ initial agreement with the client does not 
decrease more when professional identity salience is heightened versus not heightened 
(Hypothesis 2 is not supported). 
Increasing client identity strength, when professional identity salience is not heightened, 
continues to influence auditors’ subsequent agreement with the client more than when 
professional identity salience is heightened but only if subsequent positive evidence is presented 
after negative evidence. However, these identity effects do not lead to greater subsequent 
agreement with the client, relative to initial agreement with the client (i.e. response to Research 
Question 1 is “no”). There continues to be no moderating effect of professional identity salience 
on the relationship between agreement with the client and professional identity strength and thus 
this effect is no greater for subsequent agreement with the client than initial agreement with the 
client (i.e. response to Research Question 2 is “no”). Therefore I fail to find evidence that 
professional identity strength influences subsequent agreement with the client, regardless of the 
level of professional identity salience. 
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CHAPTER 6: RESULTS OF STUDY TWO 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides results of Study Two. Section 6.2 reports demographic information 
about the participants. Section 6.3 examines the manipulation checks and section 6.4 examines 
the comprehension checks. Section 6.5 reports the analysis of the control variables. Section 6.6 
examines a number of identity process measures to validate the manipulation of client identity 
strength. Section 6.7 provides a further test of the relationship between both client and 
professional identity strength and initial audit judgments, in an ambiguous decision context when 
professional identity salience is not heightened. Section 6.8 explores whether these relationships 
are maintained for subsequent audit judgments, however, in an unambiguous decision context. I 
conclude this chapter in Section 6.9. 
6.2 Demographic Information about Experimental Participants 
As indicated in Subsection 4.3.2, the final sample of participants in this study consists of 
15 auditors that have at least three years of audit experience; all participants are from the same 
Big 6 audit firm. Due to the small sample size, most tests in this chapter are performed using 
non-parametric techniques. On average, participants spent 30 minutes on the task. Table 17 
provides background information about these participants.  
On average, participants had 5.2 years of public accounting experience and participate in 
approximately 11 audits per year; years of experience do not vary significantly between 
treatment conditions (K = 0.01, p = 0.906). However, reported number of audits is significantly 
higher in the low versus high CI strength condition (low: 14, high: 8; K = 4.34, p = 0.033). 
Nonetheless, I do not find that this variable is significantly associated with the main dependent 
variables and my main results are qualitatively similar whether it is included or excluded as a 
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covariate; thus, I exclude it from reported results. Forty-seven percent of participants have 
participated in the audit of a public company on multiple occasions; this frequency does not vary 
significantly between treatment conditions (chi-square = 1.23, p = 0.542).  
In total, 11 seniors and 4 managers completed the study; distribution of auditor rank does 
not vary significantly by treatment condition (chi-square = 1.03, p = 0.310). No participants 
reported specializing in the technology industry, the same industry as the hypothetical client; the 
most common single industry specializations reported were not-for-profit (13 percent) and 
manufacturing (13 percent). Auditor industry specialization does not vary significantly between 
treatment conditions (chi-square = 5.76, p = 0.330). On average, participants indicated they are 
slightly unfamiliar with the industry/business facts described in the case materials (mean = -0.67, 
on a -3 to +3 scale); these perceptions did not differ between treatment conditions (K = 0.13, p = 
0.722)  
Similar to participants in Study One, participating auditors in the treatment conditions 
appear to have sufficient experience dealing with going concern audit issues. Eighty percent of 
participants reported being involved in audit engagements where substantial doubt existed about 
the going concern assumption and the number of such engagements (mean = 4.3) does not differ 
by condition (K = 0.00, p = 0.953). On average, 53 percent of the audits involving going concern 
doubt resulted in note disclosure; on average, only 14 percent of the audits involving going 
concern doubt resulted in a qualified opinion. Neither frequency differed across treatment 
conditions (note disclosure:  K = 0.43, p = 0.514; qualified opinion: K = 0.00, p = 1.000). On 
average, participants felt somewhat strongly that they have sufficient experience with going 
concern issues (mean = 0.93, on a -3 to +3 scale) and average sentiments do not differ by 
treatment condition (K = 0.01, p = 0.905).  
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In general, characteristics of the participants appear to be randomly distributed between 
the two treatment conditions, reducing the likelihood that differences between conditions are 
attributable to these characteristics. However, to the extent that these characteristics have 
equivalent but non-zero effects on auditor judgments between conditions, they will need to be 
controlled for to isolate the treatment effects. I perform an analysis of pair-wise correlations 
between participant characteristics and my dependent variables (untabulated) and find little 
evidence that these variables are related to the dependent variables of interest. Only one variable 
is significantly correlated with more than one dependent variable (p < 0.05, two-tailed). The 
percentage of clients with a going concern issue that received a qualified audit opinion 
(Qualified) is negatively correlated with GC1 and GC2; the negative association suggests that 
auditors have lower going concern assessments (i.e. make more conservative judgments) as they 
experience increasing numbers of clients that require qualified audit opinions due to going 
concern issues. To address this potential relationship, I include Qualified as an additional 
between-subjects factor in all analyses.  
6.3 Manipulation Checks 
As discussed in Section 4.5 and shown in the Appendix (p. 175, question 4), I use a 
measure with overlapping circles representing self and client (adapted from Aron et al. 2004) to 
test that the manipulation of CI strength is effective. In Panel A of Table 18, I compare the 
means from the circle-overlap scale when CI strength is manipulated as high (3.29) versus low 
(1.88) and a Mann-Whitney U-test in Panel B confirms that the mean is higher in the high CI 
strength condition (U = 2.05, p < 0.020, one-tailed). Contrary to my expectation, I do not find 
that perceptions that the task was joint between participant/auditor and client are higher in the 
high versus low CI strength condition. Panel D of Table 18 shows that the means reported for 
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question 1 in Panel C are statistically indistinguishable (U = -0.18, p = 0.857). Panels C and D 
also show that perceptions of client pressure to meet reporting deadlines are statistically 
indistinguishable (U = 0.78, p = 0.439), which alleviates concerns that the language in the CI 
strength conditions caused different perceptions of pressure that could influence auditor 
judgments. 
I also verify that the level of CI salience is equivalent across CI strength conditions; a 
chi-square test (untabulated) confirms that the likelihood of auditors referring to their actual 
client base does not differ when CI strength is manipulated as high (14 percent) versus low (25 
percent) (chi-square = 0.27, p = 0.605).  
As discussed in Section 4.2, I do not manipulate PI salience in Study Two but I expect 
that the level of PI salience in this study to be comparable to the unheightened PI salience 
condition in Study One. Recall that in the unheightened PI salience condition, I provide cues 
unrelated to the accounting profession. The purpose of the cues is not to influence PI salience but 
to balance the task and information content with the heightened PI salience condition in Study 
One.  
Participants appear more likely to mention their profession in Study Two (47 percent) 
than in the unheightened PI salience condition in Study One (19 percent), which may cause 
concern that PI salience was reduced beyond the normal level in Study One. However the 
frequency in Study Two is also higher than in the heightened PI salience condition in Study One 
(35 percent) and the control condition in Study One (15 percent). The control condition, like 
Study Two, also does not have a PI salience manipulation and is comparable in frequency to the 
unheightened PI salience condition in Study One. Further, the mean rating of the continuous 
measure of PI salience is not significantly different (U = 0.94, p = 0.348) when comparing 
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participants in Study Two (3.73) to those in Study One when PI salience is not heightened (4.19). 
Thus, it does not appear that PI salience was unintentionally lowered in the unheightened PI 
salience condition in Study One. Rather, it appears that auditors from non-Big 4 firms (Study 
Two) may be more likely to describe their profession when describing themselves than auditors 
from Big-4 firms (Study One). 
The perceived level of ambiguity of the task was consistent across treatment conditions. 
Untabulated analyses demonstrate that on average, participants neither agreed nor disagreed that 
the going concern issue had a clear right answer (mean = -0.43, on a -3 to +3 scale). A Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test indicates that these responses are not significantly different from the scale 
midpoint of zero (W = -0.90, p < 0.371); responses also do not differ by condition (U = 0.59, p = 
0.554). An additional Wilcoxon signed-rank test indicates that the responses of participants in 
Study Two were significantly higher than those of participants in Study One (W = 1.80, p < 
0.072), which suggests that, as intended, participants in Study Two found the task relatively less 
ambiguous. In Study One, I found that RightAns is negatively correlated with the dependent 
variables, which is consistent with prior literature (e.g. Peecher et al. 2003). However, in Study 
Two I find a positive correlation between RightAns and my dependent variables. That is, auditors 
are more likely to agree with the client as ambiguity about the audit issue decreases. It may be 
the case that in Study Two, auditors who believed that there was a right answer believed it was 
consistent with the client being able to satisfy the going concern assumption whereas, in Study 
One, auditors appeared to believe that the right answer was that the client did not satisfy the 
going concern assumption. Regardless, I include RightAns as a covariate in my main tests. 
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6.4 Comprehension Checks 
As described in subsections 4.2.4 and 4.5.2, I employ a recall task consisting of 8 
multiple-choice questions to reinforce the client identity strength manipulation and measure 
whether participants correctly interpreted the client facts. Thirteen of the 15 auditors (87 percent) 
correctly answered the four identity-related questions and all eight questions combined. 
Excluding those participants who did not correctly answer the questions from the sample does 
not qualitatively change the results for the CI strength manipulation or the tests of hypotheses; 
thus, I retain them in my analyses. 
As described in subsection 4.5.2, I measure whether participants understood that going 
concern note disclosure would cause Highpoint to violate its debt covenant. Four of the 15 
auditors (27 percent) answered incorrectly while one further participant (7 percent) was unsure 
of the correct answer. Although only two-thirds of participants answered this question correctly, 
its purpose is to measure whether participants understood the client preference to assert that it 
meets the going concern assumption. Prior audit research shows that auditor judgments are 
influenced in the direction of client preference; including auditors with uncertainty about client 
preference would bias against my expected results and thus I do not exclude these observations 
from my sample. 
6.5 Control Variables 
Participants’ perceptions about the case materials, and their self-efficacy at completing 
the experimental task, are summarized in Table 19.  Descriptive statistics in Panel A of Table 19 
demonstrate that, on average, participants found the case materials to be realistic (mean = 1.20, 
on a -3 to +3 scale) and somewhat challenging (mean = 0.67, on a -3 to +3 scale); participants 
also felt motivated to complete the task (mean = 1.60, on a -3 to +3 scale) and were confident in 
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their ability to do so (mean = 1.60, on a -3 to +3 scale). Panel B of Table 19 shows that none of 
the measures vary significantly between CI strength conditions (all p ≥ 0.365).
56
 I also ask 
participants to provide an assessment of the company’s risk of material misstatement (MRisk). 
Untabulated analyses indicate that participants believed the client to be of somewhat high risk, as 
the mean response of 5.5 is significantly greater than the scale midpoint of 4.0 (Wilcoxon signed 
rank test: W = 3.07, p ≤ 0.002), but a Mann-Whitney rank-sum test shows no differences in 
MRisk between conditions (U = 0.66, p < 0.511). 
6.6 Identity Process Measures 
As in Study One, I ask auditors to assess the client on its perceived level of 
cooperativeness (Coop), trustworthiness (Trust), and competence (Comp) and I ask auditors the 
importance of working with the client to avoid note disclosure (Avoid). All four measures use a 
7-point Likert scale with higher values indicating higher ratings of the client (or importance). I 
expect that auditors will provide higher ratings in the high versus low CI strength conditions. The 
descriptive statistics in Panel A of Table 20 show that each of the 4 measures is higher in the 
high CI strength condition. In Panel B I use the non-parametric, Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA to 
examine the significance of each measure. The results indicate a significant effect of CI strength 
for all measures except Coop (Coop p ≤ 0.476, one-tailed; all other p ≤ 0.034, one-tailed). In 
general, these results are consistent with theory, which predicts that individuals that have 
stronger identities will exhibit stronger perceptions of group members and more actively strive to 
reach agreement with those members.  
                                                 
56
 In addition, unless otherwise reported in subsequent analyses, participants’ confidence in their specific audit 
judgments is not significantly associated with the audit judgment and is therefore excluded from reported results. 
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6.7 Initial Audit Judgments in an Ambiguous Decision Context 
 Although the main purpose in Study Two is to examine audit judgments in an 
unambiguous context, the design of the experimental task allows me to corroborate findings from 
Study One for initial audit judgments. The going concern issue is initially described in an 
ambiguous manner – as in Study One – and only after additional evidence is provided does the 
audit evidence unambiguously indicate that the going concern assumption is unsupported. 
Although I only examine a setting where PI salience is not heightened, results for initial audit 
judgments would be consistent with Study One if there is a positive relationship between CI 
strength and auditors’ initial agreement with the client and no relationship between PI strength 
and auditors’ initial agreement with the client. To examine these relationships, which are 
reported in Table 21, I examine the effect of CI strength (CISt), and the measured variable of PI 
strength (PI_Str) on auditors’ initial assessment of the likelihood that Highpoint meets the going 
concern assumption (GC1). Higher values for GC1 indicate greater agreement with the client. As 
explained previously, I also include the covariates RightAns (perceived task ambiguity) and 
Qualified (percentage of actual prior audits with going concern doubt that resulted in a qualified 
audit opinion) in an ANCOVA. 
The ANCOVA results in Panel B of Table 21 show a significant effect for PI_Str (p ≤ 
0.099) but not for CISt (p ≤ 0.538). The covariate-adjusted means in Panel A indicate that the 
pattern for CI strength is consistent with expectations as GC1 is higher when CISt is high (55.49) 
versus low (47.69). A power analysis indicates that the power of this test is quite low (0.16, 
alpha = 0.05 one-sided). The number of participants needed per condition to demonstrate a 
significant result when power equals 0.4 or 0.8 is 38 and 121, respectively.
57
 An untabulated 
                                                 
57
 In Study One, the comparison of low versus high CI strength in the unheightened PI salience condition had an 
approximate power level of 0.4.  
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analysis reveals that PI strength has a significantly positive relationship with GC1 (regression 
coefficient = 11.50, p ≤ 0.099), which is unexpected. In this setting, when PI salience was not 
influenced, auditors not only showed no negative association between PI strength and initial 
audit judgments but actually agreed with the client more as PI strength increased. 
Overall, the results in Study Two do not corroborate the findings from Study One. 
However, the sample size appears insufficient to detect significant differences between treatment 
conditions.  In addition, I find a positive relationship between initial agreement with the client 
and PI strength. 
6.8 Subsequent Audit Judgments in an Unambiguous Decision Context (Exploration of 
Research Question 3) 
In research question 3, I explore whether there is a relationship between revisions in 
auditor agreement with the client and CI strength when additional audit evidence unambiguously 
indicates that the client’s position is unsupportable. In Study Two, both additional pieces of audit 
evidence provide evidence that does not support the client’s position that it meets the going 
concern assumption. Thus, subsequent audit judgments are made in an unambiguous context, as 
opposed to initial audit judgments.  
Participants in Study Two received two pieces of additional, negative evidence; one item 
was the same as participants received in Study One and thus I refer to the evaluation of this 
evidence as I did in Study One (Pers2). The evaluation of the other item is referred to as Pers3.  
As expected, the mean rating of each evidence item (Pers2: -0.87; Pers3: -0.33) is less than the 
scale midpoint of 0, although untabulated Wilcoxon signed-rank tests demonstrate that only 
Pers2 is significant (Pers2: W = -2.02, p < 0.043; Pers3: W = -0.90, p < 0.369). Untabulated 
ANCOVA models also indicate that neither rating is influenced by CI strength.   
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The mean overall rating (PersTot; -0.90) is also significantly lower than zero (W = -1.91,     
p < 0.057). The ANCOVA results in Panel B of Table 22 show no significant effects for CISt (p ≤ 
0.379) or PI_Str (p < 0.502). The covariate-adjusted means in Panel A indicate that the pattern of 
means for PersTot is higher – i.e. less negative – when CISt is high (-0.47) versus low (-1.34). A 
power analysis indicates that the power of this test is low (0.23, alpha = 0.05 one-sided) but the 
effect of CI strength on PersTot is stronger than the effect on GC1. The number of participants 
needed per condition to demonstrate a significant result when power equals 0.4 or 0.8 is 19 and 
59, respectively.  
After evaluating the additional audit evidence auditors are asked to make a final 
judgment about the likelihood that the client meets the going concern assumption (GC2). In 
Table 23 I examine whether CI strength influences how participants revise initial assessments to 
determine final assessments, using a RM ANCOVA. As in Study One, the repeated measure is 
Assess and I use the same variables as used to evaluate GC1 in study two (see Table 21). Panel A 
and Panel B of Table 23 show the covariate-adjusted means for the two CI strength conditions, 
for initial and subsequent going concern assessments, respectively. Whereas there is an 
approximately 8 percent increase in GC1 as CI strength increases, there appears to be little 
important difference in the mean of GC2 as CI strength increases (low CISt = 46.18; high CISt = 
48.65). Panel C of Table 23 provides results of the repeated measures analysis and shows that 
there are no significant effects. This indicates that the effect of CI strength did not differ across 
initial and subsequent audit judgments. However, my tests failed to detect a positive relationship 
for initial going concern assessments. Thus, it is unclear whether the lack of association between 
CI strength and revisions in going concern assessments is due to low power or because 
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participants with stronger client identities did not agree more with the client to begin with. I 
attempt to address these issues with the following analysis. 
The power analysis for GC1 indicated that increasing the sample size by a factor of 
approximately 5 may provide significant results if power = 0.4; even for a power level of 0.4, the 
sample size would need to increase by a factor of approximately 55 to reach significance for 
GC2 (412 participants needed per cell). Alternatively, rating the likelihood of continued client 
existence as above the 50 percent threshold indicates that a participant believes the client is 
likely to succeed, whereas a rating below the 50 percent threshold indicates that a participant 
believes the client is likely to fail (Joe 2003). The mean initial assessment of auditors with strong 
(weak) client identities is above (below) the 50 percent threshold, although the difference in 
means is not significant. Nonetheless, this pattern is similar to that exhibited by participants in 
Study One, when PI salience was unheightened. Unlike Study One, the mean subsequent 
assessment for auditors with strong client identities dropped below the 50 percent threshold. 
Thus, there is little difference in subsequent opinion between auditors with strong and weak 
client identities and both groups indicated the client is likely to fail.  
After providing a final assessment auditors are asked to assess the appropriateness of the 
client’s conclusion that no going concern note disclosure is needed (Approp). The ANCOVA 
results in Panel B of Table 24 show no significant effects for CISt (p < 0.599) or PI_Str (p < 
0.629). The pattern of covariate-adjusted means of Approp in Panel A show a pattern similar to 
the other dependent variables. Agreement with the client is higher (less negative) when CISt is 
high (-0.96) versus low (-1.54); the power of this test is 0.15 (alpha = 0.05, one-tailed). There is 
more power for this test than for GC2 but less than the test for GC1; the number of participants 
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needed per condition to demonstrate a significant result when power equals 0.4 or 0.8 is 58 and 
165, respectively. 
Overall, regarding research question 3, there is no relation between client identity 
strength and revisions in agreement with the client that are made subsequent to the provision of 
evidence that is unambiguously against the client. However, initial agreement with the client, 
when the decision context is ambiguous, is also not related to client identity strength. Increasing 
the sample size may improve results for initial going concern assessments but is not expected to 
improve results for subsequent assessments. This alternative outcome would indicate that in an 
unambiguous setting, auditors do not agree more with the client as client identity strength 
increases, consistent with arguments made in prior audit literature (Kadous et al. 2003). 
6.9 Summary 
This chapter provides results obtained from my examination of research question three. 
Generally, when the audit decision context is unambiguous and professional identity salience is 
not heightened, there is no relationship between agreement with the client and client identity 
strength. As client identity strength increases, auditors’ subsequent revisions in agreement with 
the client do not increase when professional identity salience is not heightened (response to 
Research Question 3 is no).  
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
7.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I provide concluding remarks on the results of my research. Section 7.2 
discusses the main results from both studies and their implication for the audit profession and 
future audit research. Section 7.3 discusses the limitations of this thesis and the opportunities for 
future research that these limitations provide. I conclude this thesis in Section 7.4. 
7.2 Discussion of Results and Implications 
 The results presented in Chapter 5 show support for hypothesis 1 but not hypothesis 2, 
and indicate that these effects are not any greater regarding research questions 1 and 2. The 
results presented in Chapter 6 indicate that no differences exist between conditions regarding 
research question 3. Collectively these findings provide evidence that, in an ambiguous setting, 
the positive relationship between auditors’ agreement with the client and client identity strength 
is moderated by professional identity salience. My findings are tenuous as to whether auditors 
with a strong client identity show any favouritism to the client preference in an unambiguous 
setting as these same auditors did not show favouritism to the client preference in an ambiguous 
setting. 
7.2.1 Initial Audit Judgments in an Ambiguous Setting 
 In an ambiguous setting, auditors’ initial agreement with the client increases as client 
identity strength increases, but only when professional identity salience is not heightened 
(Hypothesis 1). Increasing professional identity salience eliminates the positive relationship 
between initial agreement with the client and client identity strength. However, I do not find 
compelling evidence that professional identity salience moderates the relationship between 
auditors’ initial agreement with the client and professional identity strength (Hypothesis 2). 
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Further, I do not find that auditors with stronger professional identities agree with the client less 
than auditors with weaker professional identities.  
The lack of results supporting hypothesis 2 appears to be a result of auditors in the high 
client identity strength condition of my experiment reacting in a similar manner to an increase in 
professional identity salience, regardless of professional identity strength. This reaction is 
demonstrated through the elimination of a positive association between initial agreement with the 
client and client identity strength when professional identity salience is heightened. Even 
auditors with weaker professional identities appear to (feel compelled to) be more skeptical when 
professional identity salience is heightened, resulting in no difference in agreement with the 
client as professional identity strength increases. Moreover, I expected little difference in initial 
agreement with the client as professional identity strength increased, when professional identity 
salience was not heightened. Thus, there is no relationship between professional identity strength 
and initial agreement with the client, regardless of the level of professional identity salience.  
Although prior research (King 2002; Bamber and Iyer 2007) has found a negative 
relationship between professional identity strength and agreement with the client, the results may 
be due to a confound between professional identity strength and salience. For example, King 
(2002) argues that a strong auditor (professional) identity mitigates the influence of client 
identity strength but appears to manipulate both audit group salience and strength in his “strong” 
audit group setting. Thus, in addition to his two conditions that are analogous to low and high 
client identity strength, his two group affiliation conditions are analogous to low professional 
identity strength/unheightened professional identity salience and high professional identity 
strength/heightened professional identity salience. One cannot determine whether it was 
professional identity salience, strength, or their combination that produced the results in King 
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(2002). This is an important distinction to make, however, since auditors generally have strong 
professional identities (Suddaby et al. 2009). While a strong professional identity is important, 
my results demonstrate that a strong professional identity is insufficient in mitigating the 
influence of a strong client identity if professional identity salience is not sufficiently high. 
A comparison of my results to King (2002) warrants further examination. Even if I could 
definitively claim that King’s results are attributable to professional identity salience, his results 
would show both a main effect of professional identity salience and of client identity strength on 
auditor judgments. Conversely, I find only an interaction effect of client identity strength and 
professional identity salience on initial auditor judgments. I find similar results as those shown in 
Table 10 even if my unheightened (heightened) professional identity salience condition only 
includes auditors with low (high) professional identity strength. Thus, similar to King (2002), my 
results demonstrate that auditor agreement with the client increases as client identity strength 
increases when professional identity salience is not heightened and professional identity strength 
is low.  
Although I did not previously examine my results as such, my results also indicate that 
when client identity strength is high, auditor agreement with the client is lower for auditors when 
professional identity salience is heightened and professional identity strength is high versus when 
professional identity salience is not heightened and professional identity strength is low. Further, 
as in King (2002), the level of auditor agreement with the client does not appear to differ when 
professional identity salience is not heightened, professional identity strength is low, and client 
identity strength is low versus when professional identity salience is heightened, professional 
identity strength is high, and client identity strength is high. However, unlike King (2002) the 
level of agreement in these two conditions is not higher than, but also appears not to differ 
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significantly from, the condition when professional identity salience is heightened, professional 
identity strength is high, and client identity strength is low. In my study, it appears that when 
client identity strength is low auditors with strong professional identities (when professional 
identity salience is heightened) do not agree with the client less than auditors with weak 
professional identities (when professional identity salience is not heightened).  
The lack of consistent results with King (2002) may be due to a number of reasons. First, 
the difference in audit judgment of student participants that were induced versus not induced to 
have a strong group affiliation (King 2002) may be greater than the difference in audit judgment 
exhibited by professional auditors with varying degrees of professional identity strength (my 
study). Recall that participants in my study with “weak” professional identities still have 
moderately strong professional identities. Thus, they may make similar judgments as auditors 
with strong professional identities, when both groups have low client identity strength. Second, 
participants in King (2002) may have responded more sharply to his manipulation of 
professional identity strength/salience due to the explicit nature of his manipulations; for 
example, he explicitly threatens to publicly shame the auditor that exhibits the most bias toward 
the client. My manipulation of professional identity salience is much more subtle; this subtlety 
may not have been sufficient to cause auditors to significantly increase their skepticism and 
thereby decrease agreement with the client, when client identity strength was already low.  
Regardless of the cause of differences between my results and those of King (2002), my 
thesis demonstrates that professional identity salience can be heightened through cues related to 
the profession. Practically, professional identity salience can be heightened by the use of 
professional slogans or promotional items in audit materials (e.g. screensavers, stationery) or 
shifting auditors’ focus from a client service to a public service role. Partners can communicate 
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this latter focus and auditors could be reminded of it prior to making judgments about ambiguous 
audit issues.
58
 For example, electronic versions of professional standards bookmarked to the 
rules of professional conduct would heighten professional identity salience prior to auditors 
navigating to specific rule provisions. 
7.2.2 Subsequent Audit Judgments in an Ambiguous Setting 
In an ambiguous setting, I find that both identity effects and the presentation order of 
evidence have important implications for auditors’ subsequent agreement with the client. The 
order of evidence led auditors to revise their initial agreement with the client in a manner 
consistent with the recency effect. Auditors that viewed the negative (positive) evidence item last 
demonstrated greater decreases (increases) in agreement with the client, subsequent to evaluating 
the additional evidence. Auditors with stronger client identities did not exhibit any greater 
subsequent agreement with the client, relative to their initial level of agreement, even when 
professional identity salience was not heightened (Research Question 1). However, results 
indicate that the identity effects that influenced initial audit judgments, while not magnified, still 
influenced subsequent audit judgments when subsequent positive evidence was presented after 
subsequent negative evidence. I do not find that the relationship between auditors’ agreement 
with the client and professional identity strength, as moderated by professional identity salience, 
is any different for subsequent versus initial agreement (Research Question 2). Given the lack of 
support for Hypothesis 2, it does not appear that professional identity salience moderated the 
relationship between professional identity strength and subsequent audit judgments, nor is 
professional identity strength related to subsequent audit judgments. 
                                                 
58
 This is similar to the justification preferences communicated by partners (e.g. “client insight-inducing” versus 
“skepticism-inducing”) as suggested by Peecher (1996). However, partners need not explicitly ask subordinates to 
be skeptical but rather stress public service as opposed to client service or client sales. 
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These results contribute to prior auditing literature on recency bias and evidence order 
effects. For example, Asare (1992) argues that the effect of evidence order will dominate initial 
judgment frames, such that subsequent audit judgments are only influenced by the order of 
evidence. My results suggest that how the initial judgment frame is generated matters. Asare 
(1992) generated initial judgment frames by suggesting that the client was either more likely to 
be viable or more likely to fail. Client identity strength leads auditors with stronger client 
identities to view the client more favourably, which can result from generating a positive client 
frame relative to auditors with weak client identities (Maitner et al. 2010). My results are 
consistent with the statement that social identities are powerful predictors of behaviour (Ashforth 
et al. 2008). In my study, client identity strength is a powerful frame/factor that influences 
auditors’ initial agreement with the client and still influences subsequent revisions in agreement, 
even as additional negative and positive evidence is encountered. However, my results also 
suggest that framing evidence negatively (presenting negative evidence last) can induce auditors 
to be highly sceptical and resist the influence of a strong client identity.   
7.2.3 Subsequent Audit Judgments in an Unambiguous Setting 
 In an unambiguous setting, I provide evidence about the relationship between auditors’ 
subsequent agreement with the client and both client identity strength (Research Question 3) and 
professional identity strength. Prior research has provided little evidence about audit judgments 
in an unambiguous setting (with the notable exception of Salterio and Koonce 1997) although 
many suggest that auditors will not show favouritism to client preferences when an audit issue is 
unambiguously against the client (Kadous et al. 2003; Blay 2005). The influence of client 
identity strength is generally “unconscious” and showing client favouritism in an unambiguous 
context would likely indicate an unintentional lapse in professional judgment as opposed to 
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intentional deceit. Nonetheless, favouring the client preference when audit evidence indicates 
that preference is not supportable would demonstrate a failure by the auditor to adhere to 
professional standards. Consistent with prior arguments in the audit literature, I do not find that 
client identity strength is related to subsequent revisions in auditor agreement with the client that 
are made after unambiguous evidence is presented. However, I do not find compelling evidence 
that client identity strength is related to initial auditor agreement made prior to the presentation 
of the unambiguous evidence (i.e. when the task is ambiguous).  
7.2.4 Comparisons to Control Condition 
 I compare the results of auditors in my treatment conditions to a control condition in an 
ambiguous audit setting. My results indicate that auditors in the control condition initially made 
judgments that appeared to neither favour nor disfavour the client.  Further, only auditors with 
strong client identities, when professional identity salience is not heightened, differed in their 
initial agreement with the client (agreed more) relative to the control condition. This suggests 
that a strong client identity can induce biased agreement with the client while increasing 
professional identity salience can mitigate this effect.  
 For subsequent auditor judgments, I do not find significant differences in revisions in 
going concern assessments between the control condition and any of the treatment conditions. 
Results indicate that auditors in the control condition were prone to recency effects similar to 
those observed for auditors in the treatment conditions. Auditors in the treatment conditions were 
also influenced by the interaction of client identity strength and professional identity salience. 
Thus, when professional identity salience is unheightened, auditors are influenced by both client 
identity strength and recency effects. However, subsequent agreement with the client exhibited 
by auditors with strong client identities is no greater than auditors in a control condition, who are 
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only influenced by recency effects. But to the extent that recency effects are undesirable then the 
subsequent agreement exhibited by auditors with strong client identities is still undesirable. 
7.3 Limitations and Opportunities for Future Research 
Limitations of my study provide opportunities for future research. I attempt to hold 
auditors’ financial incentives, both positive and negative, constant. While recent evidence 
suggests that auditor ethics and professionalism may be more important than financial incentives 
for auditors to maintain their independence (Hope and Langli 2010), individuals tend to respond 
to both financial and non-financial incentives (Evans, Hannan, Krishnan, and Moser 2001). 
Future research may explore whether client financial importance (to the auditor or audit firm) 
exacerbates the influence of client identity on auditor judgment or whether certain auditors, 
given individual characteristics, are more likely to be influenced by their professional identity or 
litigation risk.  
I do not directly measure objectivity or professional skepticism of auditors in my 
experiment; Hurtt (2010) has developed a scale that measures professional skepticism as a stable 
auditor trait. Future research may use her scale to more generally examine how trait skepticism 
influences client and professional identity strength, or potentially, how identity strength or 
salience influences skepticism. I manipulate client identity in an experimental setting, which may 
limit the ability to observe extremely strong client identities. Suddaby et al. (2009) show that 
auditors’ identity with actual clients can be quite strong; a more powerful client setting may lead 
to different inferences about the extent to which professional identity salience must be activated 
or other debiasers of client identity that may be effective. For example, a more powerful client 
setting may create greater pressure from the client such that when both client and professional 
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identities are salient, auditors may not simply adhere to their professional identity but choose 
alternative strategies to deal with the identity conflict, as suggested by Ashforth et al. (2008).  
Future research can examine other cues or aspects of the audit task that influence 
professional identity salience. In particular, increased engagement risk or the review process 
common in audit tasks may lead to increased accountability and more careful thinking when 
evaluating evidence (Kennedy 1993) including greater thought about the goals of the profession, 
which serves to increase professional identity salience. Accountability may also increase the 
salience of the audit team identity; whether this increases or decreases agreement with the client 
may depend on both audit team/firm identity strength and the client identity strength of other 
audit team members. In particular, the strength of subordinates’ audit team/firm identity and 
supervisors’ client identity may significantly influence how auditor judgments made during field 
work translate into final decisions regarding the financial statements or the auditor’s report. 
In chapter 2, I argued that my choice to focus on the professional rather than 
organizational (i.e. audit firm) identity is in part due to professional values developing prior to, 
and thus driving, audit firm values. Recent work by Suddaby et al. (2009) offers a different 
perspective; the professional identity is mediated by an individual’s organizational identity. For 
example, the authors argue that the sheer size of audit firms, in particular that of the Big 4, 
results in an organizational presence that overshadows the profession. In this regard, the thrust of 
professional values for an auditor comes from the values espoused by the audit firm; again, it is 
not clear what direction this will lead the auditor in. It has been argued that the focus by Arthur 
Andersen on client service and consulting fees was a root cause of their audit failures (Chung 
and Kallapur 2003) and yet, others point out that independence was a core value of Arthur 
Andersen (Squires, Smith, MacDougall, and Yeack 2003). Although I have chosen to examine 
 
109 
professional identity, including audit firm identity as an additional focus may have provided 
broader insights. The results of Suddaby et al. (2009) suggest that both audit firm identity and 
client commitment may be increasingly important relative to professional identity for auditors of 
higher ranking positions in the audit firm. Future research in this area could examine, for 
example, whether a strong professional identity is less relevant in predicting auditor judgments in 
the presence of a strong audit firm identity. Further, future research can more directly examine 
the values that a strong audit firm identity engenders and how this differs across individual firms, 
the size of firm, or firm type (e.g. Big4 versus others; regional vs. national vs. international). 
7.4 Conclusions 
I believe that the results of this thesis will make important contributions to the audit 
literature. Existing audit literature suggests that different levels of client versus professional 
identity strength will lead to differences in auditor judgments (King 2002; Bamber and Iyer 
2007). My results, consistent with recent research in SIT (Forehand et al. 2002; LeBoeuf et al. 
2010), suggest that the effects of client identity strength depend on professional identity salience. 
In particular, the impaired objectivity induced by a strong client identity may not be mitigated by 
professional identity strength when professional identity salience is not heightened but increasing 
professional identity salience appears to eliminate this impaired objectivity.  
While prior research has closely related client identity to client familiarity, my results 
show that a strong client identity can be formed through subtle cues that routinely occur in the 
audit context, which is distinct from familiarity or auditor tenure. This is also important to audit 
practice as it suggests that client identity may pose a greater risk than current guidelines and 
rules acknowledge. More careful thought should be given to how to mitigate such risk, which 
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Illustration of Hypotheses 
 
Panel A: Hypothesis 1 
Moderating Effect of Professional Identity (PI) Salience on the Association 































H1: B-A > 0




Panel B: Hypothesis 2 
Moderating Effect of Professional Identity (PI) Salience on the Association 






























H2: D-C < 0






Figure 2  
Timeline of Study One  
(manipulation steps in bold) 
 




Recall task that questions: i) client facts related to identity; and ii) unrelated client facts 
(1) 
Details about engagement and results of planning meeting 
Includes information about low client image, success & reputation, lack of prestige of 
the audit, and the audit and F/S being stressed as distinct auditor & client tasks 
 
(3a) 
Verbal/visual cues related to national 
tourism 




View preliminary financial statements 
Assess client’s risk of material misstatement (MRisk) 
Assess initial likelihood of agreement that client meets going concern assumption (GC1) 
(6) 
Further evidence supporting and refuting going concern assumption 
Assess persuasiveness of evidence (Pers1, Pers2, PersTot) 
 
(7) 
Finalize assessment of the likelihood of agreement that client meets the going concern 
assumption (GC2) 
Assess appropriateness of client’s conclusion that no material uncertainty about going 
concern exists (Approp) 
 
Assess importance of working with client to avoid note disclosure (Avoid) 
(8) 




Verbal/visual cues related to 
accounting profession 




Details about going concern (audit) issue 
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Figure 2 (Continued) 
 
 




Recall task that questions: i) client facts related to identity; and ii) unrelated client facts 
(1) 
Details about engagement and results of planning meeting 
Includes information about high client image, success & reputation, prestige of the 
audit, and the audit and F/S being stressed as a joint task between auditor & client 
 
(3a) 
Verbal/visual cues related to national 
tourism 




View preliminary financial statements 
Assess client’s risk of material misstatement (MRisk) 
Assess initial likelihood of agreement that client meets going concern assumption (GC1) 
(6) 
Further evidence supporting and refuting going concern assumption 
Assess persuasiveness of evidence (Pers1, Pers2, PersTot) 
 
(7) 
Finalize assessment of the likelihood of agreement that client meets the going concern 
assumption (GC2) 
Assess appropriateness of client’s conclusion that no material uncertainty about going 
concern exists (Approp) 
 
Assess importance of working with client to avoid note disclosure (Avoid) 
(8) 




Verbal/visual cues related to 
accounting profession 



































Manipulated intervention. Each participant is either presented with client information that strengthens 
client identity (coded 1) or weakens client identity (coded 0). 







Dependent Variable Measurements 
 
Assessment of Going Concern Assumption 
 
The following questions were used to measure participants’ assessment of the likelihood that the 
client (Highpoint) meets the going concern assumption; both after financial statements were 
presented (GC1) and subsequently, after two additional evidence items were presented (GC2). 
Responses are collected by requesting a percentage between 0 and 100 percent. 
 
GC1  Based solely on the financial statement information previously presented, what do you 
believe is the likelihood that the company meets the going concern assumption and will 
be able to continue to exist for the foreseeable future (0-100%)? 
 
GC2  After viewing the evidence presented, what do you believe is the likelihood that the 
company meets the going concern assumption and will be able to continue to exist for 
the foreseeable future (0-100%)? 
 
 
Evaluation of Additional Evidence 
 
The following questions were used to measure participants’ evaluation of two additional 
evidence items (Pers1 and Pers2; questions are equivalent), and their overall evaluation of the 
combined evidence (PersTot). Responses are collected using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 
-3 (Strongly refutes) to +3 (Strongly supports). 
 
Pers1&2 How strongly does the above evidence refute or support the company’s going concern 
assumption that it will continue to exist for the foreseeable future? 
 
PersTot How strongly did all the previous sources of evidence, taken all together, refute or 
support the company’s going concern assumption that it will continue to exist for the 
foreseeable future? 
 
Assessment of Appropriateness of Client Conclusion 
 
The following question was used to measure participant’s final decision about the 
appropriateness of the client’s conclusion that it meets the going concern assumption and, 
therefore, does not require note disclosure (Approp). Responses are collected using a 7-point 
Likert scale ranging from -3 (Highly inappropriate) to +3 (Highly appropriate). 
 
Approp How appropriate is the client’s conclusion that there is no material uncertainty about its 




Professional Identity Salience Measurements 
 
The following questions were used to measure participants’ perceptions of professional identity 
salience during the audit task. These questions were the first questions asked as part of the post-
experiment questionnaire. 
 
Responses for question 1 are collected by permitting the participants to respond in the space 
provided below the question. Responses for question 2 are collected using a 7-point Likert scale 
ranging from 1 (Gave it little thought) to 7 (Gave it much thought). 
 
1. Tell me about yourself in your own words. Feel free to list anything that describes you as 
a person. Do not identify yourself by name. Please take about a minute to do so. 
 
2. To what extent has the information in this experiment made you think about the 





Identity Strength Process Measurements 
 
The following questions were used to measure participants’ perceptions of various client factors 
that prior research has shown to be associated with identity strength. These questions were 
provided as part of the post-experiment questionnaire. 
 
Responses for question 1 are collected using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (Very 
uncooperative) to 7 (Very cooperative). Responses for questions 2 and 3 are collected using a 7-
point Likert scale ranging from -3 (Strongly agree) to to +3 (Strongly disagree). Responses for 
question 4 are collected using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from -3 (Not very important) to +3 
(Very important). 
 
1. Imagine that another accounting issue arises that will require the client to provide you 
with a significant amount of documentation and additional information. How cooperative 
do you think the client will be in providing you with the details requested? 
 
2. Based on the information provided about the client, I consider the client to be trustworthy. 
 
3. Based on the information provided about the client, I consider the client to be competent. 
 
4. How important is it to negotiate or work with Highpoint in order to avoid note disclosure 








Client Image/ Audit & Predicted
Reputation F/S as Recall Agreement
& Prestige Joint of Client Verbal & With
Treatment Group of Audit Task Information Visual Cues Client
Study One
E N/A N/A N/A N/A Low
Study Two
N/A Uncertain
CI Strength Low 
& PI Salience 
Heightened
CI Strength High 
& PI Salience 
Heightened
CI Strength High 
& PI Salience 
Not Manipulated
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Summary of Design and Expectations for Auditor Agreement with the Client
A
CI Strength Low 















Mean Median Dev. Minimum Maximum N
1. Experience working in public 5.45 4.00 2.67 3.00 13.00 73
accounting (years):
Standard
Mean Median Dev. Minimum Maximum N
2. Number of audits per year: 8.32 6.00 6.08 1.00 25.00 73
3. Participated in the audit of a public
company: Number Percentage
"No" 8 11%
"Yes, once" 5 7%
"Yes, multiple times" 60 82%
73 100%
4. Rank of employment: Number Percentage
Senior 36 49%
Manager 23 32%
Senior Manager 14 19%
73 100%
5. Industry specialization: Number Percentage
Financial Services 10 14%
Manufacturing 15 21%






Mean Median Dev. Minimum Maximum N
6. Familiar with industry/business -0.34 0.00 1.68 -3.00 3.00 73
facts described in case materials:
[on a scale of -3 (Strongly disagree) to +3 (Strongly agree)]




Table 5 (Continued) 
Standard
Mean Median Dev. Minimum Maximum N2
7. Number of prior audits with going 2.89 2.00 2.92 0.00 10.00 72
concern doubt:
Standard
Mean Median Dev. Minimum Maximum N2 3
8. Percentage of prior audits (in Q7) 55% 55% 0.39 0% 100% 56
that resulted in note disclosure:
Standard
Mean Median Dev. Minimum Maximum N2 3
9. Percentage of prior audits (in Q7) 8% 0% 0.23 0% 100% 56
that resulted in a qualified opinion:
Standard
Mean Median Dev. Minimum Maximum N
10. Self-perceived sufficient 0.74 1.00 1.57 -3.00 3.00 73
experience with going concern issues:




No other industry, aside from those listed above, had more than 3 auditors list it as their area of specialization. 
Technology is listed as a separate industry, despite only 3 specialists, as the client industry in the experimental 
task is technology.
One auditor, who reported having experience with 90 prior audit clients that had going concern doubt, is 
removed from this comparison in order to report less skewed results.
16 auditors reported that they had not dealt with a client that had doubt about its going concern assumption, 




Panel A: Contingency Table of Dichotomous Measure of PI Salience2 (n = 73)
N Freq. N Freq. N Freq.
29 81% 24 65% 53 73%
7 19% 13 35% 20 27%
Panel B: Tests of Statistical Significance of Dichotomous Measure of PI Salience2 (n = 73)
Significance Test Test Statistic p-value
Fisher Exact n/a 0.107 one-tailed
Chi Square 2.26 0.133 two-tailed
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics of Continuous Measure of PI Salience3 (n=73)
N Mean (S.D.) N Mean (S.D.) N Mean (S.D.)
36 4.19 36 4.76 73 4.48
(1.62) (1.12) (1.41)
Panel D: Test of Statistical Significance of Continuous Measure of PI Salience3 (n = 73)
Significance Test Test Statistic p-value




See description of question 1 in Table 2. Measure is adapted from Forehand et al. (2002).
See description of question 2 in Table 2. Measure is adapted from Reed (2004).
Professional Identity (PI) Salience1 Manipulation Checks
Experiment made participant 
think about profession.
Manipulated intervention. Each participant is either presented with verbal and visual cues related to the 
accounting profession that increase the salience of the professional identity (coded 1) or related to tourism and 
vacation so as not to alter professional identity salience in any way (coded 0).


















Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of CI Strength Measure2 (n=73)
N Mean (S.D.) N Mean (S.D.) N Mean (S.D.)
36 2.39 37 3.54 73 2.97
(0.99) (1.30) (1.29)
Panel B: Test of Statistical Significance of CI Strength Measure2 (n = 73)
Significance Test Test Statistic p-value
T-test 4.25 < 0.001 one-tailed
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics of CI Strength-Induced Client Perceptions3 (n=73)
N Mean (S.D.) N Mean (S.D.) N Mean (S.D.)
36 1.22 37 1.16 73 1.19
(1.17) (1.30) (1.23)
36 0.69 37 0.86 73 0.78
(1.41) (1.25) (1.33)
Panel D: Test of Statistical Significance of CI Strength-Induced Client Perceptions3 (n = 73)
Significance Test Test Statistic p-value
T-test: Joint task -0.21 0.837 two-tailed





Responses are collected using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from -3 (Strongly disagree) to +3 (Strongly agree).
The language used in the manipulation of CI strength is intended to increase participants' perceptions (in the high 
CI strength condition) that the audit is a joint task between auditor and client but may have an unintended 
consequence of increasing  participants' perceptions that the client is under pressure to meet reporting deadlines. 
Manipulated intervention. Each participant is either presented with client information that strengthens client 
identity (coded 1) or weakens client identity (coded 0).
Low CI Strength High CI Strength Combined
Low CI Strength High CI Strength Combined
2. The client is under pressure 
to meet reporting deadlines.4
See description of question in the Appendix (p. 170, question 4). Measure is adapted from Aron et al. (2004).
Personal identity overlap with 
client identity.
Client Identity (CI) Strength1 Manipulation Check
1. The audit is a joint task 










4. Confidence in ability to complete task.2 1.30 1.11
Panel B: Correlations (n = 73)
Question 1 Question 2 Question 3 Question 4
Question 1 1.00
Question 2 0.21* 1.00
Question 3 0.51** 0.32** 1.00
Question 4 0.22* -0.20* 0.21* 1.00
** Correlation is significant at p < 0.01, two-tailed
*   Correlation is significant at p < 0.10, two-tailed
Panel C: Multivariate Analysis of Variance of Questions 1-3 (n=73)
F df
CI Strength3 0.34 3 0.794
PI Salience4 1.14 3 0.341
CI Strength x PI Salience 0.87 3 0.464
Panel D: Analysis of Variance of Question 4 (n=73)
F df
CI Strength 0.44 1 0.508
PI Salience 5.16 1 0.026
CI Strength x PI Salience 0.05 1 0.819
1
Responses are collected using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from -3 (Strongly disagree) to +3 (Strongly agree).
2
Responses are collected using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from -3 (Not very confident) to +3 (Very confident).
3
4
Manipulated intervention. Each participant is either presented with client information that strengthens client 
identity (coded 1) or weakens client identity (coded 0).
Manipulated intervention. Each participant is either presented with verbal and visual cues related to the 
accounting profession that increase the salience of the professional identity (coded 1) or related to tourism and 





3. Motivated to complete task.1
1. Realism of case materials.1
2. Audit task is challenging.1





Panel A: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
1. Consider the client cooperative.2 3.67 1.35 4.70 1.20
2. Consider the client trustworthy.3 -0.42 0.97 0.62 1.09
3. Consider the client competent.3 0.31 1.01 0.7 0.94
4. Consider it important to work with 0.53 2.01 1.03 1.61
    client to avoid note disclosure.4
Panel B: Correlations (n = 73)
1
Question 1 Question 2 Question 3 Question 4
Question 1 1.00
Question 2 0.45** 1.00
Question 3 0.31** 0.43** 1.00
Question 4 0.03 -0.04 0.13 1.00
** Correlation is significant at p < 0.01, two-tailed








CI Strength x PI Salience 0.52 1 0.667
Panel D: Analysis of Variance of Question 4 (n=72)
F df
CI Strength 1.16 1 0.285
PI Salience 0.5 1 0.482
CI Strength x PI Salience 0.2 1 0.659
1
 One participant did not respond to the question for Avoid.
2
 Responses are collected using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (Very uncooperative) to 7 (Very cooperative).
3
 Responses are collected using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from -3 (Strongly disagree) to +3 (Strongly agree).
4 
Responses are collected using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from -3 (Not very important) to +3 (Very important).






Manipulated intervention. Each participant is either presented with client information that strengthens client 
identity (coded 1) or weakens client identity (coded 0).
6 
Manipulated intervention. Each participant is either presented with verbal and visual cues related to the accounting 
profession that increase the salience of the professional identity (coded 1) or related to tourism and vacation so as 
not to alter professional identity salience in any way (coded 0).















Panel B: Analysis of Covariance: GC1
Mean
Effect Squares F df p-value
CISt 189.65 0.43  1 0.51
PISa 17.89 0.04  1 0.84
CISt x PISa 1291.46 2.96  1 0.09
PI_Str
4
35.04 0.08  1 0.78




2860.34 6.56  1 0.01
Audits
6





Panel C: Comparison of Low versus High CISt by PISa Condition
Change in
GC1 t-stat p-value 
b
PISa unheightened: Condition B - Condition A 11.90 1.67 0.05
PISa heightened: Condition D - Condition C -5.39 -0.78 0.44
Professional Identity Salience (PISa
3
)
Not Heightened Heightened Overall
Analysis of Initial Going Concern Assessments (GC1) by Client Identity (CI) Strength and 

































Table 10 (Continued) 
2
 Manipulated intervention. Each participant is either presented with client information that strengthens client 
identity (coded 1) or weakens client identity (coded 0).
2
 PI_Str is the extent to which the auditor identifies with the accounting profession. The scale for this measure is 
adapted from Aron et al. (2004) and described in the Appendix (p. 170, question 5); it is equivalent to a 7-point 
Likert scale (range +1 to +7).
6
 Audits is the number of audits participated in per year, as indicated by each individual auditor.
3
 Manipulated intervention. Each participant is either presented with verbal and visual cues related to the accounting 
profession that increase the salience of the professional identity (coded 1) or related to tourism and vacation so as 
not to alter professional identity salience in any way (coded 0).
5
 RightAns is the extent to which the auditor agrees that the going concern issue had a clear right answer. The scale 
ranges from -3 (“strongly disagree”) to +3 (“strongly agree”).
b
 p-values are one-tailed for all tests unless the magnitude of the effect is opposite in direction to hypotheses.
1
 GC1 is the auditor's initial assessment (in percent) of the likelihood that the client meets the going concern 
assumption and will continue to exist for the foreseeable future. A further definition appears in Table 1.
a
 GC1 is adjusted for auditors' perceived ambiguity (RightAns), audits conducted per year (Audits), and professional 
identity strength (PI_Str) by including these variable as covariates in the ANCOVA model. The adjusted means are 





Panel A: Descriptive Statistics: GC1
1
Statistics PI_Str < 4 PI_Str = 4 PI_Str = 5 PI_Str = 6 PI_Str = 7
Overall (n = 73)
Mean 54.50 54.50 51.76 51.08 48.75
(s.d.) (31.49) (24.09) (19.07) (20.48) (20.13)
n 10 10 21 24 8
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics by PI Salience (PISa
3
) Condition: GC1 
Statistics PI_Str = 5











Initial Going Concern Assessments (GC1) by Level of Professional Identity Strength (PI_Str)
Level of PI_Str
2





 GC1 is the auditor's initial assessment (in percent) of the likelihood that the client meets the going concern 
assumption and will continue to exist for the foreseeable future. A further definition appears in Table 1.
4 
The relationship between PI_Str and GC1, when separated into low (≤4), medium (=5), or high (≥6) is insignficant 
both when PISa is not heightened and heightened. No simple t-tests are significant either for comparisons between 




 PI_Str is the extent to which the auditor identifies with the accounting profession. The scale for this measure is 
adapted from Aron et al. (2004) and described in the Appendix (p. 170, question 5); it is equivalent to a 7-point 
Likert scale (range +1 to +7).
3
 Manipulated intervention. Each participant is either presented with verbal and visual cues related to the accounting 
profession that increase the salience of the professional identity (coded 1) or related to tourism and vacation so as 









Treatment B: high CISt/unheightened PISa 17
Treatment D: high CISt/heightened PISa 20
Treatments A & C: low CISt 36
Panel B: Regression: GC1
Coefficient Std Err t    p-value
PI_Str
2
1.79 4.69 0.38 0.71
RightAns
3
-3.69 3.16 -1.17 0.26
Audits
4
0.57 0.66 0.87 0.40




Panel C: Comparison of Control Condition to Treatment Conditions
Difference 
in GC1 t-stat
Treatment Condition B - Control Condition 10.31 1.33
Treatment Condition D - Control Condition -0.70 -0.09
Treatment Conditions A & C - Control Condition 1.55 0.23
1
 GC1 is the auditor's initial assessment (in percent) of the likelihood that the client meets the going concern 







 PI_Str is the extent to which the auditor identifies with the accounting profession. The scale for this measure is 
adapted from Aron et al. (2004) and described in the Appendix (p. 170, question 5); it is equivalent to a 7-point 
Likert scale (range +1 to +7).
0.82
b





 RightAns is the extent to which the auditor agrees that the going concern issue had a clear right answer. The scale 
ranges from -3 (“strongly disagree”) to +3 (“strongly agree”).
4
 Audits is the number of audits participated in per year, as indicated by each individual auditor.





 GC1 is adjusted for auditors' perceived ambiguity (RightAns), audits conducted per year (Audits), and professional 
identity strength (PI_Str) by including these variable as covariates in the regression model. The adjusted means are 









Analysis of Covariance: PersTot
1
Mean
Effect Squares F df p-value
CISt
2
1.42 0.88   1 0.35
PISa
3
2.35 1.46   1 0.23
CISt x PISa 6.18 3.84   1 0.05
PI_Str
4
5.34 3.32   1 0.07
PI_Str x PISa 3.76 2.34   1 0.13
Order
5
2.76 1.72   1 0.20
CISt x Order 6.71 4.18   1 0.05
CISt x PISa x Order 2.90 1.80   1 0.17




2.89 1.80   1 0.18
Audits
7





Analysis of Identity Effects and the Effect of Evidence Order on Overall Evaluation 
of Additional Audit Evidence (PersTot)
6
 RightAns is the extent to which the auditor agrees that the going concern issue had a clear right answer. The scale 
ranges from -3 (“strongly disagree”) to +3 (“strongly agree”).
7
 Audits is the number of audits participated in per year, as indicated by each individual auditor.
2
 Manipulated intervention. Each participant is either presented with client information that strengthens client 
identity (coded 1) or weakens client identity (coded 0).
3
 Manipulated intervention. Each participant is either presented with verbal and visual cues related to the accounting 
profession that increase the salience of the professional identity (coded 1) or related to tourism and vacation so as 
not to alter professional identity salience in any way (coded 0).
4
 PI_Str is the extent to which the auditor identifies with the accounting profession. The scale for this measure is 
adapted from Aron et al. (2004) and described in the Appendix (p. 170, question 5); it is equivalent to a 7-point 
Likert scale (range +1 to +7).
1
 PersTot is the auditor's belief that the combined evidence refutes or supports the client's going concern assumption. 
The scale ranges from -3 ("strongly refutes") to +3 (strongly supports); a further definition appears in Table 1.
5








































































t) 48.18 51.86 50.02
(4.70) (4.78) (3.32)
19 17 36
Analysis of the Change in Agreement with Client: Initial Going Concern Assessments (GC1) 
versus Final Going Concern Assessments (GC2) 
Professional Identity Salience (PISa)
Not Heightened Heightened Overall
Professional Identity Salience (PISa
4
)










Table 14 (Continued) 
Panel C: Repeated Measures Analysis of Covariance: Assess
5
Mean
Effect Squares F df p-value
Within Subjects
Assess 73.74 0.50    1 0.48
Assess x CISt 247.18 1.67    1 0.20
Assess x PISa 216.90 1.47    1 0.23
Assess x CISt x PISa 13.61 0.09    1 0.76
Assess x PI_Str
6
31.97 0.22    1 0.64
Assess x PI_Str x PISa 246.37 1.67    1 0.20
Assess x Order
5
1542.43 10.44  1 0.01
Assess x CISt x Order 201.19 1.36    1 0.25




138.42 0.94    1 0.34
Assess x Audits
6
36.76 0.25    1 0.62
Error 147.69 61
Between Subjects
CISt 14.65 0.02    1 0.88
PISa 351.33 0.54    1 0.47
CISt x PISa 1722.55 2.65    1 0.11
PI_Str 516.04 0.79    1 0.38
PI_Str x PISa 1060.97 1.63    1 0.21
Order 2.76 0.18    1 0.68
CISt x Order 6.71 0.12    1 0.73
CISt x PISa x Order 2.90 1.37    2 0.26
Covariates:
RightAns 1662.71 2.55    1 0.12







Table 14 (Continued) 
8
 RightAns is the extent to which the auditor agrees that the going concern issue had a clear right answer. The scale 
ranges from -3 (“strongly disagree”) to +3 (“strongly agree”).
9
 Audits is the number of audits participated in per year, as indicated by each individual auditor.
2
 GC2 is the auditor's final assessment (in percent) of the likelihood that the client meets the going concern 
assumption and will continue to exist for the foreseeable future. A further definition appears in Table 1.
5
 Assess is the repeated measures factor in the analysis, which represents the initial (GC1) and final (GC2) going 
concern assessments provided by each participant.
4
 Manipulated intervention. Each participant is either presented with verbal and visual cues related to the accounting 
profession that increase the salience of the professional identity (coded 1) or related to tourism and vacation so as 
not to alter professional identity salience in any way (coded 0).
6
 PI_Str is the extent to which the auditor identifies with the accounting profession. The scale for this measure is 
adapted from Aron et al. (2004) and described in the Appendix (p. 170, question 5); it is equivalent to a 7-point 
Likert scale (range +1 to +7).
3
 Manipulated intervention. Each participant is either presented with client information that strengthens client 
identity (coded 1) or weakens client identity (coded 0).
7
 Order = 1 for auditors who received the positive evidence item last and 0 for auditors who received the negative 
evidence item last.
a
 GC1 and GC2 are adjusted for auditors' perceived ambiguity (RightAns), audits conducted per year (Audits), and 
professional identity strength (PI_Str) by including these variable as covariates in an ANCOVA model, which does 
not include the effect of evidence order. The adjusted means are reported here in Panels A and B.
1
 GC1 is the auditor's initial assessment (in percent) of the likelihood that the client meets the going concern 





Panel A: Analysis of Covariance: Approp
1
Mean
Effect Squares F df p-value
CISt
2
1.63 1.09  1 0.30
PISa
3
5.74 3.83  1 0.06
CISt x PISa 0.23 0.15  1 0.70
PI_Str
4
0.71 0.48  1 0.49
PI_Str x PISa 4.46 2.98  1 0.09
Order
5
3.79 2.53  1 0.12
CISt x Order 0.18 0.12  1 0.73
PISa x Order 0.06 0.04  1 0.85
CISt x PISa x Order 10.34 6.91  1 0.01
PI_Str x Order 4.93 3.29  1 0.07




0.57 0.38  1 0.54
Audits
7
8.53 5.70  1 0.02
Public
8





Analysis of Identity Effects and the Effect of Evidence Order on Assessment of the 




Table 15 (Continued) 


















Professional Identity Salience (PISa)
Overall














































































Table 15 (Continued) 
2
 Manipulated intervention. Each participant is either presented with client information that strengthens client 
identity (coded 1) or weakens client identity (coded 0).
7
 Audits is the number of audits participated in per year, as indicated by each individual auditor.
5
 Order = 1 for auditors who received the positive evidence item last and 0 for auditors who received the 
negative evidence item last.
8
 Public = 1 for auditors that have participated in more than one public company audit, and 0 otherwise.
3
 Manipulated intervention. Each participant is either presented with verbal and visual cues related to the 
accounting profession that increase the salience of the professional identity (coded 1) or related to tourism 
and vacation so as not to alter professional identity salience in any way (coded 0).
4
 PI_Str is the extent to which the auditor identifies with the accounting profession. The scale for this measure 
is adapted from Aron et al. (2004) and described in Appendix 1 (p. X, question 5); it is equivalent to a 7-point 
Likert scale (range +1 to +7).
6
 RightAns is the extent to which the auditor agrees that the going concern issue had a clear right answer. The 
scale ranges from -3 (“strongly disagree”) to +3 (“strongly agree”).
1
 Approp is the auditor's assessment of Highpoint's conclusion that no going concern note disclosure is 
needed. The scale ranges from -3 (highly inappropriate) to +3 (highly appropriate). A further definition appears 
in Table 1.
a
 Approp is adjusted for auditors' perceived ambiguity (RightAns), audits conducted per year (Audits), 
experience auditing public companies (Public), and professional identity strength (PI_Str) by including these 









Treatment B: high CISt/unheightened PISa 17
Treatment D: high CISt/heightened PISa 20
Treatments A & C: low CISt 36




Treatment B: high CISt/unheightened PISa 17
Treatment D: high CISt/heightened PISa 20

















Table 16 (Continued) 
Panel C: Repeated Measures Analysis of Covariance: Assess
3
Mean
Squares F df p-value
Within Subjects
Assess 33.08 0.25 1 0.62
Assess x Control
4
163.22 1.24 1 0.27
Assess x PI_Str
5
4.10 0.03 1 0.86
Assess x Order
6
1389.63 10.54 1 0.01




0.29 0.00 1 0.96
Assess x Audits
8
2.31 0.02 1 0.90
Error 131.87 30
Between Subjects
Control 252.83 0.25 1 0.62
PI_Str 211.25 0.21 1 0.65
Order 2552.75 2.48 1 0.13
Control  x Order 0.46 0.00 1 0.98
Covariates:
RightAns 62.13 0.06 1 0.81







Table 16 (Continued) 
7
 RightAns is the extent to which the auditor agrees that the going concern issue had a clear right answer. The scale 
ranges from -3 (“strongly disagree”) to +3 (“strongly agree”).
8
 Audits is the number of audits participated in per year, as indicated by each individual auditor.
6
 Order = 1 for auditors who received the positive evidence item last and 0 for auditors who received the negative 
evidence item last.
4
 Control = 1 for auditors that are assigned to the control condition and 0 for auditors that are assigned to the 
treatment condition where CI strength is manipulated as high and PI salience is manipulated as unheightened.
a 
GC1 and GC2 are adjusted for auditors' perceived ambiguity (RightAns), audits conducted per year (Audits), and 
professional identity strength (PI_Str) by including these variable as covariates in an ANCOVA model, which does 
not include the effect of evidence order. The adjusted means are reported here in Panels A and B.
1
 GC1 is the auditor's initial assessment (in percent) of the likelihood that the client meets the going concern 
assumption and will continue to exist for the foreseeable future. A further definition appears in Table 1.
5
 PI_Str is the extent to which the auditor identifies with the accounting profession. The scale for this measure is 
adapted from Aron et al. (2004) and described in the Appendix (p. 170, question 5); it is equivalent to a 7-point 
Likert scale (range +1 to +7).
2
 GC2 is the auditor's final assessment (in percent) of the likelihood that the client meets the going concern 
assumption and will continue to exist for the foreseeable future. A further definition appears in Table 1.
3
 Assess is the repeated measures factor in the analysis, which represents the initial (GC1) and final (GC2) going 






Mean Median Dev. Minimum Maximum N
1. Experience working in public 5.20 4.00 3.05 3.00 15.00 15
accounting (years):
Standard
Mean Median Dev. Minimum Maximum N
2. Number of audits per year: 11.27 10.00 5.26 6.00 20.00 15
3. Participated in the audit of a public
company: Number Percentage
"No" 7 11%
"Yes, once" 1 7%
"Yes, multiple times" 7 82%
15 100%




5. Industry specialization: Number Percentage
Not-for-profit 2 13%
Manufacturing 2 13%
None Listed 4 27%





Mean Median Dev. Minimum Maximum N
6. Familiar with industry/business -0.67 -1.00 1.54 -3.00 3.00 15
facts described in case materials:
[on a scale of -3 (Strongly disagree) to +3 (Strongly agree)]
Standard
Mean Median Dev. Minimum Maximum N
7. Number of prior audits with going 4.33 2.00 5.72 0.00 20.00 15
concern doubt:




Table 17 (Continued) 
Standard
Mean Median Dev. Minimum Maximum N 1
8. Percentage of prior audits (in Q7) 53% 45% 0.41 2% 100% 12
that resulted in note disclosure:
Standard
Mean Median Dev. Minimum Maximum N 1
9. Percentage of prior audits (in Q7) 14% 0% 0.26 0% 80% 12
that resulted in a qualified opinion:
Standard
Mean Median Dev. Minimum Maximum N
10. Self-perceived sufficient 0.93 2.00 2.05 -3.00 3.00 15
experience with going concern issues:
[on a scale of -3 (Strongly disagree) to +3 (Strongly agree)]
1
Three auditors reported that they had not dealt with a client that had doubt about its going concern 




Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of CI Strength Measure2 (n=15)
N Mean (S.D.) N Mean (S.D.) N Mean (S.D.)
8 1.88 7 3.29 15 2.53
(0.64) (1.38) (1.25)
Panel B: Test of Statistical Significance of CI Strength Measure2 (n = 15)
Significance Test Test Statistic p-value
Mann-Whitney U-test 2.05 < 0.020 one-tailed
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics of CI Strength-Induced Client Perceptions3 (n=15)
N Mean (S.D.) N Mean (S.D.) N Mean (S.D.)
8 1.13 7 1 15 1.07
(1.46) (2.00) (1.67)
8 0.25 7 0.71 15 0.47
(1.49) (1.11) (1.30)
Panel D: Test of Statistical Significance of CI Strength-Induced Client Perceptions3 (n = 73)
Significance Test Test Statistic p-value
U-test: Joint task -0.18 0.857 two-tailed





See description of question in the Appendix (p. 170, question 4). Measure is adapted from Aron et al. (2004).
The language used in the manipulation of CI strength is intended to increase participants' perceptions (in the high 
CI strength condition) that the audit is a joint task between auditor and client but may have an unintended 
consequence of increasing  participants' perceptions that the client is under pressure to meet reporting deadlines. 
Responses are collected using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from -3 (Strongly disagree) to +3 (Strongly agree).
Combined
1. The audit is a joint task 
between auditor and client.4
2. The client is under pressure 
to meet reporting deadlines.4
Manipulated intervention. Each participant is either presented with client information that strengthens client 
identity (coded 1) or weakens client identity (coded 0).
Client Identity (CI) Strength1 Manipulation Check - Study Two
Low CI Strength High CI Strength Combined
Personal identity overlap with 
client identity.










4. Confidence in ability to complete task.2 1.60 1.06




Question 1 0.13 1 0.720
Question 2 0.82 1 0.365
Question 3 0.00 1 0.951
Question 4 0.26 1 0.614
1
Responses are collected using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from -3 (Strongly disagree) to +3 (Strongly agree).
2
Responses are collected using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from -3 (Not very confident) to +3 (Very confident).
3
3. Motivated to complete task.1
p-value 
(two-tailed)
Manipulated intervention. Each participant is either presented with client information that strengthens client 
identity (coded 1) or weakens client identity (coded 0).
Comparison of Perceived Case Material Characteristics and Self-Confidence - Study Two
1. Realism of case materials.1





Panel A: Descriptive Statistics (n=15)
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
1. Consider the client cooperative.1 4.75 0.59 4.86 0.34
2. Consider the client trustworthy.2 -0.75 0.37 0.43 0.37
3. Consider the client competent.2 0.00 0.42 0.86 0.34
4. Consider it important to work with -0.88 0.61 1.00 0.76
    client to avoid note disclosure.4




Question 1 0.00 1 0.476
Question 2 4.14 1 0.021
Question 3 2.18 1 0.020
Question 4 3.32 1 0.034
1
 Responses are collected using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (Very uncooperative) to 7 (Very cooperative).
2
 Responses are collected using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from -3 (Strongly disagree) to +3 (Strongly agree).
3 
Responses are collected using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from -3 (Not very important) to +3 (Very important).
4 
Manipulated intervention. Each participant is either presented with client information that strengthens 
client identity (coded 1) or weakens client identity (coded 0).
p-value 
(one-tailed)
Low CI Strength (n = 8) High CI Strength (n = 7)
Comparison of Perceived Client Characteristics and Desire to Actively Agree with 











Panel B: Analysis of Covariance: GC1
Mean
Effect Squares F df p-value
CISt 211.97 0.41   1 0.54
PI_Str
3




528.32 1.01   1 0.34
Qualified
5






 RightAns is the extent to which the auditor agrees that the going concern issue had a clear right answer. The scale 
ranges from -3 (“strongly disagree”) to +3 (“strongly agree”).
Analysis of Initial Going Concern Assessments (GC1) - Study Two
5
Qualified is the percentage of prior audit clients with going concern doubt that received a qualified audit opinion,
as indicated by each individual auditor.
1
 GC1 is the auditor's initial assessment (in percent) of the likelihood that the client meets the going concern 
assumption and will continue to exist for the foreseeable future. A further definition appears in Table 1.
2
 Manipulated intervention. Each participant is either presented with client information that strengthens client 
identity (coded 1) or weakens client identity (coded 0).
3
 PI_Str is the extent to which the auditor identifies with the accounting profession. The scale for this measure is 
adapted from Aron et al. (2004) and described in the Appendix (p. 170, question 5); it is equivalent to a 7-point 
Likert scale (range +1 to +7).
a
 GC1 is adjusted for auditors' perceived ambiguity (RightAns), prior experience with clients that required a 
qualified opinion regarding the going concern assumption (Qualified), and professional identity strength (PI_Str) by 


















Panel B: Analysis of Covariance: PersTot
Mean
Effect Squares F df p-value
CISt 2.65 0.85   1 0.38
PI_Str
3




3.88 1.24   1 0.29
Qualified
5







 PersTot is adjusted for auditors' perceived ambiguity (RightAns), prior experience with clients that required a 
qualified opinion regarding the going concern assumption (Qualified), and professional identity strength (PI_Str) by 
including these variable as covariates in the ANCOVA model. The adjusted means are reported here in Panel A.
1
 PersTot is the auditor's belief that the combined evidence refutes or supports the client's going concern assumption. 
The scale ranges from -3 ("strongly refutes") to +3 (strongly supports); a further definition appears in Table 1.
5
Qualified is the percentage of prior audit clients with going concern doubt that received a qualified audit opinion,
as indicated by each individual auditor.
2
 Manipulated intervention. Each participant is either presented with client information that strengthens client 
identity (coded 1) or weakens client identity (coded 0).
3
 PI_Str is the extent to which the auditor identifies with the accounting profession. The scale for this measure is 
adapted from Aron et al. (2004) and described in the Appendix (p. 170, question 5); it is equivalent to a 7-point 
Likert scale (range +1 to +7).
4
 RightAns is the extent to which the auditor agrees that the going concern issue had a clear right answer. The scale 
ranges from -3 (“strongly disagree”) to +3 (“strongly agree”).
-1.34 -0.47 -0.90
(0.64) (0.68) (0.46)
Analysis of Overall Evaluation of Additional Audit Evidence (PersTot) - Study Two




















Panel C: Repeated Measures Analysis of Covariance: Assess
4
Mean
Effect Squares F df p-value
Within Subjects
Assess 133.07 0.98   1 0.35
Assess x CISt 49.63 0.37   1 0.56
Assess x PI_Str
5




296.60 2.18   1 0.17
Assess x Qualified
7
10.32 0.08   1 0.79
Error 135.80 10
Between Subjects
CISt 183.46 0.19   1 0.67
PI_Str 1222.01 1.27   1 0.29
Covariates:
RightAns 1010.59 1.05   1 0.33







Analysis of Revisions in Going Concern Assessments - Study Two
Client Identity Strength (CISt)
Low High Overall












Table 23 (Continued) 
a
 GC1 and GC2 are adjusted for auditors' perceived ambiguity (RightAns), prior experience with clients that 
required a qualified opinion regarding the going concern assumption (Qualified), and professional identity strength 
(PI_Str) by including these variable as covariates in the ANCOVA model. The adjusted means are reported here in 
Panels A and B.
7
Qualified is the percentage of prior audit clients with going concern doubt that received a qualified audit opinion,
as indicated by each individual auditor.
1
 GC1 is the auditor's initial assessment (in percent) of the likelihood that the client meets the going concern 
assumption and will continue to exist for the foreseeable future. A further definition appears in Table 1.
3
 Manipulated intervention. Each participant is either presented with client information that strengthens client 
identity (coded 1) or weakens client identity (coded 0).
5
 PI_Str is the extent to which the auditor identifies with the accounting profession. The scale for this measure is 
adapted from Aron et al. (2004) and described in the Appendix (p. 170, question 5); it is equivalent to a 7-point 
Likert scale (range +1 to +7).
6
 RightAns is the extent to which the auditor agrees that the going concern issue had a clear right answer. The scale 
ranges from -3 (“strongly disagree”) to +3 (“strongly agree”).
2
 GC2 is the auditor's final assessment (in percent) of the likelihood that the client meets the going concern 
assumption and will continue to exist for the foreseeable future. A further definition appears in Table 1.
4
 Assess is the repeated measures factor in the analysis, which represents the initial (GC1) and final (GC2) going 











Panel B: Analysis of Covariance: Approp
Mean
Effect Squares F df p-value
CISt 1.16 0.30   1 0.60
PI_Str
3




8.51 2.17   1 0.17
Qualified
5







 Approp is adjusted for auditors' perceived ambiguity (RightAns), prior experience with clients that required a 
qualified opinion regarding the going concern assumption (Qualified), and professional identity strength (PI_Str) by 
including these variable as covariates in the ANCOVA model. The adjusted means are reported here in Panel A.
1
 Approp is the auditor's assessment of Highpoint's conclusion that no going concern note disclosure is needed. The 
scale ranges from -3 (highly inappropriate) to +3 (highly appropriate). A further definition appears in Table 1.
5
Qualified is the percentage of prior audit clients with going concern doubt that received a qualified audit opinion,
as indicated by each individual auditor.
2
 Manipulated intervention. Each participant is either presented with client information that strengthens client 
identity (coded 1) or weakens client identity (coded 0).
3
 PI_Str is the extent to which the auditor identifies with the accounting profession. The scale for this measure is 
adapted from Aron et al. (2004) and described in the Appendix (p. 170, question 5); it is equivalent to a 7-point 
Likert scale (range +1 to +7).
4
 RightAns is the extent to which the auditor agrees that the going concern issue had a clear right answer. The scale 
ranges from -3 (“strongly disagree”) to +3 (“strongly agree”).
-1.54 -0.96 -1.25
(0.71) (0.76) (0.51)
Analysis of Assessment of the Appropriateness of Client Conclusions (Approp) - Study Two








Experimental Instrument – Study One 
Thank you for considering participating in my research study. Participation in this study is voluntary 
and will take approximately thirty minutes of your time. Upon reading this you may choose to 
participate (or not) in the audit task. A decision to participate or not will have no impact on your standing 
as an employee and your supervisor(s) will not know if you participated in the study or not.  
The purpose of this study is to examine the decision processes used by auditors to make audit 
judgments. Therefore, as a participant in this study I invite you to complete a hypothetical audit task 
where you will be asked questions about your evaluation of evidence. Please respond and proceed through 
the case as you would in practice. I realize that your time is valuable but your assistance with this project 
will further knowledge in auditor decision making. 
You may decline to answer any questions presented during the study if you so wish.  All information 
you provide is considered completely confidential; indeed, you will not be asked to identify yourself by 
name at any point in the study. Furthermore, because the interest of this study is in the average responses 
of the entire group of participants, you will not be identified individually in any way in any written 
reports of this research. In addition, the web site is programmed to collect responses alone and will not 
collect any information that could potentially identify you (such as machine identifiers). 
The data, with no personal identifiers, collected from this study will be maintained on a password-
protected computer database in a restricted access area of the university. As well, the data will be 
electronically archived after completion of the study and maintained for two years and then erased. 
Electronic data, on summary not individual results, will be kept indefinitely. Finally, only Tim Bauer and 
members of his thesis committee in the School of Accounting and Finance at the University of Waterloo 
will have access to these materials. There are no known or anticipated risks associated to participation in 
this study.  
I would like to assure you that this study has been reviewed and received ethics clearance through the 
Office of Research Ethics at the University of Waterloo. However, the final decision about participation is 
yours. If you have any comments or concerns resulting from your participation in this study, please 
contact Dr. Susan Sykes of this office at 519-888-4567 Ext. 36005 or ssykes@uwaterloo.ca. 
Consent to Participate 
“With full knowledge of all foregoing, I agree, of my own free will, to participate in this study.” 
[radio button]  “I agree to participate.” 






1.  Age 
 
2. Gender  M    F    
 
3. I have participated in the audit of a public company.  
 
 Yes, on more than one occasion (even if the same firm in multiple years) 
 Yes, but only on one occasion  
 No   
 
4. I work for one of the Big 4 accounting firms. 
 
 Yes  
 No   
 
If yes to 4 
5. I work for the following accounting firm: 
 
 Deloitte 
 Ernst & Young 
 KPMG   
 PWC 
 I would prefer not to disclose that information   
 
If no to 5 
5. I work for the following accounting firm: 
 
 BDO 
 Grant Thornton  
 Meyers, Norris, Penny 
 RSM Richter 
 Other  
 
 
 I would prefer not to disclose that information    
 
6. My current job title is: 
 
 Senior (or level below manager) 
 Manager (or equivalent level)  




Proceed to login 
 
159 
Please do not navigate back through the browser. Doing so will prevent responses from being 
recorded. Once the task is started it must be completed through to the end. You will not be able to log 
out and log back in again later. Please ensure you have allotted sufficient time (approx. 30 minutes) to 
complete the task. 
 
 
Please create a unique username and enter it in the space provided below.  
 













Because this study is concerned with an individual’s decision process it is important that you complete 
this task independently and that no one but you contributes to your responses. Please do not share 
your responses with your colleagues. The username and password are provided to assist you in 
maintaining this unique, confidential, and independent location for your responses. Their purpose is 
twofold. First, they will ensure that no one but me has access to the information you provide; as a 
reminder, I am only interested in aggregate responses and will not identify you individually in any way in 
my research. Second, they will ensure that your responses are solely yours and provide validity to my 

















You are the in-charge auditor on the audit of Highpoint Computer Corporation (Highpoint) for the year 
ended December 31, 2009. Highpoint manufactures and sells real-time computer systems and services 
directly to a diverse group of industries, including gaming, air-traffic control, weather analysis, and 
financial market data services. Highpoint has been involved in this business for 20 years and has 
personnel with significant expertise in all aspects of the business. Highpoint’s common shares are traded 
on the TSX Venture Exchange (TSX-V).   
 
This is a new client for your firm, who successfully bid to provide assurance services to Highpoint during 
the first quarter (Q1) of 2009. The audit for Highpoint was up for bid as a result of Highpoint’s 
mandatory audit partner rotation. Since their audit partner would change, Highpoint thought this would be 
a good time to look at other audit firms.  
 
[High Client Identity Strength Condition]  In discussing the successful bid the engagement partner 
remarked that “the public would view our audit firm as gaining prestige from acquiring Highpoint as a 
client and certainly auditors in our firm would love the opportunity to be assigned to what they view as a 
prestigious audit client.”  
 
[Low Client Identity Strength Condition]  In discussing the successful bid the engagement partner 
remarked that “the public might not see our audit firm as gaining any prestige from acquiring Highpoint 
as a client and certainly our firm has other clients that our auditors view as more prestigious and would 
prefer to be assigned to. In the end though, a win is a win.”  
 
You were recently assigned to the audit after the previous in-charge auditor went on sick leave. 
 
[High Client Identity Strength Condition] Highpoint has received a lot of positive press recently. 
Environmental groups have praised Highpoint for its efforts to recycle production waste, which far 
exceeds the initiatives of its competitors and the industry in general. Further, a well-respected annual 
competition released its results for the current year and included Highpoint in its list of best technology 
companies to work for in Canada. 
 
[Low Client Identity Strength Condition] Highpoint has received a lot of negative press recently. 
Environmental groups have criticized Highpoint for its lack of effort in recycling production waste, 
which lags far behind its competitors and the industry in general. Further, a well-respected annual 
competition released its results for the current year and did not include Highpoint in its list of best 
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Planning Memo – Excerpts 
 
The following are excerpts from the planning memo prepared in Q4 after the audit team’s planning 
meeting for the December 31, 2009 year end. 
 
 In discussing Highpoint’s general business environment, the partner noted that “historically 
Highpoint has had a good share of the market. They have had a high reputation as a good investment 
and as a firm that delivers a quality product. This year remains to be seen, but they have always had 
solid operating margins.” 
 
[High Client Identity Strength Condition]   
 Some strategic decisions of Highpoint have been perceived as big successes by the greater public 
community. Social welfare agencies are sympathetic to business reasons for closing down one of its 
factories but have praised Highpoint for assisting former employees with training of new job skills. In 
Q3, an article in the business press announced that Highpoint would continue to be the lead partner 
with a municipal group for a children’s literacy initiative that includes a new library. The 
municipality claims that Highpoint has been “responsive and easy to deal with” so far. 
 
[Low Client Identity Strength Condition] 
 Some strategic decisions of Highpoint have been perceived as big failures by the greater public 
community. Social welfare agencies are sympathetic to business reasons for closing down one of its 
factories but have criticized Highpoint for not assisting former employees with training of new job 
skills. In Q3, an article in the business press announced that Highpoint was backing out as the lead 
partner with a municipal group for a children’s literacy initiative that included a new library. The 
municipality claims that Highpoint has been “unresponsive and vague” about its reasons for backing 
out.  
 
 The predecessor auditors were engaged for 10 years prior to the change in auditor. An unqualified 
opinion was issued in each of those years. 
 
 Your firm reviewed the working papers of the predecessor auditors; no issues were found, nor 
reported by them with respect to the December 31, 2008 year end or Q1 of 2009 prior to the change 
of auditor.  
 
 At the conclusion of the engagement planning, engagement risk was assessed at a medium level 
based on knowledge and analysis of the client business and industry.  
 
[High Client Identity Strength Condition]   
 Your partner met with management of Highpoint to discuss the current year audit. She remarked that 
“we talked about reporting deadlines and feel that together we can complete our field work, and we 
can get the financial statements issued, on schedule. We hope that this first year audit runs smoothly 
and that we can resolve any problems that arise. We will assist each other in conducting our audit 
field work.” 
 
[Low Client Identity Strength Condition] 
 Your partner met with management of Highpoint to discuss the current year audit. She remarked that 
“they talked about their reporting deadlines; they and I feel that the field work can be completed, and 
the financial statements can be issued, on schedule. Management and I hope that this first year audit 
runs smoothly and that their team and our team can resolve any problems that arise. Their team will 





Please respond to the following questions about the preceding information. You may review the 
previous pages by clicking on the links above. 
 
1. With respect to community involvement and charity, Highpoint: 
 
Is actively involved with children’s literacy. 
Is no longer actively involved with children’s literacy. 
 
2. With respect to the current year audit, Highpoint is: 
 
A long-standing client for your firm. 
A first year client for your firm. 
 
3. With respect to the audit of Highpoint, it is viewed as: 
 
Less prestigious than most other audits. 
More prestigious than most other audits.  
 
4. With respect to social/environmental responsibility, Highpoint:  
 
Is a leader in its industry.  
Lags behind others in its industry. 
 
5. With respect to its industry, Highpoint:  
  
Manufactures and sells real-time computer systems. 
Manufactures and sells pharmaceutical supplies.  
 
6. With respect to satisfaction in the workplace, Highpoint is: 
 
Not included in the list of best employers in the technology industry. 
Considered one of the best employers in the technology industry. 
 
7. With respect to its prior auditor and audit opinions, Highpoint has:  
 
Received an unqualified opinion in each of the past 10 years. 
Received at least one qualified opinion in the past 10 years. 
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[Heightened Professional Identity Salience Condition]                                                                                
 
Before proceeding to the next section of the study I would like to gather some information on the use of 
media provided by the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA). Reaching its 
membership and promoting the CA profession are important issues in recent years and your responses 
will provide some insight into the use of media to achieve this. 
 
The CICA regularly publishes CA Magazine, which is the leading accounting publication for Canadian 
chartered accountants on professional, financial, and other business issues.  
 
















The CICA maintains an extensive website (www.cica.ca) containing news, resources, services, and 
information for chartered accountants in Canada (including CA Magazine). 
 
3. When was the last time you visited the CICA website?  
 
Within the past month 
Within the past 6 months 
Within the last year 
It has been more than a year 
I have never visited the website 
 
4. Recent news on the CICA website reported on the decision to allow CGA’s to issue audit opinions 












[Unheightened Professional Identity Salience Condition]   
 
Before proceeding to the next section of the study I would like to gather some information on the use of 
leisure time in Canada. Work-life balance is an important issue in recent years and your responses will 
provide some insight into the use of leisure time to achieve this. 
 
Tourism Canada has made significant investments and great strides in recent years of encouraging 
Canadians and the world to explore the many destinations and attractions Canada has to offer.  
 








2. How often do you choose to use your vacation time to vacation in Canada? 
 






Tourism Canada maintains an extensive website (www.canada.travel) containing maps, resources, 
services, and travel information for individuals to learn about fun activities found in Canada.  
 
3. When was the last time you visited the Tourism Canada website?  
 
Within the past month 
Within the past 6 months 
Within the last year 
It has been more than a year 
I have never visited the website 
 
4. Recent information on the Tourism Canada website reminded individuals about stricter laws for 
entering or re-entering the US (e.g. passports or NEXUS card required). Would these laws cause you to 












General Audit Procedures and Financial Statement Information 
 
The annual general audit procedures require a review of Highpoint’s assessment of its ability to continue 
to operate as a going concern. Highpoint has assessed its situation and asserts that it meets the going 
concern assumption and that there is no material uncertainty about its ability to continue as a going 
concern and that it will exist for the foreseeable future.  
 
Your partner has asked you to review any and all relevant client information for her and provide your 
assessment of the appropriateness of Highpoint’s above conclusion. She will take this into account in 
making her conclusions.  
 
Specifically, she would like your opinion whether there is material uncertainty about certain events or 
conditions that would cast significant doubt on Highpoint’s ability to continue as a going concern. 
Material uncertainty requires note disclosure in the financial statements; if a client fails to provide 
adequate note disclosure a qualified opinion is further required. 
 
The prior year financial statements did not contain management disclosure of material uncertainty about 
Highpoint’s ability to continue as a going concern. The predecessor auditors issued an unqualified 
opinion and did not provide any documentation indicating a difference of opinion with Highpoint on its 
going concern assumption or material uncertainty. 
 
The CFO has made it known to you that a going concern note in the financial statements would cause 
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HIGHPOINT COMPUTER CORPORATION 
 
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS 
(In thousands of dollars, except share data) 
 
 December 31, 
 2009  2008 
ASSETS    
Current assets:    
 Cash and cash equivalents $    4,275  $    6,874 
 Securities held for trading 12,092   –  
 Accounts receivable net of allowance for doubtful accounts of $1,143    
 (December 31, 2008 - $1,434) 33,538  30,547 
 Inventory 14,020  17,412 
 Other current assets 2,860  5,164 
 Total current assets 66,785  59,996 
Property, plant and equipment, net 39,782  51,080 
Other long-term assets 4,088  6.954 
  Total assets $110,655  $118,031 
    
LIABILITIES AND SHAREHOLDERS’ EQUITY    
Current liabilities:    
 Accounts payable and accrued liabilities $  54,872  $  42,055 
 Deferred revenue  5,488  5,809 
 Current portion of long-term debt 7,505  9,894 
  Total current liabilities 67,775  57,758 
Long-term debt  22,322  11,443 
Other long-term liabilities 12,077  6,625 
 102,174  75,827 
Shareholders’ equity    
 Common shares, authorized 100,000,000; issued 49,424,000     
  (December 31, 2008 – 36,223,000) 101,596  88,096 
 Retained deficit (93,115)  (45,893) 
 8,481  42,204 
 Total liabilities and shareholders' equity $110,655  $118,031 
    
    
 
   
HIGHPOINT COMPUTER CORPORATION 
 
SELECTED CASH FLOW INFORMATION 
(In thousands of dollars) 
 
 Year ended December 31, 
 2009  2008  2007 
Net cash provided by operating activities $    3,928  $  11,099  $    6,232 
Net cash used in investing activities   (3,832)  (6,168)  (9,101) 
Net cash used in financing activities (2,695)  (9,306)  (22,388) 
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HIGHPOINT COMPUTER CORPORATION 
 
CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS AND RETAINED EARNINGS 
(In thousands of dollars, except share data) 
 
 Year ended December 31, 
 2009  2008  2007 
Net sales:      
 Computer systems $  50,916  $  86,489  $120,352 
 Service and other 64,044  81,684  94,486 
  Total net sales 114,960  168,173  214,837 
Cost of sales:      
 Computer systems  32,984  46,367  65,420 
 Service and other 39,658  49,006  58,168 
  Total cost of sales 77,642  95,372  123,588 
Gross margin 42,318  72,800  91,249 
      
Operating expenses:      
 Research and development 16,604  23,357  28,588 
 Selling, general, and administrative 36,214  44,305  58,381 
 Restructuring charge 29,376  2,640  12,672 
  Total operating expenses 82,194  70,302  99,641 
Income (loss) from operations (39,012)  2,498  (8,392) 
Interest and other income (expenses), net (6,350)  (2,866)  (4,006) 
Loss before income taxes and extraordinary item (45,362)  (367)  (12,397) 
Provision for income taxes 1,860  2,040  1,560 
Loss before extraordinary item (47,222)  (2,407)  (13,957) 
Extraordinary loss on extinguishment of debt  –   –  (33,832) 
Net loss (47,222)  (2,407)  (47,789) 
      
Retained earnings (deficit), beginning of year (45,893)  (43,486)  4,303 
Retained earnings (deficit), end of year (93,115)  (45,893)  (43,486) 
      
Loss per share:      
 Loss before extraordinary item (1.55)  (0.08)  (0.49) 
 Extraordinary loss 0.00  0.00  (1.21) 
 Net loss (1.55)  (0.08)  (1.70) 
      
 
Other significant events during the year ended December 31, 2009: 
 
 The industry has continued to change rapidly. Many new competitors entered the market and 
several competitors failed. 
 Net sales fell 31% this year and gross margin percentage declined from 43% to 36%. 
 During 2009, Highpoint completed the sale of one of its least cost-effective factories for liquidity 
purposes. 
 During June, Highpoint acquired the real-time division from one of its largest competitors in 
exchange for common shares and long-term debt. The issues increased the number of shares 
outstanding by 33% and doubled Highpoint’s long-term debt. Management expects the acquired 
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1. Provide a preliminary assessment of the company’s risk of material misstatement. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Low risk  Neutral High risk 
 
2. How confident do you feel about your assessment above? 
 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Not very  Neutral Very 
confident confident 
 
3. Based solely on the financial statement information previously presented, what do you believe is the 
likelihood that the company meets the going concern assumption and will be able to continue to exist for 




4. How confident do you feel about your assessment above? 
 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
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Additional Information Regarding the Audit Issue of Going Concern 
 
To further assess Highpoint’s statement about its ability to continue (and operate as a going concern), 
Highpoint has provided you with requested documentation on various accounts and aspects of its 
business. 
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Markets and Products 
 
Highpoint focuses its business on several strategic target markets: 
 
Simulation: Highpoint’s newly acquired competitor is recognized as a leader in real-time systems for 
simulation. The primary applications for Highpoint’s simulators include commercial and military aviation, 
battle management, and engineering design simulation for avionics and automotive labs. Highpoint 
attempts to provide a real-time advantage by integrating these applications. The market for this class of 
products has grown at a rate of 60% over the past three years. Highpoint’s sales related to this product line 
have decreased at a rate of approximately 30% in the past three years. However, sales of the newly 
acquired competitor have increased at a rate of 70% during this time. This product line accounted for 
approximately 40% of Highpoint’s sales in 2009. 
 
Data Acquisition: Highpoint provides radar data processing and control systems for national weather 
programs. Other customers include the Navy and NASA. The market for this class of products has not 
grown significantly in the past three years. Highpoint’s sales related to this product line have decreased at 
a rate of 10% per year. This product line accounted for approximately 25% of Highpoint’s sales in 2009. 
 
Interactive Real-Time: Highpoint is pursuing this growth market. The products Highpoint provides 
span such industries as gaming, hotels, and airline. Highpoint has attempted to position itself as a supplier 
of server technology for customers who require reliable delivery of multiple streams of high quality video. 
Highpoint is the largest provider of systems for the gaming industry. The market for this class of products 
has grown at a rate of 100% over the past three years. Highpoint’s sales related to this product line have 
increased at a rate proportional to the market. This product line accounted for approximately 20% of 
Highpoint’s sales in 2009. 
 
Telecommunications: Highpoint is focusing on the ever-expanding market for cellular data 
communications and wireless gateways. Highpoint has, together with a software supplier, developed a 
system for wireless communications that require data transfers, protocol conversions, and other interfaces 
with on-line service providers. The market for this class of products has grown at a rate of 60% over the 
past three years. Highpoint’s sales related to this product line have increased at a rate of 30% per year. 





1. How strongly does the above evidence refute or support the company’s going concern assumption 
that it will continue to exist for the foreseeable future?  
 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Strongly   Neutral Strongly 
refutes supports 
 
2. How confident do you feel about your assessment above? 
 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
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Highpoint Computer Corporation 
Subsequent Events and Jan/Feb Financial Data 
 
 Selected Financial Data (in 000’s of dollars) 
     
Income Statement Data  Jan-Feb, 2010  Jan-Feb 2009 
Net sales  18,597  19,659 
Cost of sales  11,346  10,650 
Gross margin  7,251  9,009 
Other expenses  14,724  12,068 
Net income  (7,473)  (3,059) 
     
Balance Sheet Data  Feb 28, 2010  Feb 28, 2009 
Cash and securities  7,009  16,367 
Other current assets  49,091  50,419 
Total assets  102,397  110,655 
Current liabilities  67,809  67,775 
Total liabilities  99,389  102,174 
Shareholder’s equity  2,738  8,481 
     
Cash Flow Data  Jan-Feb, 2010  Jan-Feb 2009 
Cash from (used by) operations  (2,435)  25 
Cash from investing  123  556 
Cash from (used by) financing  16  (1,672) 
Net cash flows  (2,296)  (1,091) 
 
Other Subsequent Events 
 
Highpoint entered into a contract for a sale-leaseback transaction on one of its manufacturing facilities. 
The transaction is expected to close later this year. 75% of the net $4.3 million in proceeds will be used to 
repay a portion of the long-term debt owed to the other party in this transaction. The remaining $1.1 
million will be used for working capital purposes. The agreement is contingent upon the buyer’s ability to 
lease approximately 100,000 square feet of area in the building to third parties and management is not 
assured that the transaction will be completed as contemplated.  
 
Management states that the slow sales during the first two months are due to slower than expected 
transitioning with the new acquisition. However, management believes that product sales will increase as 
the year progresses. 
 





1. How strongly does the above evidence refute or support the company’s going concern assumption 
that it will continue to exist for the foreseeable future?  
 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Strongly   Neutral Strongly 
refutes supports 
 
2. How confident do you feel about your assessment above? 
 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
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1. How strongly did all the previous sources of evidence, taken all together, refute or support the 
company’s going concern assumption that it will continue to exist for the foreseeable future?   
 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Strongly   Neutral Strongly 
refutes supports 
 
2. How confident do you feel about your assessment above? 
 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Not very   Neutral Very 
confident confident 
 
3. After viewing the evidence presented, what do you believe is the likelihood that the company meets 




4. How confident do you feel about your assessment above? 
 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Not very   Neutral Very 
confident confident 
 
5. How appropriate is the client’s conclusion that there is no material uncertainty about its ability to 
continue as a going concern and thus no note disclosure is needed? 
 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Highly Neutral Highly 
inappropriate appropriate 
 
6. How confident do you feel about your assessment above? 
 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Not very   Neutral Very 
confident confident 
 
7. How important is it to negotiate or work with Highpoint in order to avoid note disclosure or a 
qualified opinion regarding the going concern assumption? 
 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 











Please respond to the following questions. 
 
1. Tell me about yourself in your own words. Feel free to list anything that describes you as a 






















2. To what extent has the information in this experiment made you think about the accounting 
profession and the values, attributes, and qualities you possess as a member of this profession? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Gave it little  Neutral Gave it much 
thought thought 
 
3. To what extent has the information in this experiment made you think about whether your personal 
values, attributes, and qualities relate to the values, attributes, and qualities of the client? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 





4. Select the picture below that best describes how your personal attributes, qualities, and values align 













        
 
5. Select the picture below that best describes how your personal attributes, qualities, and values align 













        
 
6. To what extent do you agree that the accounting issue (going concern) had a clear right answer? 
 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Strongly  Neutral Strongly 
disagree agree 
 
7. Based on the information provided about the client, I consider the client to be trustworthy.  
 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Strongly  Neutral Strongly 
disagree agree 
 
8. Based on the information provided about the client, I consider the client to be competent.  
 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Strongly  Neutral Strongly 
disagree agree 
Self       Highpoint Self        Highpoint Self        Highpoint 
Self           Highpoint 
Self         Highpoint 
Self             Highpoint Self       Highpoint 
Self     Profession Self       Profession Self       Profession Self         Profession 
Self           Profession Self             Profession Self        Profession 
 
176 
9. Imagine that another accounting issue arises that will require the client to provide you with a 
significant amount of documentation and additional information. How cooperative do you think the client 
will be in providing you with the details requested? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very Neutral Very 
uncooperative cooperative 
 
10. Highpoint appeared to be under pressure to meet tight reporting deadlines. 
 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Strongly  Neutral Strongly 
disagree agree 
 
11. The nature and timing of audit field work (including reporting) was a joint task with Highpoint. 
 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Strongly  Neutral Strongly 
disagree agree 
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Given the limitations on time and information in an experiment, please respond to the following two 
questions. 
 
13. The experimental task was realistic to the audit duties I perform on a regular basis. 
  
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Strongly  Neutral Strongly 
disagree agree 
 
14. How confident did you feel in your ability to complete the audit task and provide an appropriate 
assessment? 
  
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Not very   Neutral Very 
confident confident 
 
Please also respond to the following questions. 
 
15. I feel I have sufficient experience dealing with going concern issues. 
  
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Strongly  Neutral Strongly 
disagree agree 
 
16. I was familiar with the particular client business/industry facts detailed in the case. 
  
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Strongly  Neutral Strongly 
disagree agree 
 
17. The task provided a challenge to me. 
  
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Strongly  Neutral Strongly 
disagree agree 
 
18. Once I began the experimental task I felt motivated to complete it. 
 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Strongly  Neutral Strongly 
disagree agree 
 
19. Approximately how many audits have you participated in where there was substantial doubt about 




20. Approximately what percentage of those audits resulted in the client providing note disclosure 

















24. If you have an industry specialization (e.g. Manufacturing, Financial Institutions, etc.) please 
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Thank you for completing my study. Below you may make 
comments about the information given to you or make any other 
general comments you may have. 
 
































Experimental Instrument – Modifications for Study Two 
[Professional Identity Salience Manipulation is Removed] 
 
 
[Additional Piece of Positive Evidence is Removed] 
 
 
[Second Additional Piece of Negative Evidence] 
 
Financing and Liquidity Information 
 
During 2009, Highpoint entered into new agreement providing for a $17.6 million credit facility with a 
5.5% interest rate, which matures on September 1, 2012. As of December 31, 2009, the outstanding 
balance under the credit facility is approximately $14.1 million, of which $6.5 million is classified as a 
current liability. The remainder is due at the rate of $150,000 per month until it is paid off in September, 
2012 in a single lump-sum payment. The facility may be repaid and reborrowed at any time without 
penalty. Highpoint has pledged as collateral substantially all of its assets. In the event of a sale or sale-
leaseback of its largest facility, Highpoint would be required to make a prepayment on the credit facility 
equal to 75% of the net proceeds from the sale. Management has no other borrowing facilities 
available at the present time. 
 
Management expects that the acquisition of its largest competitor and its continued integration of the 
businesses will improve Highpoint s liquidity through improved operating performance and the planned 
disposition of its largest manufacturing facility. Future liquidity is highly dependent on the revenue 
growth expected during the upcoming period. 
 
As of December 31, 2009, the company has $4.3 million in cash on hand, a decrease of $2.6 million from 
the prior year. However, Highpoint holds publicly traded shares with a market value of $12.1 million as of 






1. How strongly does the above evidence refute or support the company’s going concern assumption 
that it will continue to exist for the foreseeable future?  
 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Strongly   Neutral Strongly 
refutes supports 
 
2. How confident do you feel about your assessment above? 
 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
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